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ABSTRACT 
There are ongoing debates about the concept of continuity and discontinuity in American 
foreign policy. This research has focused on whether the controversial George W. Bush`s 
rhetoric can be seen as radical new or as a traditional element in American foreign policy.   
According to researchers such as Sven Melby, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, George 
W. Bush can be seen as a revolutionary president. George W. Bush rhetoric was aggressive 
and dualistic. With his polarization of the world into good and evil spheres, he must carry 
much of the responsibility for his hawkish image, they claim. 
Not all agrees to a presentation like this one. Researchers such as Melvyn P. Leffler, John 
Lewis Gaddis, Robert Kagan and Walter Russell Mead argue more for continuity. Walter 
Russell Mead operates with four traditions in American policy. According to Mead, these 
traditions were present under Bush. These traditions are: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, 
Wilsonian, and Jacksonian.   
In searching for answers, this research investigated speeches and statements from two 
American president`s by focusing on time of crisis and the relation to “the others.” The 
controversial Harry S. Truman`s rhetoric has been compared with George W. Bush`s in 
relation to the Wilsonian and Jacksonian traditions. Truman and Bush can be seen as 
representatives not only for the Wilsonian and the Jacksonian tradition, but also the same 
aspects and variations within these typologies.   
Looking at it historically, it can be discussed whether Bush`s sharp tone was a new 
phenomenon in American politics. An aggressive and dualistic style seems to be little 
revolutionary in American politics. Much indicates that George W. Bush was one of several 
carriers of continuity in the U.S. politics. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 George W. Bush and the Debate Between Continuity and Discontinuity 
Among internationally oriented researchers there are ongoing debates about the concept of 
continuity and discontinuity in American foreign policy. A recurrent theme of the discussion 
is to what extent the U.S. foreign policy have changed after the fall of the wall and 9/11. With 
Soviet Union's collapse a structural change appears to be evident. United States must no 
longer deal with a bipolar system. The country has become a hegemonic power in an almost 
unipolar system. Although the U.S. role in the world trade appears to weaken, the nation 
frequently shows muscles as a fearsome war-hungry nation (Sadar and Davies 2002:78).  
The focus on the U.S. as a new and more powerful state was especially present during George 
W. Bush`s presidency. During the Bush era several nations were threatened, and some were 
attacked. A majority of Europeans saw themselves in opposition to the U.S. behavior 
(Lanford and Tashev 2005, Kagan 2003). Much of the U.S. confidence in the world 
community was broken down, due to Bush and his illegal interventions and frequently 
rhetorical assault against a number of nations.  
In this context, some researchers saw Bush as a revolutionary phenomenon in American 
foreign policy. According to one of the discontinuity researchers, Svein Melby, it was only a 
matter of time before the U.S. unique position of strength after the Cold War would lead to a 
change in the country's foreign policy. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI) researcher argues that 9/11 was the excuse the U.S. needed to increase the 
aggressiveness (Melby 2004:166). In “The Bush Revolution in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Melby 
consistently refers to Bush as an American president that has changed the United States. In 
Melby`s eyes, Bush took a final farewell with Harry S. Truman's defensive policy of 
containment (Melby 2004:17).  
Melby, places himself within a larger tradition of researchers. In Ivo H. Daalder and James M. 
Lindsay “America Unbound, the Bush Revolution In Foreign Policy”, Bush is being fronted 
as a radical new element. Daalder and Lindsay write that Bush turned the U.S. foreign policy 
on its head (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:12). The philosopher Peter Singer sees Bush as the 
hugest moralist ever becoming president (Singer 2004:2). Bush is being portrayed as more 
aggressive and dualistic than any previous president, especially when it comes to his rhetoric. 
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This discontinuity aspect is not an understanding all researchers share. The Cold War 
historian Melvyn P. Leffler found little new with Bush (Singh 2006:175) and the political 
scientist Robert Kagan argues that the U.S. only became more of itself after 9/11 (Kagan 
2008). In “Special Providence” the former pupil of Henry Kissinger, Walter Russell Mead, is 
arguing for the existence of four traditions in American politics regardless of president (Mead 
2002). It is in the light of this intense foreign policy debate I will examine whether Bush was 
a new element, or only one of several carriers of continuity in the U.S. politics. 
1.2 Defining the Paper Thematically 
One major motivation behind this research is to see how Bush has broken down the U.S. 
confidence in the global community. The skepticism toward the U.S. under the leadership of 
George W. Bush can be compared with late 60`s and early 70`s, and the war in Vietnam. Like 
the Johnson and Nixon-administration, Bush has made strong anti-American sentiments. 
Large protest-movements have united across national borders against the United States. Both 
in the media and among scholars the connotations of George W. Bush were negative: stupid, 
ignorant, cowboy, imperialist and warlike were typical descriptions of him as a president.  
With his polarization of the world into good and evil spheres, Bush has to carry much of the 
responsibility for this image. There is no need for discussing whether Bush was aggressive or 
not. What can be discussed is whether Bush's sharp tone is a new phenomenon in American 
politics. Could it be that the Bush critics disliked his value-conservative policy so strongly 
that they were emotionally involved? Perhaps political values and science have been mixed up 
in terms of researching the phenomenon of George W. Bush.  
This research will focus on whether George W. Bush`s rhetoric is comparable to former 
president`s. Have we heard the aggressive and dualistic tone before? Or has the discontinuity 
research a point in seeing Bush as one who surpassed his predecessors in aggressiveness and 
dualism? I will approach this debate by comparing presidential speeches and statements. It is 
possible to imagine that almost all presidents mention "the others” in a condescending 
manner. ”The others” will be an important concept in this task. The others” refers to the 
fundamentalist Islamist and Communist groups.  
The concept of "the others" is taken from Edward Said`s “Orientalism”, the Palestinian 
professor who was arguing for a current tradition where the Western World acted 
condescending against "the others." 
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A short historical overview shows that a number of president`s have used a tough 
phraseology. Thomas Jefferson, the great author of the Constitution with its principles of 
liberty and equality, is the man behind the characterization on Muslims as: "Treacherous 
Villains" (Eide and Ottoson 2002:21), Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized the Soviet Union 
as an empire of "Godless terrorism" (Lawrence and Jewett 2003:89). Lyndon B. Johnson told 
during the Vietnam War that he wanted to: “Whoop the hell out of èm and kill and some of 
èm” (Fog of the War: 2003 documentary).  
Ronald Regan spoke of: "the Evil Empire". Bill Clinton talked about the: "Evil Cowards" 
(Eide and Ottosen 2002:34). Even the idealistic Jimmy Carter could be confrontational in his 
style, as when he told that the Soviet Union could expect a war if they were obstructing the 
U.S. interests in the Middle-East (Morris 1996:276). 
Examples like these can illustrate that some parts of the criticism against Bush has evolved 
into a grassroots-like and unreflected fashion campaign. On the internet, Bush is being 
compared with everything from Adolf Hitler to monkeys. The presentation of the president is 
simplified. By simplifying, I mean overlooking historical perspectives, and embracing 
political values in a larger degree than empirical history. In doing so, it may turn out to be a 
failure to describe Bush as a radical president. However, it is not unthinkable that revolution 
is a striking characteristic of the president. George W. Bush seems to be especially aggressive 
and dualistic with many of his expressions. ”Axis of evil”, ”Hunt them down”, ”Evildoers” 
and ”Crusade for freedom” are some examples of his harsh rhetoric.  
Whether the revolution arguments live up to a scientific standard, will be tested empirically in 
relation to a selection of speeches from another president. With his rhetoric about the evil of 
”the others” Ronald Reagan could have worked well as a basis for comparison with Bush. But 
such a comparison has little new in it. There is nothing innovative about comparing two 
typical right-wing republican hard-liners. Therefore, I will take a daring chance in my 
comparative selection. My sample of speeches will consist of a comparison of the Democrat 
Harry S. Truman and the Republican George W. Bush.  
Why Truman is chosen will further be explained under heading 1,4. As a starting point in the 
debate between continuity and discontinuity this research has a twofold thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
1.3 Introducing and Explaining the Thesis 
Let me begin the first thesis by asking the question: Is it so that George W. Bush represented 
radically new elements in his speeches in relation to”the others”, compared with Harry 
Truman? Or is it possible to talk about historical continuity in the U.S. policy in this area?  
This task cannot give answers to the major international issues, only parts of the debate 
between break and continuity. The purpose is to provide an indication on how far we can see 
discontinuity or continuity through the use of speeches and statements of sources. This survey 
will have a primary focus on the presidents in their relation to "the others". How they refer to 
"the others" in the speeches and statements is my primary focus.  
When it comes to what kind of speeches and statements I refer to, I will focus mainly on 
presidential rhetoric in situations where they have faced serious foreign crises in American 
history. Most of the speeches and statements for the basis analyze will have their origins from 
turbulent times in American history. For Truman, this is mainly in the negotiations with the 
Russians after the war, and in his second term, after 1948. George W. Bush met on his side a 
climax in the context after 9/11 and the Iraq War. A series of speeches and statements will be 
based on the rhetoric surrounding the Iraq-and the Korean War. 
The content in the speeches will be considered in relation to Walter Russell Mead`s traditions. 
Mead claims that four traditions, named after former American politicians, are always present 
in the U.S. foreign policy (Mead 2002). These traditions will be more comprehensively 
commented on in chapter two under the theory and research section, and is only a brief 
introduction. The Hamiltonian favor American business (the economic tradition). Jeffersonian 
thinks that the U.S. should stay away from the dangerous world (the isolationistic tradition). 
The Wilsonian promoted the idea that the United States should spread democracy (the 
idealistic tradition). In the last tradition, the Jacksonian, tough and simple attitudes are ideals 
(the cowboy-tradition).  
This survey is focusing on two of these traditions, the Wilsonian and the Jacksonian. If the 
president`s have links to Mead`s traditions, it will illuminate continuity or some degree of it. 
Chapter three and four will comment on whether they belong to the traditions such as Mead 
understands them. But as we shall see in chapter two, Mead is simplifying the continuity in 
American politics.  
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Therefore, I have added some additional theory to Mead`s understanding by introducing 
different types and aspects of Jacksonian and Wilsonian traditions. If Bush and Truman turn 
out to be representative for the same aspects and directions within this tradition, it can further 
strengthen the continuity claim. That`s the reason why I raise this second thesis by asking: 
Are Bush and Truman members of the Wilsonian and Jacksonian traditions? And, are they the 
same kind of Wilsonians and Jacksonians?  
1.4 Why Comparing Harry Truman with George W. Bush? 
Comparing Harry S. Truman with George W. Bush is done mainly out of two reasons. First, it 
is a desire to make the paper concise and to the point. Truman in relation to Bush is an 
unusual comparison. Potential links between these president`s would be more innovative than 
links between hard-liners. Second, Truman was a conscious choice because it is precisely this 
president that Melby believes Bush distanced himself from (Melby 2004:17). Let us take a 
brief look at these presidents. Who are they? 
Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) was a former Missouri senator, who became president after the 
death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Truman is controversial as president. Some sees him as a 
dove in international politics, others as a hawk. Those who front a positive image of the 
president regard him as a hero, one that saved the world from a World War III. His focus on 
institution building, defensive policy of containment and human rights is often highlighted 
(Kirkendale 2004:6,15). Among those who want to draw a positive picture of the president we 
have David McCullough, author of the Pulitzer-winning biography “Truman”, and the 
historian Wilson D. Miscamble`s “From Roosevelt to Truman.” These two claim that Truman 
wanted peace and reconciliation with the communists. It might appear strange that someone 
will draw parallels to George W. Bush.  
The former Texan Governor, George W. Bush (1946-) became president after he defeated Al 
Gore in the dramatic 2000 election. Bush is often described as an arch-typical political hard-
liner in his fight against terrorists (Melby 2004, Daalder and Lindsay 2005). To a large extent, 
these president`s verdict of history can be related to their success in the fight against "the 
others." Both went off as the extremely unpopular president`s (Kirkendale 2004:2).  
Both had started wars in the periphery, in Iraq and Korea, and they were widely regarded as 
tough president`s in their response to "the others". Moreover, Truman and Bush had little 
knowledge and experience in foreign policy when they became president`s.  
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They were representatives of Heartland America, using a simple, folk-oriented rhetoric. Even 
in international settings and public speeches they used a simple rhetoric. With Bush, this 
careless rhetoric was perhaps a bit surprising. He received after all diplomatic training from 
political veterans such as Henry Kissinger and George Schultz (Daalder and Lindsay 
2005:30). Despite the training, George W. Bush had little knowledge about foreign policy`s 
issues in the election campaign in 2000 (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:32). Harry Truman was 
vice president, but was little involved in the foreign policy planning. Wilson D. Miscamble 
has shown that Roosevelt failed to inform Truman about important foreign policy issues. In 
the Manhattan Project and in negotiations with Stalin and Churchill, Truman was excluded 
from the process (Miscamle 2007:94). Miscamble`s headline, “Knowing Nothing About 
Foreign Policy”, is an adequate formulation for underlining the lack of experience Truman 
had in this area.  
Although the president`s were inexperienced, they learned quickly. They made clear traces in 
international politics. Both can be fronted as representatives of a new era, or a new world 
order as well. After the Second World War, Truman faced a new international situation. The 
Americans soon understood that Russia would become a rival superpower and that they had to 
enter an ideological, geopolitical, economical battle. New measures were then needed in the 
security policy. In the Truman period, 1945-1953 the United Nations, NATO, CIA, IMF and 
the basis for the containment policy were created. Also under Bush it can be argued for a new 
world structure. After the Cold War it was difficult to identify who the enemy was, and when 
the enemy could strike back in the global world community. After 9/11 Bush responded to the 
challenges by increasing resources on new agencies such as Homeland Security. The 
President made use of anti-terror laws and preemptive warfare against his enemies.  
In the history profession there is often a battle of what`s the real truth. In fact this is a highly 
complicated matter. Even if Truman has been portrayed as a nearby saving angel or a 
necessary hard-liner, he has also been criticized. Arguments like, Truman was embracing a 
defensive containment policy (Melby 2004:17), will not be recognized by all scientists. The 
Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis shows that Truman in 1948 started an increasingly 
aggressive policy of containment (Gaddis 2005:81).  
Truman is also portrayed as an aggressive head of state by the historian Thomas Patterson, 
who draws a picture of a tough and simple president blinded by anti-communism. Patterson 
argues that Truman regarded communists as red devils and Fascists (Patterson 1988:12-13). 
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He was a president who saw relentlessly on America's enemies (Patterson 1988:38). Melvyn 
P. Leffler emphasizes that Truman had a very simple world view. He saw the world in black 
and white (Leffler 2007:41). The presidential scholar Robert Ferrell follows the same line of 
thinking. He describes Truman as a plain-speaking ordinary fellow (Ferrell 1984:135).  
All these descriptions could easily have been given about George W. Bush. In addition to this, 
several factors indicate that Truman broke with Roosevelt's conciliatory style in relation to the 
Russians. The fact that the President scolded the Russians, asked them to go to hell and 
threatened with nuclear weapons, made the climate tense. He was responsible for much of the 
escalation of the Cold War (Moen 2008:426).  
On the other hand, Truman never rolled communism back in Eastern Europe. He wanted no 
domestic anti-communistic legislation and provided several veto’s against such proposals. He 
took a stand against the extreme anti-communists like Joseph McCarthy and Douglas 
MacArthur. However, it is not without a reason Truman was admired by George W. Bush and 
other hawks in American politics (Moen 2008:435). Even though he was distancing himself 
from the extremely anti-communistic forces, he did not reject them. Truman was probably 
influenced or pressured by anti-communist movements in the American society. The 
President became known for his hard-line and skepticism towards double talk (Medhurst and 
Scott 1997:74). The nickname ”Give em hell, Harry” tells that Truman could be clear in his 
message.  
Looking at it this way, it can be productive to compare the former Missouri-Senator with 
Bush. Which face Truman really showed toward "the others" remains to be seen in analyzing 
his formulations. A brief glance at the speeches may indicate that Truman disliked 
communists. The main question is whether Truman was just as skeptical to”the others” as 
Bush? Or expressed in relation to this tasks theory: Are Truman and Bush Wilsonians and 
Jacksonians, and are they the same type of these traditions? 
1.5 Sources and Methology 
Most of the speeches and statements are found on the web. Some hand-written speeches have 
been sent from the Truman Library and Research Center in Missouri. The number of special 
individual statements which is included in my source material are to be found in biographies 
and books related to these president`s.  
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Speeches as sources can provide a solid overview of president`s policy toward ”the others.” 
But as we shall see, speeches have clearly weaknesses. Essentially, there are two weaknesses 
using this kind of source: 
Weakness number one: representativeness: 
How representative the speeches and statements really are for a president`s policies can turn 
out to be a problem. The final content in a speech is often a result of what kind of voices 
whom gains most power in promoting their view. The battle of the final words is a struggle 
between competing wings. In the Truman-administration, this seems to be the case between 
Dean Acheson, a hard-liner, and Henry T. Wallace, a soft-liner. The Bush administration 
experienced also an ideological battle between the hawk Donald Rumsfeld versus the realist 
Colin Powell. 
 This means that a president`s policy and rhetoric consists of variations. A president has a 
great deal of staff members. One consequence of this can be little room for personal design on 
speeches. Under Bush, this appears to be the case. He seems to have been strongly influenced 
by the advice of heavy political ideologues like Karl Rove and Richard Perle (on Rove: 
Draper 2007:100-102. on Pearle: Melby 2004:78). Truman had a somewhat different 
situation. In “Presidential Speechwriting” Martin Meadhurst tells that Truman had a tendency 
to put a personal touch to the speeches (Medhurst /Ritter 2004:43). This could mean that 
Truman`s speeches to a greater extent than Bush, are less representative of the administration 
as a whole.  
Reducing the weakness:  
In trying to make the speeches as representative for the administration as possible, I have 
chosen to investigate speeches that have been thoroughly discussed and debated by the 
administration. This is particularly public speeches like the president`s doctrines, the State of 
Union and Annual Addresses. The doctrines are important because they show the main core in 
a presidential policy, while in the State of the Union and Annual Address many considerations 
are included in order to win support. In this case the political administration`s remarks are 
reflected, not only single personalities or wings in the politics. 
Weakness number two: disparity between words and action:  
I am also aware of the dangers involved in focusing on speeches, particularly the disparity 
between, what is being said and what`s the real action.  
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Bush and Truman could threaten "the others" repeatedly. However, there was made no action 
out of the threat. On the other hand, occasionally politicians talk like diplomats before going 
to war.  
Reducing the weakness: 
This weakness can be reduced by including the context. Both presidents faced strong 
challenges in which the harsh rhetoric in many cases was followed up by real action. I will put 
up several speeches and statements made in situations where the presidents are forced or 
expected to act in a nearly churchillian way. If Truman and Bush in their contextual situation 
are applying a similar response pattern, this is highly valued in a continuity perspective.  
Although the study of rhetoric has weaknesses, it is also a good source for getting 
information. It is through speeches that culture manifests itself. In speeches and statements we 
can find information about how the U.S. regarded the world, and not at least, how they 
wanted to promote themselves and ”the others.” The professor in communication theory 
Robert F. Scott, claims in “the Cold War and Rhetoric” that words and reality are more 
integrated with each other than many realize (Scott 2001:7). In fact, all sources have 
weaknesses, something which makes it difficult to conclude with one hundred percent 
accuracy.  
It is unlikely that the speeches are less uncertain than other types of sources. If I had been 
doing a survey on the continuity-discontinuity by using military budget as a source, it would 
have been weakness here as well. It is not certain that an increase in a military budget under a 
president is synonymous with increased hatred against "the others."  
History is not physics. We cannot predict the future with the same certainty that a physicist 
can chart the trajectory and velocity of a falling object. My analysis of words cannot tell 
anything with one hundred percent accuracy, but it will be a source to some vital information 
about tendencies toward break or continuity in American foreign policy. 
Methodological work on speeches and statements 
This research area, the U.S. foreign policy, has a rich theoretical basis. This can be seen as 
strength where it is possible to include several fruitful approaches. I will refer to key literature 
and theory after advice given by researchers and experts such as Ole O. Moen and Olof 
Kronvalla.  
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In my material, it is clear that the scientific principle of neutrality is not always respected. The 
theme is often politically biased. Several of the researchers have a political background from a 
certain administration in which they served in vital positions.  
It may therefore be sensible to create more or less equilibrium between the categories: liberal-
conservative, Democrat-Republican and realist-idealist. When this diverse spectrum of the 
theory is used, it will be of great help in the interpretation of speeches. In examining the 
speeches only some factors will be the subject of analysis. My focus is on how the presidents 
understand themselves in relation to "the others."  
By searching after a certain type of formulations in the speeches, presidential aggressiveness 
and dualism, this paper uses a qualitative method. This is the best approach in order to get a 
broad insight into the presidents understanding of “us” and “them.” A number of places the 
analysis is simple. The presidents talk directly by referring to”the others” as: monsters, 
terrorists, murders, totalitarians. However, connotation of words is important to include as an 
analytical method. Truman and Bush`s formulations will be seen in relation to the context. 
Despite the fact that both referred to the formulation “crusade” it does not mean that these 
president`s appeared identical. Things have different connotations in relation to whom they 
were speaking to, and at what time/space they are saying it.  
In including a historical perspective it is possible to see what`s lying behind their 
formulations. Already on an early stage it appears that the fear of "the others" is a profound 
common denominator. As we shall see in the following chapters the challenges these 
president`s meet influenced their rhetoric. The next chapter will provide some comments 
about this papers central research and theory, something which includes introducing my 
additional theory.  
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH AND THEORY: CONTINUITY VERSUS 
DISCONTINUTY   
2.1 Svein Melby and the Bush Revolution 
As one of the representatives for the discontinuity research, Melby is pretty clear in arguing 
that Bush represented a revolution. In his reader-friendly, “The Bush Revolution in American 
Foreign Policy” and in the more scientific research report “Hegemonens Hamskifte”, Melby 
characterizes the Bush presidency as a revolution. Yet Melby recognizes parts in Mead's 
thinking. He agrees that the four traditions provide a good explanation of the U.S. foreign 
policy and its conduct. He refers to Mead in order to explain the large-scale and generally 
structural picture of America. But despite nuances, Melby recurrently promotes Bush as the 
most aggressive Jacksonian and dualistic Wilsonian president ever. Mead`s theory is seen 
more as a general idea or as an abstract structural explanation, than as a concrete description 
of the U.S. foreign policy. Melby provides the following three arguments for seeing Bush as a 
new element in American foreign policy: 
1) The President`s dualism: Bush perceived the world as a struggle between good and evil. He 
was more moral and religious oriented than previous presidents. His rhetoric was simple and 
religious. The image of ”the others” was simplified. ”We” are good, ”the others” are evil. 
Stereotypes were being created. ”The others” were compared with the Nazis and devils. The 
reference, in particular the speech to the Congress 20th September 2001 in which Bush 
describes the world in black and white, was highly dualistic (Melby 2004:135). 
 2) The President`s approach in meeting with "the others": Melby refers frequently to the 
West Point 20th January 2002. In this speech Bush proclaimed a global warfare against "the 
others." With this speech, Bush is characterized as an aggressive head of state, an anti-realist 
who left Truman's defensive policy of containment. Particular formulations referring to 
preemptive warfare were seen as a radical element (Melby 2004:149-51). 
3) The President`s macho cowboy rhetoric: Melby refers to Bush as a simple and straight 
talking president. Bush is portrayed as an anti-intellectual, ”a doer, not a thinker” in American 
politics. He acted more out of emotion than rationality. With Wild Western statements such 
as:”I`m a gut player”,”Hunt em down” and ”Take em out”, Bush provoked the international 
community in a larger scale than any president before him (Melby 2004: 87,132). 
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Why focus on Melby`s discontinuity research? 
George W. Bush was a controversial president and Melby places himself among several 
researchers who look critically at the Bush era. With crisp offensive formulations such as: 
"They hate us", "Axis of evil" ”Crusade” and "Either you are with us or against us", including 
the context after 9 /11, there are good arguments for Melby`s assertion about a radical 
transformation. Bush was aggressive and dualistic in his style. He made the fight against 
terrorism into a struggle between good and evil. But drawing conclusions from this are 
perhaps too daring in a research project. Is it really productive to talk about the total 
transformation of an existing order? Is Bush the only dualist, the aggressor and cowboy in 
American history?  
Walter Russell Mead states that the U.S. was not changed after 9/11. The country only 
became more of itself. After the terror attack, the four traditions came into force, he argues 
(Mead 2002:335-36). 
2.2 Walter Russell Mead and the Four Traditions 
Mead names the traditions after three former president`s and one minister of finance. In 
Mead`s theory, these traditions are always reflected in the U.S. foreign policy. Regardless of 
party affiliation, personality, ideological foundation and background, a presidential speech 
will always reflect these traditions (Mead 2002:2). It is only the later two traditions I will try 
to relate to Bush and Truman. This because it seems to be possible to relate these two 
tradition to both president`s. The two others will therefore be briefly commented. The 
Hamiltonian comes from Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) who was the first minister of 
Treasury in USA. Hamilton is known for his hard effort to achieve a strong financial base in 
the union. An alliance of national governments and big business was seen as necessary to 
ensure stability at home and abroad. This tradition implies that foreign policy should reflect 
actions that benefit the U.S. economic interests.  
The national icon Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), is the thinker behind American 
isolationism, also known as Jeffersonian. Jefferson was concerned with staying out of foreign 
conflicts. He did not want to become embroiled in the Napoleonic wars. In the Jeffersonian 
mentality, the United States serves best if they stay away from the dangerous world. In doing 
that the U.S. is avoiding compromising their policies in the world community.  
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This tradition has been weak in the U.S. foreign policy after World War II. Apart from a brief 
aftermath of the Vietnam War, the tradition has been disregarded by the other three directions.  
The Wilsonian is the Jeffersonians greatest opponent with its idea of active American 
involvement in the world. The Wilsonian tradition comes from the idealist Woodrow Wilson 
(1856-1924). Wilson`s idea was that democracy and freedom should be spread to all people 
all over the world. Historically, this idealism is based on the view that the U.S. is a unique 
country. The United States has a special obligation as a great power. The country has a moral 
responsibility to promote liberal values. This is an approach that builds on the idea that the 
U.S. is based on completely different assumptions than other great powers. Former Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk (1909-1994) once pointed out:”While other states have interests, the 
United States only has obligations” (Melby 2004:21). 
The origins of the Wilsonian-tradition are not related to Woodrow Wilson exclusively. The 
idea of the United States as something unique has roots back to the Puritan refugees arriving 
in Cape Cod on the ship May Flower in 1620. This event can explain the strong religious 
rhetoric in American politics. A Wilsonian argues that the world needs the spreading of 
American values such as: democracy, freedom, human rights and personal rights. The idea is 
that these values can harmonize the world. In a Wilsonian`s eyes the world should be based 
on laws, not on power, but as we shall see in chapter three with my additional theory, power is 
also recognized, even within this tradition.  
In the Jacksonian tradition, Mead shows the main attitudes among ordinary Americans. This 
tradition consists of values such as: toughness, conservatism, liberalism, and simplicity. It is 
closely related to traditional Wild Western values. Andrew Jackson, who is this tradition`s 
pioneer, was in many ways a good representative for typical American grassroots values. He 
was a macho president. The brutal Jackson was a lightweight compared to his intelligent and 
sophisticated predecessors (Moen 2008:145). His behavior toward Indian`s is a dark chapter 
in American history. More than any other president his name is synonymous with the Indians 
suffering. Yet Andrew Jackson was enormously popular.  
Historians such as, Hans Olav Lahlum and Jon Meacham tell about a president who was loved 
by the people. How was it possible to admire such a violent head of state as Jackson? Mainly 
there are two explanations. Firstly, Jackson`s background meant a lot. Andrew Jackson was a 
man of the people.  
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He was born in poverty, prisoner under war, and he fought his way to the top in the oval 
office. Americans loves an underdog. Jackson represented the American dream in practice. 
Secondly, in his violent attitude, force was emphasized (Meacham 2008:91-2). Andrew 
Jackson was not afraid to have a shoot-out with his enemies.  
He threatened to shoot political opponents, even his own vice president was in Jackson`s line 
of fire. Showing muscles was extremely popular in the Wild West. Much of the hard-boiled 
style of the Jacksonian tradition originated from groups of poor immigrants from Europe, 
particularly Irish and Scottish settlers, in what could be regarded as the Wild West. It is 
perhaps among these people the so-called hawk`s in American politics has its origins. They 
are those who turn to military power in order to promote the U.S. interests.  
Jacksonian is an extensive tradition. It unites pessimism and optimism. On one side, the world 
is perceived as a dangerous anarchy where the evil controls all development. Everyone must 
fight hard to survive in a system like that, but the tradition is also based on optimism. United 
States are perceived as the world's foremost nation. With this populist worldview, Jacksonians 
are embracing the inherited and ingrained attitudes about the Wild West's right to self- 
defense, also included the right of individuals to bear arms (Mead 2002:231). 
Threats must according to the tradition be eliminated before they turn into full bloom. Much 
of this can be transferred to the security policy arena. Jacksonians are therefore characterized 
by a straightforward mentality. Diplomacy has been seen as weak. It prevents quick results. 
This tradition is related to ”Cowboy rhetoric”. It lies in the Jacksonian nature that “we” take 
care of our self. In order to do so “we” need action. Action is a sign of strength. This is why 
values as self-help and patriotism are central in the tradition. The tradition recognizes violent 
actions against an enemy. Crushing those who would or could harm the United States is 
regarded as a necessity (Mead 2002:246).  
Why focus on Mead`s continuity research? 
When Mead's theory and research are selected in my task there are multiple factors behind 
this choice. Mead is a heavy weight scholar with great scientific work. Despite the fact that he 
is an active political democrat, he avoids a one-sided negative image of George W. Bush. In 
addition to this he promotes with his four traditions, a fruitful view of continuity. Politics is 
never static in practice. It is a struggle between several traditions.  
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In relation to Walter McDougal’s “Promised Land And Crusader State”, which operated with 
two traditions, Mead provides a more flexible explanation. Also purely empirical, Mead 
seems to give a sensible explanation. The traditions linked to the politicians blend in well with 
their political goals and behavior. Minister of finance, Alexander Hamilton was eager in 
promoting increased trade.  
Thomas Jefferson would keep the U.S. away from a dangerous world characterized by the 
Napoleonic Wars. Woodrow Wilson wanted to spread democracy and human rights for all the 
world's peoples. Andrew Jackson wanted to show military muscles against ”the others” as the 
leader of a state with increasing industrial development. These traditions seem to have been 
continued and taken up by later president`s.  
The flexible in Mead`s typology is that no president are marked by one tradition exclusively. 
Moreover in a research perspective, the Jacksonian tradition is in the highest interest. The 
strength and scope of this tradition is probably underestimated. Academics have likely a 
tendency to overlook the populistic motivations behind someone’s actions. But Mead operates 
in no way without missing elements in his theory. At times, the theory is too narrow-minded. 
There is a need for introducing some additional theory.  
2.3 Introducing Additional Theory 
As we shall see in Chapter three and four, a Wilsonian and a Jacksonian can act far more 
flexible than what Mead expresses. By promoting the Wilsonians and Jacksonians as one 
coherent tradition Mead became victimized by the “tyranny of the models” criticism. The 
term “tyranny of models” has its origins from the Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip`s 
criticism against forcing real life into abstract models. This thesis recognizes Seip`s empirical 
stand, but adds the importance and necessity with social science models. History is after all a 
hybrid discipline. We need models to explain and analyze features in complex areas such as 
the U.S. foreign policy. 
By creating a division within Wilsonian and Jacksonian traditions, it would be more up to the 
reality than abstract theory. It is a “tyranny of models” mistake to regard Wilsonian only as a 
peace loving tradition. Although a Wilsonian loves peace and reconciliation, the tradition 
recognizes promoting the good society by applying rough power. This makes it possible to 
create a division of two different groups.  
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I name them the ”communicative Wilsonians” and the ”war-hungry Wilsonians.” A 
Jacksonian has also various ways to move forward, or to put it differently, there are different 
ways to demonstrate toughness.  
Taken into consideration that not all Jacksonians are thirsting after participation in global 
warfare, I will create a division between what I name the ”extreme Jacksonians” and the 
”moderate Jacksonians.” This additional theory will be further elaborated in chapter three and 
four.  
2.4 International Relation Theory 
Since the continuity and discontinuity debate is highly a battle between different directions in 
international relation theory, it can make sense to define terms like realism, idealism, 
expansionism and containment policy. Here is a short explanation of these terms, starting with 
realism, idealism and expansionism. 
Realism, idealism and expansionism 
Political philosophy offers two different views of how harsh a state needs to be. Thomas 
Hobbes, the father of political realism, wrote in an England wracked by civil war, emphasized 
insecurity and force. He described humanity as being in constant war. A half century later, 
John Locke, writing in a more stable England, argued that although a state of nature lacked a 
common sovereignty, people could develop contracts, and therefore anarchy was less 
threatening. These two views, one pessimistic (realism), and one optimistic (idealism) still 
operate today in foreign policy.  
Realism has been the dominant tradition in thinking about international politics. A realist will 
maximize a nation`s power, and minimize the ability of other states to jeopardize it`s security. 
This term is often synonymous with power politics. According to a realist a state should not 
base its policy on morality. A president has to relate to the world as the world is, not as he 
wished it to be. A realist embraces military power because the world is seen as a dangerous 
place. Comparing it to Mead`s typology, realism is closely related to Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian.  
Idealism is often being traced back in Western political philosophy to Kant in Germany and to 
British philosophers as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Idealists see a global society 
that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for states.  
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Trade crosses borders, people have contacts with each other, and international institutions 
such as United Nations create a context in which the realist view of pure anarchy is 
insufficient. Idealists complain that realists portray states as possessed with balancing power. 
The realism is regarded as immoral by idealistic Wilsonians.  
What about the expansionism? This orientation combines the ideal libertarian ambitions to 
promote the good, and a realistic recognition of the hard power in order to do so. Recognition 
of the force to achieve success is an important feature in this direction. But the direction is 
different from realism since it recognizes use of violence in a wieder context.  
Even military interventions in areas which are not considered as a vital sphere of interest can 
be a military target for an expansive head of state. Where can the U.S. be placed among these 
typologies? One answer to that can be found in the policy of containment. 
Policy of Containment 
During the Cold War, the United States made use of a policy of realism known as 
containment policy. Containment was a policy using military, economic, and diplomatic 
strategies to temper the spread of communism, enhance America’s security abroad, and 
prevent a domino effect.  A component of the Cold War, the policy was a response to a series 
of moves by the Soviet Union to expand Communist influence in Eastern Europe, China, and 
Korea. Containment combined hard and soft power. Often has this policy of realism fought 
partly against idealism and expansionism.  
Policy of containment was regarding some centers in the world as of vital security 
importance. Daalder and Lindsay, together with Melby claim that Bush was abandoning this 
containment policy with his global battle against terrorism. Bush acted as a radical leader 
promoting American interests in attacking all the corners of the world, not geographical 
limited areas, they argue (Melby 2004:17. Daalder and Lindsay 2005:194).   
Robert Kagan disagrees with a presentation like this one. He sees Bush more as a traditional 
real politician. In “Of Paradise and Power: America And Europe In A New World Order” he 
admits that change has occurred in the world. Communism is gone and the United States is 
the winner. But just as before, the United States is committed to protect its citizens with 
military aims, Kagan argues (Kagan 2003:2). Through an intense focus on security issues, the 
United States appeared typical American under Bush with policy of containment as a strategy, 
but this time against the radical Islamic fundamentalism (Kagan 2008:18).  
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When it comes to discussions about Bush and the containment policy, John Lewis Gaddis is 
an important scientist. He shows that the containment policy has functioned in numerous 
ways, and that this policy was present under Bush. In the updated version of his classic 
“Strategies of Containment” he provides a power-filled historical perspective on Bush policy. 
Gaddis refers to a number of cases in which the former president`s were harsh in their style 
against ”the others.” Although the U.S. based their policy on containment, Gaddis tells that 
there also existed hawks within this policy. Gaddis does not see containment policy 
unilaterally as a defensive strategy (Gaddis 2005:81). This point I will look into in chapter 
four, under heading 4.5.1. 
2.5 Rhetoric and Theory 
Chapter three, four and five will include a number of researchers who have worked with 
rhetoric. Closely linked to this paper is a master thesis written at Trondheim University, 
NTNU, titled: “The Rhetoric of Good and Evil in American Foreign Policy.” It shows an 
American tradition dividing the world into good and evil spheres. Other research related areas 
can be found in communication professor Denise M. Bostdorff`s “Proclaiming the Truman 
Doctrine.” Bostdorff gives a detailed analysis of Truman`s rhetoric in relation to the 
doctrines. Among other things, she is concerned with the simple and dualistic language of 
both presidents in an international setting. In “The President of Good and Evil”, Peter Singer 
has a different point of view. He shows that no president in living memory has spoken so 
often about good and evil, right and wrong as George W. Bush did  (Singer 2004:1).  
There will also be some references to biographies. Both of David McCullough’s “Truman”, 
and George W. Bush biography like, “The Polarized Presidency of George W. Bush” and 
Robert Draper`s “The Presidency of George W. Bush”, discuss a number of speeches in my 
selection. The wording, purpose and context surrounding presidential formulations are all 
being discussed. Common for the biographies is that they portray their president`s as unique 
leader. In “War Rhetoric” by Rune Ottosen and Elisabeth Eide there are several references to 
the rhetoric before and after 9/11. In the book it is being discussed whether the United States 
did experience a fracture after the terror attack. Some of the book's authors are presenting 
Bush as a radical element, while others point out tradition. As we have seen, this is a major 
debate in the U.S. foreign policy area. Let us turn our attention toward a scientific discussion 
in chapter three, four and five, starting with Wilsonian dualism. 
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CHAPTER 3: WILSONIAN DUALISM – A TRADITION IN AMERICAN 
POLICY? 
3.1 Never heard it before? 
Taken from a perspective of continuity, many American president`s such as Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, have promoted strong dualism in their speeches and 
statements. Roosevelt compared the Second World War cooperation with Russia as: “Holding 
hands with the Devil” (Gaddis 2005:3). More famous is Ronald Reagan’s statement in the 
Evil Empire speech. Statement as: “I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in 
God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in 
God,” are nearby legendary as a dualistic performance 
(http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/reagan/evilempire.htm). 
Is it really possible to categorize George W. Bush as a unique character when including this 
historical context? If George W. Bush was a revolutionary dualistic president, it would be a 
sensational tragedy for the Americans and international relations. Especially considering that 
dualism represents a black-white thinking that can have unfavourable consequences. But 
sometimes dualism is a useful tool, essential to categorizing the reality. To understand our 
complex daily life we need some degree of the black and white mentality. On the other hand, 
dualism can lead to racism, prejudices, ethnocentrism, and creations of stereotypes. A strong 
dualism can increase hatred among people and states.  
When the discontinuity research argues that black and white thinking was a hallmark of the 
Bush administration after 9/11, I will try to check out whether it is possible to relate this to the 
Wilsonian tradition in American politics (Melby 2002:38-39. Daalder and Lindsay 2005:186). 
Dualism is after all a vital part of this tradition. The Wilsonian mentality is based on the 
division ”we” and ”the others.” “We” are representing values as democracy, freedom and 
individuality. ”We” have a responsibility to spread these values to the oppressed ”others.” A 
mentality like this has long traditions. Mead himself shows this by telling that the Wilsonian 
has missionary roots as their background (Mead 2002:133-135). By observing Bush`s 
presidential period, 2000-2008, it is not difficult to argue for a pro-dualistic style during his 
time in office. A statement like:  
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“We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name,” is only 
one expression of the “we” – “the others” thinking in the Bush`s rhetoric 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.htlm).  
However, when Melby, among others, writes that dualism is a distinctive character of George 
W. Bush, it seems to be a strong charge against the President (Melby 2004:135). The 
Norwegian researcher sees it as characteristic for the administration that they divided the 
world into friends and enemies, based on black and white thinking. Melby writes: “After 
September 11, the world was divided into friends and enemies. There was no room for some 
middle position or neutrality” (Melby 2004:135). He refers also to the well-known Bush 
saying: “You are either with us or you're against us” as an evidence of the dualism (Melby 
2004:135).  
The discontinuity research has a point in being concerned about the dualism in Bush's politics. 
Bush appeared to be dualistic, in a hostile manner. The speeches in my selection refer to a 
number of places where the world is divided into good and evil spheres. It is more 
problematic whether this kind of language represented a new element in American politics. Is 
it conceivable that former presidents have had a Bush like, black and white view on the 
world? Maybe we have heard it all before?  
There are different ways to categorize the U.S. presidents. In this case I will ask whether it is 
possible to regard these president`s as representatives of the Wilsonian tradition. If this turns 
out to be possible, it can illuminate continuity or degrees of it.  
3.2 Two Presidential Wilsonians? 
Today there is almost a common agreement that the U.S. won the Cold War based on 
hardcore highly nuanced realism. But it should be added that realism was not the only 
direction in the American foreign policy during the Cold War. It`s counterpart idealism, had a 
great deal of influence as well. Several American president`s after 1945 were inspired by 
Woodrow Wilson`s idealistic values. It is not uncommonly that we have heard American 
president`s talking about promoting liberty, human rights, international cooperation and world 
peace. Well-known for this type of rhetoric is president`s like John F. Kennedy and Jimmy 
Carter, but also Harry S. Truman can be seen as a typical Wilsonians (Mead 2002:314). 
A Wilsonian president has often a tendency to cherish previously national leaders, seeing 
them as heroes or icons from a gone past.  
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In that case, Truman`s favorite president of the century was Woodrow Wilson (McCullough 
1992:356). Melvyn P. Leffler tells that Truman was inspired by this president. Leffler claims 
that Truman decided to support Woodrow Wilson`s crusade to make the world safer for 
democracy (Leffler 2007:37).  
It can be debated how much influence the Wilsonian tradition had under Truman. To regard 
Truman as a Wilsonian, and nothing else, will be an oversimplification of his foreign policy. 
The reality is much more complex. Since foreign policy seems to be an enduring battle 
between different international directions it would be incorrect to label Truman or any other 
president as one hundred percent Wilsonian. A president`s final political stand seems to be a 
result of compromising between these different directions. In that case, Henry Kissinger is on 
to something when he claims that Truman had to balance between idealism and realism 
(Kissinger 1994:23).   
When it comes to George W. Bush`s foreign policy, he disappointed many realists in the 
American Cold War tradition (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:124). The former Texan governor 
drove his own style with a worldwide crusade against “those who hated freedom.” It is likely 
that he was motivated by his idol, Harry S. Truman. It is possible to object to a presentation 
like this one by arguing: George W. Bush had clearly realism in his policy. The U.S. politics 
toward North-Korea and Saudi Arabia under Bush appeared to be classical realpolitik.  
Saudi-Arabia is one of the least Wilsonian places on the face of the earth, but the United 
States support the royal family. Even under Bush they did so. Bush`s choice of Condoleezza 
Rice as his national security adviser after the election, including Colin Powell as minister of 
foreign affairs, made many people assume that Bush was a realist (Daalder and Lindsay 
2005:195).  
After 9/11 it has become obvious that Bush was not a typical realist. Bush has since the terror 
attack consistently painted the international scene in moral terms. His moralism is the polar 
opposite of the realist approach. Despite some traces of realism in Bush`s foreign policy, his 
presidency must have been like heaven for those who embraced spreading political freedom 
around the globe. Bush seems to be a typical representative for the Wilsonian tradition. 
Although Daalder and Lindsay strongly argue that Bush was something new, they choose to 
place the President within the Wilsonian tradition (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:78).  
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Perhaps this is not surprising at all? Let`s take a look at some speeches and statements, 
starting with George W. Bush Inaugural Address: 
“Though much of the last century America`s faith in freedom and democracy was a 
rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations.  
Our democratic faith is more than the creed of our county, it is the inborn hope of our 
humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along. And even 
after nearly 225 years, we have a long way yet to travel.” (...)  
“If our country does not lead the cause of freedom it will not be led” 
(http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.20.01.html). 
What about Harry S. Truman? Does he differ from Bush? Here is a part of Truman`s 
Inaugural Address from 20th January 1949: 
“The American people stand firm in the faith which has inspired this nation from the 
beginning. We believe that all men have a right to equal justice under law and equal 
opportunity to share in the common good. We believe that all men have a right to 
freedom of thought and expression.(...) 
We believe that all men are created equal because they are created in the image of 
God. From this faith we will not be moved” 
(www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030). 
In this Inaugural Address the Wilsonian values are clearly promoted: “democracy”, 
“freedom”, “image of God” and “justice.” Actually, it seems to be common for both that they 
express a typical Wilsonian worldview. Put another way, they represent a worldview saying: 
The U.S. has a responsibility to promote these values to the rest of the world, and “we” are 
determined to do so. Applying a further detailed comparative overview can make sense.  
In examining the speech Melby regards as revolutionary, the speech in the Congress, 
September 20th 2001, Bush says: “Enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our 
country.” In the middle of the speech Bush declares:   
“Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what they see right here in this 
chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed.  
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They hate our freedom—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom 
to vote and assemble and disagree with each other!” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html).   
This is a controversial part of the speech. On one side Bush received criticism for these 
formulations. Some meant it was hostile dualistic in its style (Melby 2002:38). On the other 
hand, Bush received praise and acclaim for the speech. The American media-expert, Norman 
Solomon pointed out that Bush was perceived as a visible politician after the speech. The 
American people were in deep grief and under great pressure after 9/11.  
The President responded to the situation, took the lead, gave comfort and played on national 
emotions. The Americans needed a strong leader, one who could unite them after the terror 
attack (Eide and Ottosen 2002:97). A strong uniter the American people got. Perhaps their 
leader became too strong and brutal in his style?  
It is possible to argue for brutality if we examine what Bush actually is saying here. The 
formulations in the speech are strongly dualistic: It`s “us” against “them.” In short, Bush was 
claiming three things in the four above sentences:  
A) They hate everything we stand for.  
B) They are different from us.  
C) They represent other values than we do. 
 
Later on, Bush gave the final answer why “the others” hated America. He argued that the U.S. 
was attacked because the country was the leader of freedom (Sadar and Davies 2002:120). Is 
really the term revolution a too strong formulation in describing the president`s style?  
The discontinuity research has a point in arguing that the background for the speech had a 
particularly context. The U.S. was attacked on its own ground. The attack in itself represented 
a break. The U.S. has not been attacked many times throughout the history. This event came 
as a total surprise from the sky, telling: U.S. the great nation, vulnerable after all. The speech 
reflected these new circumstances. Bush does not ask for the reasons why some hates the U.S. 
There is no invitation to dialogue. The speech is devoid of self-criticism and self-
understanding.  
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On the other hand, perhaps a bit surprisingly, as the discontinuity research did not included, 
the President gives several nuances in his presentations of ”the others”, such as the following: 
”We respect your faith (Islam). It`s practiced freely by many millions Americans, and 
by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. It`s teaching are good 
and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of 
Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect to hijack Islam 
itself.”(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html).   
“We`ve got to do a better job of explaining to the people in the Middle-East, for 
example that we don`t fight a war against Islam or the Muslims. We don`t hold any 
religion accountable.” (http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911e.html) 
In 2003 he explained that: ”It should be clear to all that Islam—the faith of one-fifth of 
humanity—is consistent with democratic rule, Democratic progress is found in many 
predominantly Muslim countries” (www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html).  
It is a particular context for the 20th September 2001 speech, with the terror attack and the 
tense surrounding. But the President is providing some nuances by giving “the others”some 
positive review. If we include some of Truman`s speeches, revolution appears to be a too 
strong charge. In his 1949 Inaugural Address Truman runs nearly parallel with Bush. In 
commenting this speech Melvyn P. Leffler argues that Truman wanted to strengthen the 
image of him as the Wilsonian leader of the free world (Leffler 1992:267). Facing the threat 
from the communists in 1949, Truman stated the following: 
“The United States and other like-minded nations find themselves directly opposed by 
a regime with contrary aims and a totally different concept of life. That regime adheres 
to a false philosophy which purports to offer freedom, security and greater opportunity 
to mankind. Misled by that philosophy, many people have scarified their liberties only 
to learn to their sorrow that deceit and mockery, poverty and tyranny, are their reward. 
That false philosophy is communism. (...) 
Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is 
unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters. (...)  
Democracy is based on the conviction that man has moral and intellectual capacity, as 
well as the inalienable right to govern himself with reason and justice. (...) 
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Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment 
without trial, and forced labour as the chattel of the state. (...) 
It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leader he 
shall follow, and what thoughts he shall think. (...) 
Democracy maintains that governments is established for the benefit of the individual, 
and charged with responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his 
freedom in the exercise of those abilities of his. (...) 
Communism maintains that social wrong can be corrected only by violence. 
Democracy has proved that social justice can be achieved through peaceful change. 
Communism holds that the world is so divided by classes that war is inevitable. 
Democracy holds that free nations can settle differences justly and maintain a lasting 
peace. (...) 
I state these differences, not to drawn issues of belief, but because the actions resulting 
from the Communist philosophy are a threat to the efforts of free nations to bring 
about world recovery and lasting peace”.     
 
At the end in the speech: 
“Steadfast in our faith in the almighty, we will advance toward a world where man`s 
freedom is secure. To that end we will devote our strength, our resources, and our 
firmness of resolve. With God’s help, the future of mankind will be assured in a world 
of justice, harmony and peace” 
(www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030). 
 
In the same way as Bush, Truman distinguishes between good and evil societies. The 
president`s are speaking plainly: “the others” represent a totally different concept of life. 
Diktonomis are especially present in their formulations.  
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Here are some dualistic utterances from the two speeches, Bush 20th September 2001 and 
Truman 20th January 1949: 
We = Positive features:   ”The others”= Negative features 
 Democracy     Autocracy.  
Democratically elected leader    Self-appointed leaders. 
Fredoom      Slavery. 
Social justice     Social wrong 
God      Hates God. 
Peace.      War  
Free media     State-controlled media 
Truth      Lies 
Wealth     Poverty 
 
The president`s are presenting their enemy societies as repressive systems. Truman states 
clearly that: “No one deserves living under communism.” In their presentation of communists 
and fundamentalists, it seems to be a fact that these two enemies not just dislike United States, 
they really hated the nation. The context is much the same when comparing the speeches from 
20th September 2001 and 20th January 1949. Both president`s were in a hard-pressed situation. 
Bush had to be the nation`s voice after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon. In the aftermath of the terrorist act the fear was distinctly present. People feared 
that terrorists should set free and explode a bomb in a major American city, or spread a deadly 
virus across the country.  
Fifty years earlier Truman had to deal with expansive communists. At the end of the 40`s, the  
U.S. officials feared that revolutionary nationalism might turn third world country against the 
West and drive them into Soviet camp (Interview George Elsey 6 January 2010). In 1948-49 
new developments reinforced older fears. The Chinese communist seizure of power, their 
intervention in the Korean conflict, created fear.  
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The threat was magnified by the Soviet acquisition of atomic capabilities. When China finally 
got lost to communism and the Soviet had its first nuclear weapons developed, it created a 
climax of fear.  
All this including the Soviet Union’s “never-ending” imperialism in Eastern Europe, told 
Truman that he had to respond. People expected that their leader would protect them from the 
danger. The contextual situation demanded that they had to act as churchillian leaders. This 
means, strong leaders who had to unite the people in difficult times. The contextual demands 
are reflected in the speeches. In tense situations like this, it is not unusual with a strong 
presence of dualism.  
However, there are differences in their formulations. Truman seems to promote communism 
as totally opposite to everything the West stands for. Bush does the same with the 
fundamentalistic terrorists. But contrary to Truman, Bush appears mild, or perhaps more 
tactical than Truman at some occasions. After the terrorist act Bush followed the same line as 
the experts of Islam did. The Islam experts told the media that the problem was not Islam, let 
alone in religious faith itself.  
The case was that a group of extremists had misinterpreted their own religion (Singer 
2004:99). Bush took several occasions to remind Americans that the fight was with terrorists, 
not Muslims. He publicly condemned the few sporadic outbursts of anger against some 
Muslims and invited their representatives to the White House (Renshon 2004:156). Bush 
received criticism for promoting views like these. One of these critics was Karina Rollins, 
editor at the American Enterprise. She replied that Islam in itself was the enemy. The 
Muslims had an inherent hatred toward Americans she claimed (Sadar and Davies 2002:21). 
Bush ignored this kind of attitude. He distinguished between different types of Muslims. Not 
all Muslims are American`s enemies in his rhetoric. Islam is promoted as a peaceful religion, 
as in this statement: 
"We see in Islam a religion that traces its origins back to God's call on Abraham. We 
share your belief in God's justice, and your insistence on man's moral responsibility. 
We thank the many Muslim nations who stand with us against terror. Nations that are 
often victims of terror, themselves" 
(http://muslimrepublicans.net/Article.asp?ID=164). 
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But despite these commendatory reviews, it is not certain at all that the President was a great 
admirer of Islam. These statements can be interpreted as fear of a confrontation with the 
Muslim world. If we take economical and geopolitical motives, as well as security, into 
consideration, such a confrontation would be little desirable for the Bush administration.  
A united Muslim front against the United States could have resulted in a political suicide. It is 
likely Bush was trying to create an alliance with moderate Muslims by using the tactics of 
divide and conquer. In this remark it seems like he wanted to create a clearly distinction 
between ”good” and ”bad” Muslims: 
 
"Islam is a vibrant faith. Millions of our fellow citizens are Muslim. We respect the 
faith. We honor its traditions. Our enemy does not. Our enemy doesn't follow the great 
traditions of Islam. They've hijacked a great religion"  
(http://muslimrepublicans.net/Article.asp?ID=164). 
Regardless of the underlying motives, Bush is promoting more nuances than what Truman 
did. Truman does not show that there are different types of communists in any of my 
selections of speeches. They all seem to be equally dangerous and destructive to the free 
world.  
This is simplifying the reality. Just like Bush created ”fairy-tale” of a relationship between 
Saddam and al-Qaida, Truman constructed an image of a united communist movement 
working against America in his 1949 Inaugural Address speech. Despite the fact that Stalin 
and Mao had a relationship, nearly comparable to oil and water, there are no medium position 
in Truman`s rhetoric. Perhaps this is not surprising when we talk about the former Missouri-
Senator. As Melvyn P. Leffler notes: Truman liked things in black and white. His closest 
advisers knew that he did not like nuance or ambiguity (Leffler 2007:47). As Truman once 
said: ”I never sit on a fence. I am either on one side or another” (Keyes 1995:28).  
Looking at it this way, Truman appears to be as dualistic as Bush. So then, what`s left to say? 
They are both Wilsonian and continuity exists. But it represents only a small degree of 
continuity. To say that Truman and Bush are Wilsonians in term of promoting a division 
between “we” and “the others” is not a solid argument for continuity. Scientific work building 
on arguments like these can be seen exactly as a “tyranny of models” explanation. The 
argumentation is too general. Almost every president since George Washington (1731-1799) 
has talked about American values such as: liberty, freedom, democracy, and human rights. 
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Even in Henry Kissinger (1923-) and Richard Nixon’s (1913-1994) dark and cynical foreign 
policy, there was some talk about promoting the ”good values” 
(http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/nixon/first_inaugural.html). In that case there 
is a need for a wider perspective on the Wilsonian-tradition.  
3.3 Variations Among Wilsonians – Introducing a Wider Perspective and Additional 
Theory 
Walter Russell Mead`s Wilsonian narrow minded method is not satisfactory in searching for 
continuity or not in American foreign policy. Mead sometimes simplifies American attitudes 
and the way to act, when he regards Wilsonian as one direction in American foreign policy. 
To Mead`s defence, he mentions that there exists more than one type of Wilsonian, but he is 
not concrete at all. All in all, Mead seems to end up with defending the tradition. The tradition 
has according to Mead done so much good for people around the world. Prevention of war is 
one of the main values among Wilsonians (Mead 2002:165).  
As a former student of the arch-realist Henry Kissinger it`s a bit surprising that he nearly 
overlooks the danger that lies in this tradition. As we shall see later on in the text it is doubtful 
that all Wilsonian are peaceful doves. It would be incorrect to regard the Wilsonian tradition 
as one direction with one common goal and way to act. There exists a variety of types within 
the tradition.  
With introducing a historical perspective, different theorically aspects and my additional 
theory, I will look into whether Truman and Bush are the same kind of Wilsonians. With this 
focus, I will investigate the variations within the Wilsonian tradition by looking at different 
aspects of it. Let us start by examining the way these president`s as Wilsonians are exploiting 
the history. Are there any similarities or differences here? 
3.3.1 Wilsonian Use of History - “The Others as Nazis”, and the “End of History” 
The Wilsonian tradition has deep historical roots, and just as nearly all of mankind has a 
tendency to do, Wilsonian utilizes history not only for the sake of the past, but also for 
gaining a certain purpose in the future. Using history in meeting with “the others” can be a 
powerful tool for politicians. A starting point here is comparing the Bush speech from 20th   
September 2001, with some of Truman`s speeches and statements. Melby regards Bush as 
something new with his aggressive black-white thinking in this speech (Melby 2004:135-36). 
Let us turn to the content in the speech. Early on in the speech Bush mentions that:  
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“On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our 
country”. (...) All this was brought upon us in a single day- and night fell on a different 
world, a world where freedom itself is under attack” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html).   
Truman stated in a similar way in his Farwell Addresses: 
”I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing 
struggle -- this conflict between those who loves freedom and those who would lead 
the world back into slavery and darkness” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059). 
Bush and Truman appear dualistic in their rhetoric. They are regarding” the others” as 
enemies of freedom. Bush uses the word “war” to describe the horrible action done by “the 
others”, while Truman apply a milder term in ”conflict”, but adds stronger formulations such 
as “slavery” and “darkness” to his argumentation. It is likely that these words are chosen to 
increase the public support toward a futuristic violent action, or to defend a certain action.  
By applying empiricism as method, we know that the Bush administration attacked 
Afghanistan and Iraq after the terrorist attack, while Truman intervened in North Korea and 
some places in Latin America. If we return to the Bush speech, the President refers to a 
historical perceptive in the middle of the speech: 
“We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of 
the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by 
abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of Fascism, 
and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it 
ends: in history`s unmarked grave of discarded lies” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html.).   
The discontinuity research saw new elements in the President`s rhetoric when comparing 
terrorist with Nazi, Fascist and others totalitarian ideologies. In Melby`s eyes it was a new 
step in the direction of a more aggressive dualism (Melby 2004:135). According to Daalder 
and Lindsay we should agree with Melby`s discontinuity research at this point. They point out 
that Bush painted the world in black and white (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:86). On the other 
side, arguing for revolution in this case seems a bit dramatic.  
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Is it really revolutionary to characterize your enemy as a totalitarian? Historically, it seems to 
be more a tradition than a new hateful formulation. It can be argued that the term 
totalitarianism was, and still is, the antithesis of Americans self-image. It`s well known that 
Americans has for a long time used expressions like: despotism, dictatorship, autocracy, 
tyranny, and authoritarianism to describe anti-democratic governments. In political speeches 
it is a well known rhetorical trick to dehumanize your opponent by calling him or her a Fascist 
or Nazi. The term “Islamo-Fascists/Nazis”, used by some conservative American 
broadcasting commentators are only one expression of this teqnique (Singh and Buckley 
2006:21). Even a number of U.S. critics have categorized the United States president`s as 
Nazis, Fascists or Imperialists. In anti-American demonstrations it is quite common that the 
U.S. is referred to as the ”Great Satan” of the world (Interview George Elsey 6th  January 
2010).  
Best known is perhaps a comment made by Noam Chomsky. In an interview, he compared the 
political relation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger with the cooperation between 
Adolf Hitler and Adolf Eichmann (http://www.chomsky.info/talks/1990----.htm).  
Among American presidents, George W. Bush was not alone in harbouring a great deal of 
skepticism towards totalitarian states. John Lewis Gaddis tells that Harry S. Truman really 
hated totalitarism (Gaddis 2005:16). Perhaps this is why Truman in 1947 proclaimed that: 
“There are no differences in totalitarian states, call them Nazi, Fascist or Communists, they 
are all the same” (Patterson 1988:47).  
In the context after the World War II Americans disliked communism. The ideology was in 
opposition to economic liberalism, human rights and the free marked. Nicknames as “Red 
fascism”, “Tzaristic imperialism”, “Red fever” and slogans as, “Better dead than Red” are all 
expressions for the skeptism toward communism. George Elsey, Truman`s administrative 
adviser, told that the Truman-administration perceived Stalin as a new type of Hitler, but he 
was seen as greater threat to the U.S. security than Hitler had ever been. Stalin had so many 
resources and ruled with terror, he told (Interview George Elsey 15th January 2010).  
It is likely that Elsey, Truman and the Americans as well, easily transferred their hatred for 
Hitler’s Germany to Stalin`s Russia. Actually, the Americans compared directly these 
regimes. As Truman said in a comment about the Russian coup in Czechoslovakia: 
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“Russia had kept none of its agreements. So now that we are faced with exactly the 
same situation with which Britain and France faced in 1938/39 with Hitler” 
(McCullough 1992:603).  
In another statement, Truman was showing Soviet`s historical roots of oppressing it people:  
“Soviet Union is made up of sturdy people, but they have been oppressed and 
downtrodden by dictatorship from the time of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great to 
this very day” (Keyes 1995:48).  
In these formulations Truman systematically abused history by focusing on negative events 
and personalities to create fear, and probably to strengthen the image on the Russians as 
totalitarians. As Bush did on Saddam, Truman used the word “dictatorship” on the Russian 
government. Truman compared also the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, with Gestapo 
(McCullough 1992:553).  
In one way it is understandable that Truman and Bush would be drawn to the simple analogy 
in the face of, the Soviet Unions and the terrorist behaviour. Soviet behaved imperialistically 
in Eastern Europe and the terrorists committed a horrible act in killing thousands of innocent 
people. But it is also note worthy that such statements probably were more the stuff of 
propaganda and international gamesmanship than of patient inquiry of statesmanship. When 
Bush said: “I can`t tell you whether the bastards will strike again” (Woodward 2003:194), he 
sounded like Truman did in the 40`s and 50`s.  
It appears like they both overplayed the image of  ”the others” as enemies in dangerous 
opposition to the American system. Totalitarian states have, of course, undeniable similarities. 
Yet it did not follow logically that Stalin`s Russia would or should act like Hitler`s Germany, 
or that the terrorists or Saddam Hussein should act as military aggressive as the Nazis. Bush`s 
comparison between Hitler and Saddam was misleading. Hitler was the leader of a strong 
world power, Saddam was not. Hitler was on an expansionist path, Saddam had been 
contained since 1991. Nor was Saddam a committed jihadist or Islamist in the mold of 
Khomeini or Bin Laden. He only used Islam when he needed to as political purpose (McNair 
2003:217). 
In Truman`s case, the Russians behaved aggressively after the war, but it is likely that they 
did so in order to gain security over certain geopolitical areas. Little suggests that the 
Russians had Adolf Hitler like imperialistic foreign policy.  
 
 
 
40 
 
The control over certain security zones in Eastern Europe was the cornerstone in the Soviet 
foreign policy (Nye 2007). Despite nuances like this, the rhetoric and the goal is in many 
cases more important than the accurate description of reality. The labeling of an enemy as a 
totalitarian ”Nazi” is an efficient metaphor.  
A metaphor means a figure of speech that are comparing two things, saying that one is the 
other. The term ”Nazi” is a cognitive metaphor. By applying it, we get some associations of 
an object to an experience outside the object's environment. In this case it will be negative 
connotations.  
If the aim is to show how evil ”the others” are, these descriptions may be an effective way to 
compare the enemy with the former evil. This may have a self-reinforcing effect of hatred. 
Nazism and Fascism are debited ideologies that most will recognize the type of evil. These 
are ideologies that we often associate with oppression. When Bush talked about: ”Axis of 
evil”, it is not coincidence (www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.29.02). The choice of 
word is done with a particular purpose, probably to wake up memories from the past. It`s a 
rhetorical trick to tell the world that ”we” are the good guys, fighting the bad guys. Just as the 
coalition of free nations did in the Second World War against the initial ”Axis of evil.”  
While Bush talks about ”Axis of evil”, Truman repeatedly warns against a new world war 
because of Soviet aggression. In the Korean War, Truman was seeking arguments for 
defending the war, and he found some in arguing: ”Communism was acting in Korea just as 
Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier” (Pierce 
2007:246). Again this is an attempt to take advantage of history in order to create a reaction. 
If the enemies are as evil as Nazis and Fascists, they evoke no sympathy among “normal” 
people. They are then regarded as monsters. Monsters who destroy people`s lives and 
societies, almost for sheer pleasure, deserves no mercy.  
Many Americans recognize that terrorists and Nazis are the same kind of enemy. President 
Barack Obama (1961-) even mentioned this in his Nobel peace speech 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/12.10.09.print.html). An even more typical 
expression for this comparison is given by the Southern Baptist-leader Pat Roberson. 
Roberson said: “Adolf Hitler was bad, but what the Muslims want to do to the Jews is worse” 
(Mansfield 2003:141). Another evidence for this view, can be found in Ann Coulter`s 
statement after the terror attack: 
 
 
 
41 
 
“We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity. 
We weren`t punctilious about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers. 
We carpet-bombed German cities, we killed civilians. That`s war. This is war” 
(Lawrence/Jewitt 2003:11).   
The background for Ann Coulter`s temper was extraordinary. Coutler, the political 
commentator, lost a friend in the World Trade Centre tragedy. However, the statement is 
likely representative for much of the American mentality after 9/11. She would, as her 
president create a connection between the terrorist`s and the Nazi`s evil acts. Only by 
applying to the Nazi term it is possible to show the world how terrible terrorists really are, 
In other statements, Bush with obviousness compares “the others” with Nazis. As in this case: 
“The Pearl Harbour of the 21st century took place today. This is a war in which people where 
going to have to die” (Woodward 2003:37).  
Truman is also clear in his comparison: 
”I knew at Potsdam that there is no difference in police states, call them what you will, 
Nazi, Fascist, Communist or Argentine Republics”. (...)” the attempt of Lenin, 
Trotsky, Stalin, et al to fool the world and the American Crackpots Association 
represented Jos. Davies, Henry Wallace, Claude Pepper and the actors and artists in 
immoral Greenwich Village, is just like Hitler`s and Mussolini`s so-called socialist 
states” (Pierce 2007:181). 
Truman seems to be even closer to Bush`s Pearl Harbour analogy, in telling that the 
Americans in meeting with the communists must not forget that: “We laughed about Hitler” 
(Patterson 1988:8). By telling this, Truman warns against a situation where the history repeats 
itself because of isolationism and idealistic pacifism.  
While some historians and even cultures argue that history repeats itself, it should be added 
that so does also the use of history. In that case the discontinuity research overlooks historical 
perceptive in arguing that Bush saw only one political ideology as viable, namely the 
democracy (Melby 2002:31.Daalder and Lindsay 2005:121). It is possible to argue against the 
discontinuity researchers at this point because Truman and Bush seem to have not only a 
common use of history as Wilsonians, but also a common agreement on the final results in 
history. Truman proclaimed in his Farwell Address that:  
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”The Iron Curtain, the secret police, the constant purges, all these are symptoms of a 
great basic weakness -- the rulers fear of their own people. In the long run the strength 
of our free society, and our ideals, will prevail over a system that has respect for 
neither God nor man” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059). 
Bush on his side, stated that fundamentalism will end up in: ”History`s unmarked grave of 
discarded lies” (www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html.). This implicates that 
the good will prevail over the evil. They agree that their enemy will lose because of their own 
greatness and ”the others” weaknesses. The democracy will win. The author of  “The End Of 
History”, Francis Fukuyama could not have said it better himself. What about their 
presidential doctrines? Are the president`s behaving comparable dualistic in these?  
3.3.2 Wilsionian Doctrines? 
In many eyes, the Bush-Doctrine was a new element in American policy. When it comes to 
the term preemptive action, there are solid arguments that the Bush-Doctrine represented new 
methods in dealing with “the others.” Perhaps this is the discontinuity’s strongest research 
evidence on revolution? Chapter four will examine the American reactions toward ”the 
others.” Now the focus is on whether the doctrines are dualistic or not.  
A doctrine is an important element in the investigation of an American president`s politics. 
The term refers to a belief system, a set of principles. A doctrine is the basis in a president`s 
policy. Let`s start with examining Truman and his doctrine. 
In the situation surrounding this speech, Greece was beset by a civil war, and the British could 
no longer fund a war against communist-led insurgents. The Americans argued that they had 
to prevent communist expansion in these important geopolitical areas. In meeting with the 
threat, Truman enunciated in March 1947 a universal doctrine. Here are some vital parts of it: 
“It must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” (...) 
”The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of 
several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's 
authority at a number of points”, 
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”We are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their 
national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them 
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes 
imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations 
of international peace and hence the security of the United States” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandoctrine.html). 
Can the content in this doctrine be compared with the Bush ones over 50 years later? This 
seems to be possible, in the Bush Doctrine at West Point in 2002, the President states: 
“The American flag will stand not only for our power, but for freedom. Our nation`s 
cause has been larger than our nation`s defence.” (...) 
“We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favours human liberty. 
We defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants.”  
Further in the speech: 
“We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a 
few mad terrorists and tyrants” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html). 
America is seen as just and fair. ”The others” are characterized as ”aggressors”, 
”totalitarians” and as ”terrorists.” The Presidents constructs two very different realities as the 
best way to deal with those realities. Bush described “the others” with the same words as 
Truman did. Referring to words like “terror”, “oppression” and “suppression,” is a recurrent 
theme in their speeches.  
It should also be noted that Truman characterized the U.S. enemies as ”terrorists.” The term 
terrorist is field with negative connotations. A terrorist can be viewed as an unworthy 
opponent. For those who achieve status as freedom fighters, instead of terrorists, the 
connotation can be milder. In a larger degree, people have an understanding for a freedom 
fighter`s cause. A terrorist however, is often regarded as a foreign hateful guy who deserves 
no compassion. Terrorists can be seen as a cowardly race, hiding and attacking innocent 
people. In the American Wild West tradition, the tactic of ambush and surprise element was 
seen as some of the most cowardly move an enemy could do.  
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According to Denise M. Bostdorff`s research one can hear echoes of Truman`s words in the 
Bush doctrine. Bostdorff tells that the Bush line: “Either you are with us, or you are with the 
enemy” looks just like Truman’s words in his doctrine, especially, when he is 
mentions:”Alternative way of life” (Bostdorff:149-5).  
This is a solid point made by the American professor in communication. There are clearly 
resemblances at this point. Truman`s two ways of life are as follows: 
”At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between 
alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.”  
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free 
institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, 
freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.  
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the 
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed 
elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.” 
Truman`s “second way of life” is also comparable with Bush`s statement in the middle of his 
doctrine:   
“Now, as then (Cold War) our enemies are totalitarians, holding a creed of power with 
no place for human dignity. Now, as then, they seek to impose a joyless conformity, to 
control every life and all of life” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandoctrine.html). 
In other words, “the others” are working against freedom, and “they” are embracing negative 
elements such as control and oppression. The doctrines are dividing the world into good and 
evil spheres. The existing links between the doctrines are not that revolutionary breathtaking. 
Even Bush himself confirmed continuity. In this statement the President compared the fight 
against terrorism with the Cold War`s fight against communism: “Like ideology of 
communism our enemy is dismissive of free people” (Bostdorff 2008:151).  
It is likely that King and Edwards have a point when they claimed that Bush`s public 
messages have served to reenergize the Cold War dualism of freedom versus communism and 
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transform it into freedom versus terrorism (King and Edwards 2007:8). It can absolutely be 
argued that Bush tried to make a connection between the war against terrorism (Iraq) by 
equating both with the struggle against totalitarism on behalf of democracy. The content in the 
doctrines is much about creating a battle between those who want freedom and those who 
“despises” freedom. It is not a surprise that these presidents applied this kind of rhetoric. 
Truman gave under the preparation of the doctrine the following instructions to his 
speechwriters:”I want no double talk” (McCullough 1992:546).  
He seeked a speech closely connected to the Roman Cicero tradition. This means a straight 
forward formulated speech (Bostdorff 2008:109). In terms of plain speaking dualism, it is 
possible to state that the Truman Doctrine is the Bush Doctrine's legacy.  
On the other hand, the content in the doctrine are not identical. An interesting point with the 
Truman Doctrine is that the President avoids mentioning the Soviet Union directly as the 
enemy. In a way, Truman acts carefully with his formulation. He is not as direct as Bush. But 
although he never mentioned the Soviet Union by name, his juxtaposition of words like 
democratic and totalitarian and his references to Eastern Europe made the menace to Greece 
appear to be the Soviets. This is a smaller difference, a bit larger one, is that Bush often refers 
to words like “Evil” and “God.” In his doctrine the rhetoric appears to be more religious. The 
next part will investigate whether there are any Wilsonian religious differences between these 
two. 
3.3.3 Wilsonians and Religion  
The Wilsonian tradition has deep roots stemming from religion. Through the missionary 
activity a Wilsonian should promote the good to the uncivilized others. The use of religion 
and religious concepts seems to make a difference between these two. Much have been 
written about George W. Bush`s religious belief (Mansfield 2003, Lind 2003). In several 
speeches it is easy to argue that Bush was extremely religious oriented.  
This religious image of the President has obviously a hint of truth in it. Religion saved the 
Texan from his personal problems in the 80`s. Bush has ever since been grateful to God for 
his new life (Lind 2003:54). Bush`s confidence to his Lord has reflected his politics. For 
instance, according to him, freedom is a: “Universal, Godgiven right” (Lind 2003:13).  
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And the battle against terrorists was being promoted as a conflict between good and evil 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html). Peter Singer portrays Bush as 
a ground-breaking Christian president. He tells that as the war with Iraq loomed, Bush read 
the bible every day, and that the President prayed under cabinet meetings (Singer 2004:91). 
Also the speechwriter David Frum tells that attendance at Bible study was a vital part of the 
working process with speeches (Singer 2004:85). A religious and moralistic president in 
America, is that a revolution?  
Religious rhetoric can provoke people, but there is a difference between provoking and being 
a revolutionist. On one hand we can ask, to what extent is it appropriate for an elected leader 
in a pluralistic world community to invoke religious faith on official occasions in speeches, 
and radio, internet broadcasts. But on the other hand, religion and politics in America is a 
curious mix. Americans are religiously oriented. While less than 20 percent in Europe goes to 
church once a week, 47 percent in America do so. About 94 percent believe in God, 89 in 
Heaven, and 72 percent in hell. This mentality is reflected in the political life and speeches 
(Singer 2004:91).  
The religious rhetoric is in itself hardly any original feature of George W. Bush. Al Gore 
(1948-), John Kerry (1943-) and Harry Truman, would likely agree with some of Bush`s 
religious statements. There are several examples of religious statements in American politics.  
One of these, said by the conservative John Adams, goes like this: ”I pray Heaven to bestow 
the best of blessing on this house (the White House) and on all that shall hereafter inhabit it” 
(http://www.infoplease.com/spot/presquotes1.html.).  
George Herbert Walker Bush (1924-) gave the U.S armed forces in Somalia the following 
message: ”You`re doing God`s work. We will not fail” (Lawrence/Jewett 2003:1). In facing 
the Watergate crisis, Richard Nixon prayed at his office together with Henry Kissinger. 
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) called the Bible: "the best gift God has given to man" 
(http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagannrbroadcasters.htm). 
What about Harry S. Truman`s religious tone? For some people, religious beliefs are seen as a 
private matter. But Truman as well as Bush are making this perspective impossible. For them, 
religion is a matter of public interests by referring to it frequently. During Truman`s time in 
office, religion had probably a stronger role in the American daily life than under Bush. In a 
historical perspective, Bush was not alone in describing “the others” as evil.  
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Among some of the Christians in America, communism was seen as master-minded by Satan. 
They thought they had to create a shield against these non-beliving ”evildoers”.  
Although many Christians voted for Truman, he occasionally provoked them with his use of 
words as “hell” and “damn” in media. This gained him a reputation as a profane man 
(Mitchell 1998:188). Despite that Truman was mentioning God in several speeches and 
directly referred to Christian/Jewish texts such as King Solomon 
(www.trumanliberary.org/whistlestop/tap/41645.htm), he was not as religious oriented as 
Bush. In my selections of speeches, Bush includes religion in a larger scale than Truman by 
referring frequently to words like God and evil in almost every speech.  
Although Truman was referring to these terms he has more varity in his language. Sometimes 
he used “evil” in commenting on “the others”, sometimes “aggressors”, which is a milder 
term. This discovery can be connected to another research, showing that no other president 
since Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 has mentioned God so often in his inaugurations 
or State of the Unions as George W. Bush (http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0129-
26.htm). Although Bush made nuances between different types of Muslims, he appears to be 
more directly than Truman. In this statement he used religion as a tool for going to violent 
actions. As in this incident: 
“Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for you 
are with me. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war and we 
know that God is not neutral between them”  (Daalder/Lindsay 2005:86).  
Occasionally, Bush sounded like a conservative preacher from the deepest Southern States. 
Formulations like this one: “They hate Christianity. They hate Judaism. They hate everything 
that is not them” (Woodward 2003:45), can verify this Southern aspect.   
Despite strong statements as the above, it is conceivable that Truman's use of the word God 
provoked ”the others” in a larger degree. It is possible to argue this because of the different 
context the presidents had to relate to. ”The others” under Bush`s presidency had after all 
some common religious features with the Americans. The Christian and Islamic faith is not 
that different. The religions have the same geographical origins. They are monotheistic 
religions, believing in one and same God. So what's so provocative in referring to a common 
God?  
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Bush does not refer to Jesus, or any distinctive Christian leaders. If he does so it is highly 
unusually. It is correct that Truman applied religious concepts in a smaller degree than Bush, 
but we have to take into consideration that he spoke toward the non-believing communists. As 
we know, communists are often atheists, believing in Karl Marx famous saying: ”Religion is 
opium for the people.” When Truman characterized the non-believing communists as an 
infidel people, or as he said in his Farwell Address,: ”A Godless system of repression”, he 
created a stronger dualism than Bush. Truman was then using religion to create a diversion 
between the Americans and ”the others.”  
As in this incident: “A dictatorship is the hardest thing in God`s world to hold together 
because it is made up entirely of conspiracies from the inside” (Keyes 1995:32).  
While Bush`s speechwriters tried to avoid using terms like heaven, hell and Jesus, and 
replacing them with God, prayer and faith (Weisberg 2008:98), Truman made use of a more 
biblical language. Is it thinkable he did this with purpose? Perhaps it was. Truman was after 
all trying to unite the world's religions in a front against communism. He did so by sending 
his personal representative to Pope Pius XII to coordinate not only with the Vatican but also 
with the heads of the Anglican, Lutheran, and Greek Orthodox churches. These church 
communities, especially the Roman Catholic Church, were strong religious allies in the moral 
battle against international communism.  
When George Elsey in the interview stressed that he had: ”No recollection of ever having 
heard Truman speak of communists as devils”, he was surely mistaken (Interview George 
Elsey 15th January 2010). Even Robert Ferrell, who gives a positive picture of Truman, 
recognizes that the President disliked many aspects of the Soviet system (Ferrell 1984:174). 
Elsey as a source is not reliable all the time. Even in the middle of his nineties he seems to be 
loyal to his friend Harry S. Truman. As a speechwriter under the Korean War he should have 
remembered his president`s formulations.  
In the Korean War Truman was including religious concepts in a dramatic dualistic way. 
Under the war he told the media that: “The devil was loose” (Ferrell 2006:96). In negotiations 
with the Russians he declared: “We shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil” 
(Patterson 1988:13). Formulations like these create a perfect transition to the next aspect of 
Wilsonian, the creations of stereotypes. 
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3.3.4 Wilsonian Stereotypes and the Dehumanizing of “The Others” 
It can be argued that Wilsonians are dependent on stereotypes. A good society cannot exist 
without an evil counterpart. In order to describe something as good, we have to present 
something as less good and evil. A dividing of the world into good and bad people is not a 
new phenomenon. In this case Edward Said (1935-2004) seem to be a central contributor in 
explaining the “us versus them” thinking during history. In “Orientalism”, the Palestine 
professor pointed out that the Western World had a tendency to create stereotypes of ”the 
others”. Orientalism can be explained as a fundamentalist political doctrine willed over the 
Orient because the Orient is weaker than the West (Said 1978:204).  
The classic image of Muslims as militant, barbaric, corrupt, tradition-oriented and uncivilized 
as people, was early developed among the Western power elite according to Said, and this 
image has proven to be very resistant (Davies and Ziauddin 2002:46). The creation of ”we” 
and ”the others”, represents continuity in our history. It is also a common feature that ”we” 
describe ourselves with good qualities and values: ”We” are good, free, modern, successful, 
democratic and fair as people. They are not (Said 1978:6-8). We have already seen that the 
presidents used descriptive words such as: ”terrorists”, ”despotism”, ”liars”, ”murders”, 
”false”, ”poverty” and ”aggression” to describe ”the others.”  
This is descriptions which are in accordance with Said`s claims. George W. Bush alone gives 
Said nearby credit for his scientific work by telling:”We haven`t seen this kind of barbarism 
in a long period of time” (Woodward 2003:94). Or Truman, who told in his last speech as 
President, in 15th January 1953: 
“I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing 
struggle-this conflict between those who love freedom and those who will lead the 
world back into slavery and darkness” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059). 
“The others” are being associated with negative formulations as:”barbarism”, “slavery” and 
”darkness.” It should be noted that Said`s claims seem to be quite dramatic. Is the Western 
world really that dualistic minded some may ask?  
Some perceive their world view in accordance with the principles in “Orientalism.” But it 
must be stated that many have a good relationship with ”the others”.  
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Why does Said ignore the fact that friendship also exists across cultures? Why does Said 
construct stereotypes of the Western people as hateful and simple minded?  
Said should have differentiated between the types of Muslims that are being discussed. A 
Muslim, well integrated in a society, will probably face less negative remarks than a 
fundamentalist fanatic from the Middle-East. On the other hand, Said`s work make some 
sense. Politicians can strengthen their position by talking condescendingly about ”the others.” 
This should not be underestimated. The anthropologist, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, argues that 
we strengthen our identity by distinguishing ourselves from ”the others.”  
By being condescending to ”the others”, we can strengthen our position as a group (Hylland-
Eriksen 2004:89). Seen from this perspective, there is a potential for continuity of negative 
characteristics of ”the others.”  
In tense situations, it is not unusual to tell how bad ”the others” are. History shows that it is 
unifying to construct a clear image of an enemy. In the Ancient Greece, the Greek states had a 
stronger cohesion because they had the Persians as their common enemy. In the middle Ages, 
the church was united by a common enemy, the Muslims. Under the Crusades which began 
November 27th, 1075, Pope Urban II held a sermon in Clemont in France. The Pope described 
his enemies as a:”demon worshiping and sleazy race” (Davies and Ziauddin 2002:128). Nine 
hundred years later, Hitler`s minister of propaganda, Josef Goebbels used the same rhetoric 
about the Jews. As Bush and Truman, Goebbels characterized his enemies as ”terrorists.”  
In conflicts today, the rhetoric of the past repeats itself. In the Palestine conflict, the 
ultraorthodox Jews regard themselves as”God`s chosen people”, while the Palestinians are 
simply ”terrorists” with no right to God`s land. This traditional rhetoric are familiar with 
Truman`s description of communists as ”devils”, and Bush comment about terrorists as 
”parasites.” What kind of connotations can these types of descriptions provide us?  
First of all ”the others” are not seen as human beings. They are evil vermits. As the 
commandant in Auschwitz Rudolf Hoss meant, the vermits (Jews) must be exterminated 
(Rees 2005:56). Creating a distinction where ”the others” becomes dehumanized may be 
appropriate in certain situations. It can legitimize violence. It creates a moral base for brutal 
actions. A week after the terror attack Bush stated:  
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“They can`t stand freedom, they hate what America stands for” ( http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html).  
In a Press Conference on 11th October 2001 George W. Bush said: “We`re smoking al Qaeda 
out of their caves so we can bring them to justice” 
(http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911e.html). 
In the following statement Bush gives a typical Orientalistc description of the Afghanistan 
society: “When I take action I`m not going to fire a 2 dollar million missile at a 10 dollar 
empty tent and hit a camel in the but. It`s going to be decisive” (Eide and Ottosen 2002:217). 
What the President is telling is that the Afghan people are underdeveloped. They live in cheap 
tents, caves, they hate freedom and have camels. In short, they have a primitive culture.  
George W. Bush seems to despise ”the others.” One day after the terror act, he stated that: 
“Freedom itself was attacked this morning by faceless cowards” (Swansbrough 2008:89). 
This statement implies that the enemies are not a worthy opponent for the Americans. They 
are cowards, hiding before attacking.  
When it comes to Truman, he said that it was almost hopeless to deal with the Russians: 
“Dealing with the communist governments is like an honest man trying to deal with a number 
of racket kings or head of a dope ring” (McCullough 1992:873). Truman was here comparing 
the Russians with criminal elements. He stated also that the:”Communists are trained to lie” 
(www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965).  
Both talked about “the others” as they were non-human or evil monsters. Under Truman`s 
presidency it was said that the communists were a: “Parasite which feeds only on diseased 
tissue” (Lawrence and Jewett 2003:82). 
Often this type of rhetoric is applied in order to achieve a certain purpose, to legitimize, or to 
defend a military attack. What Bush says about Saddam Hussein`s brutality can be one 
expression of legitimizing an attack: “Tongues are cut off, their eyes are gouged out, and 
female relatives are raped in their presence” (King and Edwards 2007:167). Saddam was a 
brutal tyrant. He had used chemical weapons against neighbours and oppressed his own 
people in decades, but this is probably an exaggerated description.  
Another example of defending an act can be found in this utterance by Truman. In this case 
the President wanted to defend the use of the atomic bomb: 
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“We have used it (the Atomic Bomb) against those who attacked us without a warning 
at Pearl Harbour, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American 
prisoners of war. We thank God that it has come to us instead of our enemies, and we 
pray that he may guide us to use it in his ways” (Jewett and Lawrence 2003:259). 
It is not surprising that Bush and Truman are describing their enemies as evil monsters. 
According to Jennifer Szalai, editor in Harper Magazine, there is nothing revolutionary about 
characterizing somebody as evil monsters in the USA. Szalai shows that a condescending 
rhetoric has been used consistently in the course of history. Industrialization, slavery, atheists, 
communists, and now Muslims have been called evil and wicked (Eide and Ottosen 
2002:128).  
This seems to be a point, because during World War II, American troops prayed that they 
would beat the enemy. It has been told that soldiers learned that their enemy was not a man, 
but a monster. He was evil. The same mentality can be located in the battle against 
communism and terrorism. These images of “us”- “them”, have been presented in so many 
movies, stories, books, and newspapers after World War II that they probably etched 
themselves firmly into the national consciousness. In a historical perspective all enemies to 
the U.S. are evil. They had/have nicknames, such as: “royalists”, “Nazi”, “jap”,“gok”, “reds” 
(Lawrence and Jewett 2003:222).  
It has to be added that Truman and Bush were presidents in times when these kinds of 
negative attitudes could grow strong, Bush after 9/11, and Truman in the McCarthy era. So 
when Bush characterized terrorists as “parasites” it is not a new formulation (Lawrence and 
Jewett 2003: 222). It`s only a part of a historical technique in dehumanizing an enemy. 
However, it can also be a genuine true belief. I will do comments about this genuine belief 
part later on.  
It is correct that humans apply words strategically to attain political goals. The problematic 
part is that we often do this, even without realizing it. Some words may be used in an 
unconscious way. It`s a part of the culture. It`s nearly a habitus in American policy that the 
country`s leaders create evil stereotypes (Bourdieuhttp://wollan.info/begrepet_habitus).  
When these stereotypes repeat themselves years after years, decades after decades, they 
become a natural part of the reality. After a while, you are not supposed to question whether 
the enemies are evil or not. They are evil!  
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But it is narrow minded to regard stereotypes only as a direct hateful creation towards ”the 
others.” It is also about treating them as inferior in a childish way. Sometimes a Wilsonian 
can behave as a strict father who is regulating his son’s behavior. All this to promote the good 
society, often with good intentions.  
3.3.5 Wilsonians and the Pax Americana Paternalism 
A Wilsonian may have a positive side in being a supporting liberator repressing people needs. 
In many cases, Wilsonians have done a great effort in helping ”the others” in creating a safe 
and wealthy environment. In that case, the American empire is comparable with the Roman 
Empire`s politics about establishing a lasting peace. In the Roman Empire this is known as the 
Pax Romana. Under and after Augustus there was a peace period approximately 200 year 
called, the Pax Romana.  
Even though the use of the word “peace” is a bit misleading, this period refers mainly to the 
great Romanization of the Western World, or as in this case, the Americanization of the 
world. The Roman Empire had under Augustus a kind of Wilsonian mentality. The Romans 
were not enjoyable with only winning a war; they needed also to win the peace. They did so 
by raising ”the others” as good Roman citizens after a war victory. This sounds familiar with 
the situation after World War II.  
In examining presidential rhetoric it seems like American president`s are trying to promote a 
period of relative peace, a Pax Americana. There are several good reasons to claim that 
Americans have tried to establish a Pax Americana after World War II. The success with the 
formation of the UN, the rebuilding of Japan and Europe was to a large scale a Wilsonian Pax 
Americana project trying to avoid further warfare.  
It is a positive feature with the Wilsonian mentality that even powerful empires like the 
Roman and the American wishes to promote peace and stability to the world. But on the other 
hand, Wilsonian wishes to promote peace can lead to ethnocentrism and paternalism.  
The Wilsonian has links to the Roman thinking about raising ”the others.” The barbarians had 
to become civilized Roman. The same attitude can be found in the beginning of America’s 
modern history with Christopher Columbus thinking about raising ”the others.” The choice 
was simple, unless ”the others” confessed to Christianity; they were slaves by nature (Davies 
and Ziauddin 2002:130).  
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It is likely that this mentality of the past has been transferred to today`s modern Western 
mentality by saying: Unless you confess to values as democracy, freedom and individuality, 
you will remain a totalitarian villain by nature.  
Just like under the Pax Romana, today Wilsonians tell ”the others” what`s good for them, and 
what kind of ideal they should seek. It can provoke a lot of people when a Wilsonian inspired 
president is telling  ”the others” how they should live and organize their society.  
Two presidents who made an effort to create and establish the Pax Americana were Woodrow 
Wilson (1856-1924) himself and Jimmy Carter. (1924-). Their presidencies can be used as 
examples of how harmful, good intensions can be.  
In Versailles, Wilson created a tense atmosphere. With his fourteen points he provoked a 
number of countries. The skepticism toward Wilson's ”kindness idealism” was perhaps best 
demonstrated by Georges Clemenceau. Clemenceau saw Wilson`s idealism as a lack of 
respect for the suffering the French people had experienced under the war. To Wilson`s 14 
point he replied: ”Why 14 points? For God it was enough with 10 points” 
(http://www.ctevans.net/Versailles/Diplomats/Clemenceau.html).  
Jimmy Carter created a bad mood in the U.S-Soviet relations when in 1978 he insisted that 
Soviet`s foreign minister, Gromyko had to respect the human rights. It is doubtful that Carter 
wanted a confrontation with the Russians before 1980, but in the meeting with Gromyko and 
Brezhnev he was certain that human rights were absolutely in everybody interest (Morris 
1996:231).  
Those with a different understanding of reality may react negative on the Wilsonian 
paternalistic style. Sometimes, Wilsonians occur almost like a Roman Emperor from a long 
gone past. They want to control cultures and teach them what they should believe in.”The 
others” are regarded as small children who need education and refinement.  
In the following three statements Truman are talking to the Russians almost like a father talks 
to a rebellious son:  
“They don’t know how to behave. They are like bulls in a China shop. They are only 
twenty-five years old. We are over a hundred and the British are centuries older. We 
have got to teach them how to behave” (Kissinger 1994:426). 
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The same President said that he had no geopolitical conflicting interests with the Russians 
but: “An anger over misbehaviour and political immaturity.” And that he was: “Tired of 
babying the Soviets” (Leffler 1992:48). Statements as these result in a condescending form of 
communication. A “we know better” form of dualism is a dangerous path, it can irritate 
people. Robert Kaplan, one of Bush top-advisers, stated this form of dualism further by 
arguing that the terrorists hated America because America was a successful nation (Davies 
and Ziauddin 2002:19). During the election campaign in 1948 Truman expressed the same 
kind of mentality in proclaiming: 
”The communists hates this Democratic administration, because of this country's 
strong foreign policy, and because the economic and social gains which we have put 
through make it impossible for them to make any progress whatever in this country” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965). 
The arrogance in formulations like this is what Noam Chomsky warns against when he writes 
that American presidents are treating others like small children (Chomsky 2004:23).  
This is perhaps worse than yelling at them. Firstly, it is humiliating and secondly it can lead to 
a form of covered imperialism, hiding behind nice words.  
3.3.6 Wilsonian Methods in Promoting Pax Americana: Introducing Additional Theory: 
”Communicative Wilsonians” Versus the “War-hungry Wilsonians” 
In relation to promoting a Pax Americana it can be said that Americans after the Second 
World War have considered themselves as the world`s most important nation and its destined 
leader. Viewing the USA as the locomotive of all mankind is often used as metaphor on the 
country`s greatness. Or as Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) said: “USA, still a land of heroes with 
all the courage and love of freedom that ever was before” (Bacevich 2005:98). In addition to 
this, Robert Kagan points out that the self-image seems to be the same under Bush as before 
the Cold War (Kagan 2008:103-105).  
We have already seen that Bush and Truman regarded themselves and “the others” in a 
similar Wilsonian way. There are traces of continuity. But it is only degree`s of continuity. 
The president`s may have the same values, but how do they actually look at those who cannot, 
or will not accept these values? How far are they willing to go as Wilsonians in promoting the 
Pax Americana?  
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The father of the Pax Romanum period, Emperor Augustus did not consolidate peacefully 
conditions by applying to soft measures. Pax Romana was protected by the emperor`s great 
army. Legions patrolled the internal borders with great success, and even though there were 
still many foreign wars, the internal empire was free from major invasion (Meyer 2002:285). 
What about Bush and Truman`s methods?  
When it comes to different ways to promote peace I will argue for the existence of two 
different types of Wilsonians. One of them can be labelled “communicative Wilsonians”, and 
the other as the “war-hungry Wilsonians”. These two can behave quite differently. The 
“communicative Wilsonians” prefers to promote the good values through soft method and 
cooperation with “the others.”  
A “communicative Wilsonian” embraces listening, diplomacy and dialogue as methods. The 
other type of Wilsonian, the “war- hungry” prefer these values, but adds an extra element in 
their willingness to use raw military power to promote the Pax Americana. First, some 
comments on George W. Bush in relation to this division.  
By using my additional theory in relation to Svein Melby`s revolution claim, it can be argued 
that the Norwegian researcher describes Bush as a ”war-hungry” Wilsonian. Melby writes:   
”The idealistic pursuit of democratization and value spread that had dominated the 
U.S. foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson's day, would now be promoted through 
aggressive and unilateral use of American power resources” (Melby 2004:20,165).  
In Melby`s more scientific report to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs with the 
title, “Hegemones Hamskifte”, he claims that Bush was willing to expand the democracy by 
using violence (Melby 2002:18-19). Several researchers are following Melby`s line at this 
point. The historian Andrew J. Bachevich describes Bush in “The New American Militarism”, 
as a: “Wilsons under arms” (Bachevich 2005).  
Peter Singer writes in “The President of Good and Evil” that Bush was willing to take 
dramatic measures in order to promote what he saw as the moral right. According to the same 
Singer, no other president in living memory has spoken so often about good and evil, right 
and wrong (Singer 2004:1). Singer`s research shows that the President spoke about evil in 319 
separate speeches in his first term (Singer 2004:2). Singer even uses the same example as 
Melby, by referring to Bush`s sentence at West Point June 1. 2002 stating: 
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”We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name”  
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html). 
Historically, these discontinuity researchers definitively have a point. Bush, the candidate 
who had promised in his 2000 acceptance speech to be a uniter not a divider, had by the end 
of his first term in office become a super-divider (King and Edwards 2007:245-246). It started 
differently, many defensive oriented real politicians (Jeffersonians) was probably satisfied 
with Bush`s answers in the presidential debate, 12th October 2000. In a classical real political 
manner, the Texan governor gave the debate leader, Jim Lehrer the following answer on a 
question about his foreign policy stand: ”If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us; if we're 
a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us” (Melby 2004:13).  
In retrospect this formulation can be regarded as an empty phrase. It`s difficult to disagree 
with the discontinuity claim that Bush was willing to promote peace through a loaded gun. 
This is reflected in this statement:”Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing 
for—and the advance of freedom leads to peace” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html).  
Is this promoting the good by using raw power, a solid argument for revolution in American 
foreign policy? When people are saying, “Peace in the world is the same as war in 
Pennsylvania Avenue”, it is not without a reason. As former secretary of defence Robert 
McNamara (1916-2009) stated in an interview regarding the methods in the U.S. foreign 
policy: “In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.”  
As the statement tells, we must not be blinded by a narrow-minded view on Wilsonians as 
peace seeking pacifists. The American empire has for a long time, like the Roman before it, 
seeked to impose a peace upon the world by using force (Kagan 2007). After the World War 
II, the isolationistic alternative in the foreign policy was seen as a dangerous path to follow.  
 
It`s not surprising that the U.S. regards involvement in the world as a natural obvious case. 
Hhistorically, isolationism has lead to a series of adverse consequences where dictators have 
strengthened their position in an anarchy-like world community. Former security adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski is on to this issue in stating that: ”American preponderance is currently 
the only practical alternative to global anarchy” 
(Harvard:http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_1_24/ai_n28905706/).  
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As Truman put it:”Isolationism is the road to war. Worse than that, isolationism is the road to 
defeat in war” (Keyes 1995:42).  
 
During the American history there are many examples on incidents that recognize that the 
only accepted plan for peace is the loaded gun. Woodrow Wilson himself was in many 
people`s eyes an idealist who disliked wars. He spent the time between 1914-1917 trying to 
keep America out of the war in Europe. By one occasion he said that: “We desire no conquest, 
no domination” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/wilson/warmessage.html).  
 
During World War One, he offered to be a mediator, but neither the Allies nor the Central 
Powers took his requests seriously. Instead the Republicans, led by Theodore Roosevelt, 
strongly criticized his refusal to build up the Army in anticipation of the threat of war. 
Renominated in 1916, Wilson used as a major campaign slogan:"He kept us out of the war", 
referring to his administration avoiding open conflict with Germany or Mexico (Moen 
2008:364). In the presentation so far he appears to be a typical “communicative Wilsonian.” 
On the other hand, it is not that easy to categorize Woodrow Wilson. He never promised to 
keep the USA out of war regardless of provocation.  
 
After a while, he decided that the war had become a real threat to humanity. Unless the U.S. 
threw its weight into the war, as he stated in his declaration of war speech on April 2. 1917, 
Western civilization itself could be destroyed. His statement announcing a "war to end all 
wars" (http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/wilson/warmessage.html).  
 
This meant that Woodrow Wilson took the U.S. out of isolation to prevent totalitarian forces 
to succeed. Even the idealistic Wilson himself went to war to prevent future warfare. In this 
emergency situation, it is understandable that something had to be done. More problematic for 
Wilson`s image as a dove is his military interventions in Latin America between 1914 and 
1918, particularly in Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and Panama. In his Latin America policy Wilson 
differs little from his predecessor, the hawk Theodore Roosevelt. With the U.S. imperial 
history in our minds, we can ask whether it is possible to characterize any president in the 
U.S. as a ”communicative Wilsonian” at all. All president`s have made use of hard power to 
promote the good values.  
 
 
 
59 
 
Maybe, Jimmy Carter is the closest we get to a communicative Wilsonian? His presidency 
was weak and unstable, although also he strengthened the grip towards Soviet Union at the 
end of his presidency. Despite his good intentions, these historical examples illustrate the 
existence of a context leading most of the U.S. presidents in an aggressive “war-hungry” 
Wilsonian direction. President`s with good intentions, who wish to build peace and prosperity, 
end up as warriors, more than diplomats. In the U.S history, it is much easier to find “war-
hungry Wilsonians” than the “communicative” ones.   
 
Researchers such as Daalder and Lindsay and Edwards and King expressed it probably well 
when they categorize Bush as a “cultural warrior,” one who was willing to use military power 
to transform to the world (King and Edwards 2007:1, Daalder and Lindsay 2005:78). 
Descriptions like these seem to be suitable. Despite the fact that several times the President 
described himself as a clear-eyed realist, his expansive rhetoric echoed much of the idealism 
of Woodrow Wilson. The content in speeches are extremely concerned about “ending the 
tyranny in the world” (Swansbrough 2008:19).  
 
The “cultural warrior” President expresses his view cleary: “Our responsibility to history is 
already clear. To answer these attack and get rid of the world of evil” (Woodward 2003:67). 
The former Texan governor also told Bob Woodward that there was:“Nothing bigger than 
achieving world peace” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:85).  
 
According to this line of thinking, Bush`s beliefs in promoting democracy through strength 
was something unique with this President. By employing a historical perspective in this part 
of the thesis, the revolutionary claim is given little credit. Many presidents have been willing 
to go far in order to promote the Pax Americana. How much force a president should use in 
order to promote the good society has been a perpetual debate between real politicians and the 
idealistic direction of Wilsonian in American politics nearly since the birth of the nation 
(Gaddis 2004).  
 
Early in the discussion, USA`s sixth president John Quincy Adams (1767-1848) had another 
perspective than the Wilsonians: “America applauds those who fight for liberty and 
independence. But she goes not abroad in searching monsters to destroy. She cannot be the 
dictatress of the world” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:4).  
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A typical Wilsonian would turn Quincy Adams statement on its head by arguing: “America 
would lose its soul if it did not go abroad.” Long before Woodrow Wilsons liberal 
internationalism there were set forth moral arguments for a broad American engagement in 
the world (Kagan 2007). It had been seen as a necessity to promote peace with strength. It is 
likely that some of the “war-hungry” Wilsonians have the same understanding as Fredrik the 
Great. This Prussian king proclaimed that “Diplomacy without armaments is like music 
without instruments” (Ferrell 2006:44).  
 
If you want to promote Pax Americana you need to combine the good intentions with 
strength. As Bush express it: “All people want is freedom. The best hope for peace in our 
world is the expansion of freedom all over the world” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush.georgew/second_inaugural). 
When Bush talked about “Expansion of freedom” it is unlikely that he wanted to promote that 
by being a “communicative Wilsionian.” Among American presidents, the American society 
as well, there is a great ideal of skeptiscm toward negotiations with terrorists.  
Some Americans regard dialogue with terrorist as practically impossible. How can you 
negotiate with a fanatic who is willing to sacrifice everything he owns for gaining a moment 
of the world`s attention? A ”war-hungry” Wilsonian combines realism and idealism in seeing 
these negotiations as impossible. Realism is seeing dialogue with terrorists as utopia. The part 
of idealism can be found in the belief that the terrorists will accept democracy under hard 
pressure.  
Also, Truman had a hard time trying to deal with “the others.” Stalin and the Communist 
officials did not hold their agreements according to Truman. This is why he frustrately 
expressed: ”I don`t believe in summit conferences. They don`t amount to a damn. I have been 
to two of them, and nothing was accomplished” (Keyes 1995:42).  
In an early stage in the aftermath of the war discussion, the Americans became frustrated. The 
Truman administration responded to the Russian stubbornness by tightening the grip 
(Miscamble 2007:97). This development gave the ”communicative Wilsonians” little leeway. 
According to the historian Ellen Schrecker, Truman was more concerned with protecting 
individual rights than any president before him, with the possible exception of Jimmy Carter 
(Kirkendall 2004:228). Could one say that Truman was willing to use violent means in order 
to promote the Pax Americana?  
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It appears so if we include Wilson D. Miscamble commenting on Truman as a Wilsonian. In 
“From Roosevelt to Truman”, Miscamble understand Truman as a non-aggressive president. 
But in comparing him with Woodrow Wilson he writes: “While Wilson defined the war, 
Truman prepared to fight it” (Miscamble 2007:6). 
The following Truman statement may indicate that the President was willing to go far in order 
to protect the free world: 
“From Darius 1`s Persia, Alexander`s Greece, Hadrian`s Rome, Victoria`s Britain, no 
nation or group of nations has had our responsibilities. It was now America`s task to 
save the world from totalitarism” (Lundestad 2003:35). 
A similar trend continues in examining the following four statements: The first one has it`s 
origins from April, 1945. In this speech Truman seems to have a Bush like tone in calling the 
nation to live up to a glorious heritage by bringing the war to total victory. He declared: 
”America will continue to fight for freedom until no vestige of resistance remains. Freedom is 
the only reliable path to peace” (Pierce 2007:8).  
Secondly, in an address at Fordham University on May 11th, 1946, Truman exhorted:  
”Intelligent Americans no longer think that merely because a man is born outside the 
boundaries of United States, he is no concern of ours. They know that in such thinking 
lie the seed of the dictatorship and tyranny. And they know from sad experience that 
dictatorship and tyranny are too ruthless to stop at the borders of the United States and 
conveniently leave us alone” (Pierce 2007:126). 
The President is referring to formulations like: ”fight until no resistance remains.” In the last 
sentence he regarded ”promoting freedom” as the only tool for gaining peace. In the second 
statement he argues for an active the U.S. involvement in the world. In order to stop 
dictatorship the U.S. has to display a great deal of energy in the international community. In 
statement three and four, Truman further strengthens his image as a ”Wilsonian war-hungry” 
president.  
In statements like: ”I want peace and I`m willing to fight for it” (McCullough 1992:384), 
and:“The will to peace must be backed by strength for peace. We must be prepared to pay the 
price for peace.” (McCullough 1992:384), he sounded like Bush. The content in these 
formulations can explain why Bush admires Truman.  
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Because, no matter how polarized Washington becomes between Democrats and Republicans, 
there is still one Democrat the Republicans love, namely: Harry S. Truman. Especially hard-
liners loves Truman`s efforts in promoting democracy, and his fight for defending the free 
world. Bush regarded Truman as one of the greatest president`s. (Weisman 2008:234-35).  
In the basement at the Truman Museum and Research Centre in Missouri there are several 
quotations on the wall were Bush is praising Truman. An example is shown below: 
"Harry Truman cared, because he had a vision that was a long-term vision about world 
peace. . . .  [He] had the foresight to see the capacity of freedom, the universal right of 
people to change the world" (Bush in Clive, Iowa, October 2004). 
But the reality is more complicated than what this view tells. Whether Harry Truman's 
presidential policy towards communism, led America to victory in the Cold War is a highly 
debatable question.  
What is not debatable is the belief that Truman`s tough style toward “the others” was the right 
way to face an enemy. This is probably one of the reasons why Bush invoked “the Truman 
story” at his 2006 West Point graduation speech. In these two statements it is obvious that 
Bush is comparing himself with Truman:  
“Like the Cold War, we are fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that 
despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has territorial ambitions, and pursues totalitarian 
aims.”  
And further in the speech: “President Truman made clear that the Cold War was an 
ideological struggle between tyranny and freedom. At a time when some still wanted to wish 
away the Soviet threat” (http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html). 
But is it fair to associate Truman`s name with the”war-hungry Wilsonian`” extremely hard-
line policy? In a way this is abuse of history. It is likely that Bush did use Truman`s history 
with great awareness, and with the purpose of defending his own hard-line. As Bush told in 
2005: “President Harry Truman stuck to his guns. He believed as I do, in freedom to 
transform an adversary into an ally” (Weisman 2008:235). 
In this way Truman became a comforting role model for Bush. Like Bush, Truman was a 
wildly unpopular wartime leader who aimed big and did some mistakes.  
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Both did face a stormy opposition and plummeting public approval during their presidency 
(U.S News, 21 January 2007 –History`s Verdict). Later on, after the fall of the communism, 
Truman is regarded as one of the greatest presidents in the U.S. history (Lahlum 2008 Moen 
2008). Robert Dallek is on to something when he claims that everyone who gets in trouble in 
their presidency period invokes ”the Truman story.” But Dallek says: “there is only one 
Truman” (The Kansas City Star, 15 December 2006 – Bush-Truman Comparison).  
Robert Dallek is in one way correct. Truman was sometimes careful in his foreign policy. 
There are discussions on how strong Truman wanted to defend the free world. Wilsonian 
moralism turned out to be short-lived as nuclear weapons spread and the Cold War emerged.  
During the Cold War, it was necessary for the United States to ignore some human rights 
violations by allies because the global struggle against the “red danger” overshadowed all 
other concerns. Therefore, several military dictatorships were given a pass as long as they 
remained friendly to the USA. But American presidents continued to expose the virtues of 
freedom and the spread of American values. However, they balanced these idealistic 
ambitions with a careful eye towards guarding American security in a nuclear age. Truman 
had to balance between politics of idealism and realism. Real political there are traces of these 
contradicting directions in Truman`s foreign policy.  
The President had clear realistic positions when he portrayed China`s leaders Chiang Kai 
Shek and South Korea`s Syngman Rhee as loyal members of the free world.  In reality these 
regimes were brutally dictatorial. They both had systematically destroyed their political 
opposition and stamped out the free speech. A true “war-hungry Wilsonian” should not have 
supported these regimes.  
Truman`s policy of containment was conservative in many ways. It rejected the risks of a 
larger, potentially devastating war associated with ”rolling back” Soviet gains in Eastern 
Europe. Truman showed patience and wisdom in responding to the Soviet threat.  
On the other hand Truman sometimes sounded just like Bush. The former Missouri Senator 
appears to be a mixture of the five directions:”war-hungry Wilsonian”, ”communicative 
Wilsonian”, ”Jeffersonian real politics” and as we shall see later on, ”Jacksonian extreme and 
moderate line.” In addition to talking as a ”communicative Wilsonian” and Jeffersonian, he 
acted like a ”war-hungry Wilsonian” and ”Jacksonian” in dropping two nuclear bombs, and 
starting a global warfare against communism in Korea, a warfare comparable with the ones in 
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Vietnam and Iraq in its cruelty. This global warfare politics toward ”the others”, will be 
examined closer in chapter four under the heading: ”Meeting ”the others” as a global enemy.”  
Despite that Truman`s foreign policy seems to be flexible, it was in many ways fairly simple: 
Truman did not believe in isolation. He was against dictators (Leffler 2007:39). It can be 
argued that Truman had great passion for history. He admired the founding fathers, and 
disliked those who worked against America`s historical values, as stated in the Constitution.  
It`s likely that his foreign minister Dean Acheson (1893-1971) with this quote summarizes the 
main point of Truman`s politics: “Americans are children of freedom and cannot be safe 
except in an environment of freedom” (Leffler and Legro 2008:51). 
In following this line of continuity thinking, George Lakoff has a point in arguing for a 
tradition  were presidents think in dichotomies, based on a ”we” versus ”the other” mentality. 
The world is always divided into an evil and a good part. Rough behavior, to promote the 
good will is nothing new according to Lakoff (Eide and Ottosen 2002:170). American policy 
has always been based on an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth mentality he argues (Eide and 
Ottosen 2002:176). Based on the above examples, it seems like Bush`s wishes to “get rid of 
the world evil” were only an echo of several of his predecessors.  
This means that a tough style is accepted if it can promote a good cause in American politics. 
However, there seems to be an insufficient ground for concluding that both president`s belong 
to the direction ”war-hungry Wilsonians.As argued above, Truman is a highly flexible 
president. In the following statement, an Annual Message to the Congress January 4th 1950, 
Truman behaved as a ”communicative Wilsonian” by arguing:”Our aim for a peaceful, 
democratic world of free people will be achieved in the long run, not by forces of arms, but by 
an appeal to the minds and hearts of men”  
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm). 
Also, Bush appeals to ”communicative Wilsonian” solutions. Like in his 2005 Second 
Inaugural Address: 
”So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
movements institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in our world. This is not a primarily task of arms” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush_georgew/second_inaugur
al.html). 
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This is a peaceful request, but it is not synomomous with dismissing the image of Bush as a 
”war-hungry Wilsonian”, or Truman for that matter. With these presidents formulations, there 
are still good reasons to claim that they saw themselves as the leaders of the free world, 
fighting evil just like USA had done in the struggle against Nazism, Fascism and the Japanese 
militarism during the World War II (Leffler 1992:267). Although the presidents had some 
links to the ”communicative Wilsonian” direction, they were not afraid of expressing 
themselves clearly.  
Bush and Truman partially overlooked advice from America`s founding fathers against 
avoiding the: ”out searching monster for destroy politics.” Sometimes, it seems like they were 
going on a crusade in the name of the free world. As Bush proclaimed in his 2005 Inaugural 
Address above: the ultimate goal was to: “End the Worlds tyranny” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush_georgew/second_inaugural.html) 
Truman expressed firmly the same content by telling: “I have been fighting communism not 
merely where it is a contemptible minority in a land of freedom, but wherever it is a marching 
and menacing power in the world” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965). 
Those who saw Bush’s foreign policy as radically moralistic, should not overlook the fact that 
both Truman and even today`s President, Barack Obama embraces vital parts of Bush`s 
freedom agenda. When the discontinuity research claims that democracy, liberal values and 
morality was more important for Bush than any previous president, it is nearly an unhistorical 
reflection on foreign affairs. According to the arch-realist Henry Kissinger, we can hear the 
drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism marching already early in American foreign policy after 
World II (Bacevich 2005:12).  
However, when America’s forty-third president may go down as one of the most criticized in 
American history, it is not without a reason. The problematic, perhaps revolutionary part, with 
Bush as a ”war-hungry Wilsonian can be found in formulation like: ”This crusade, this war on 
terrorism is going to take a while” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html). 
It was at a Press Conference only a week after the terror attack that the President gave this 
answer to the audience. The term crusade refers to a series of religiously sanctioned military 
campaigns waged by much of the Christian Europe.  
 
 
 
66 
 
The specific aim to the crusaders were to restore Christian control of the Holy Land. When 
Bush applied this term it seems to be little new about it. Truman expressed the same term in 
his acceptance speech, July, 1948 by saying: 
”This is more than a political campaign: it is a call to arms. Give me your help, not to 
win alone, but to win in this new crusade to keep America secure and safe for its own 
people” (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1060). 
Although they are applying the same term, the context is different in this case. The 
surroundings are not the same at all. Truman used the term in a Campaign speech in 
Philadelphia in 1948, while Bush talked in a broadcasted Press Conference with millions of 
listeners all over the world. It is worrying that the President did use such a heavily charged 
term in a public performance. Crusade has different connotations around the globe. In 
America, Bush's reference to a "crusade" against terrorism, passed almost unnoticed. In the 
Middle-East the alarm bells rang.  
The formulation raised fears that the terrorist act could spark a “clash of civilizations” 
between Christians and Muslims, sowing fresh winds of hatred. Although Bush was obviously 
quite pleased with himself for having thought of such a catchy phrase, he was quickly 
silenced by his advisers, who pointed out to him that the word "crusade" has very unfortunate 
associations for the Muslim world (Woodward 2003:94-95). In relation to communists, the 
term did not have burdensome historical connotations. In this case, Bush seems to differ from 
Truman as a clearer dualistic president. Why was Bush behaving that aggressive? One 
explanation can be found in the fact that the President leaded an incredible powerful nation. 
The rhetoric reflected this great power. Having much power gives a ”war-hungry Wilsonian” 
a solid opportunity to develop and grow strong under a presidency.  
What about Truman in relations to Bush at this point, is it possible to argue for a common 
power context in comparing these presidents?  
3.4 Common Context of Great Power Gives Strength to “War-Hungry” Wilsonians 
One of the discontinuity arguments for the Bush revolution can be found in the president`s 
great power. The U.S. operates no longer in a power sharing bipolar system, but in a more 
unilateral one. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the USA was characterized as superpower. 
In the 90`s a new term started to emerge. The new label was the hegemonic superpower.  
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This since Bush led a powerful nation he could tighten the grip on ”the others,” without 
meeting any consequences (Melby 2004:34). With great power, Bush could make a solid 
effort in creating Pax Americana. The discontinuity argument seems to make sense. Despite 
an economic downfall in the end of his last term, Bush led a powerful nation during the period 
2000-2008.  
Gone was the competing ideology in east. The U.S. alone accounted for nearly 40 percent of 
the world's defense budgets under Bush. The country also stood for 25 percent of the world's 
total production of goods and services (Melby 2002:6). In addition to this, the country had a 
leading star when it came to higher education and research. This is evidence on a current 
hegemonic power. But is it possible to object to a presentation like this and ask for nuances? 
Is it really true that the U.S. was more powerful under Bush than under Truman? Harry S. 
Truman did not lead a weak state during his time in office. He was well aware of the USA`s 
great power, as in this formulation:  
“Today, by the grace of God, we stand a free and prosperous nation with greater 
possibilities for the future than any people ever had before in the history of the world.”  
Later on in the same speech, Truman was arguing for a more active U.S. involvement in the 
world: “Our tremendous strength has brought with tremendous responsibilities”, and further 
on the President declared that he wants to use this strength to support “world peace” and the 
“free world” (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm).  
Truman was in many ways correct in his statements about the U.S. greatness. In World War II 
almost 40 0000 Americans soldiers died and another million was wounded (Lundestad 
2003:27). But the American people did not experience the suffering during the early 40`s as 
many others did. The United States emerged from the conflict stronger than it had ever been 
before. American production attained new peaks. At the end of the war the USA had 2/3 of 
the world`s gold reserves and 3/4 of its invested capital. The gross national product of the 
United States was three times the Soviet, and more than five times the Britan (Leffler 
1992:23). The country was a strong military power. It`s navy dominated the sea while the 
strategic air force had the airspace under control. It also held a monopoly over the most 
intimidating weapon, the atomic bomb. The historian Geir Lundestad has compared the U.S. 
power with the one Britan had at the end of the Napoleonic wars.  
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Both completed a triumphant war, their technological revolution had taken off and their rivals 
were exhausted. Lundestad concludes that the U.S. was the strongest power the world had 
ever seen and the undisputed leader of the free world (Lundestad 2003:27). But this 
presentation needs certain refinements. For instance, the American military advantage was 
eaten up by competing elements around the globe in the late 40`s. The Soviets developed the 
nuclear bomb and China got lost to the communists.  
By this, it seems like the discontinuity research has a point in its claim about a more powerful 
nation under Bush. However, the U.S. under Bush was not an almighty state. A nation`s 
power cannot be measured only in its internal greatness. It`s power depends to a large degree 
on the state`s behavior at the international stage. If a state interacts well with others, it can 
gain power through confidence and trust. On the other hand, if a nation acts like a bully, 
others will create alliances against the state. This is what we have seen in the Iraq War where 
Russia, France and Germany together protested against the U.S. Put another way, the fact that 
Soviet lost the Cold War is not synonymous with the U.S. doing whatever they like.  
Under Bush`s presidency, the U.S. met resistance, and the country will still in the future face 
nations and actors that disagrees with them. Viewed this way, Truman had probably an 
advantage by leading the U.S. in a time where the relationship to the other states was better.  
By contributing with the Marshall-aid and rebuilding the free world, the U.S. was in a larger 
scale than under Bush regarded not as a ”imposing power”, but as an ”inviting power” 
(Lundestand 2003). During Truman`s presidency, the world`s community needed an active 
involvement from the Americans. The American`s were active in their involvement in the 
creation of several international organizations in the aftermath of the war. In this context, 
Truman had a power-advantage in cooperation and confidence that Bush did not have.  
However, common for both, it can be stated that with great and overwhelming power, they 
were expected to refashion the world in America`s image. In American`s justification for war 
it is a traditional Casus Belli, that they enter wars in order to remove the evil and promote the 
good.  Edwards and King point out that Bush in a Wilsonian manner went into Iraq because of 
his vision to restore freedom to the oppressed people (Edwards and King 2007:167). This is a 
bit simplifying the causes of war. There are many motivations behind the invasion. 
Economical and geopolitical factors are at least two driving forces.  
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Perhaps, this Wilsonian, defending freedom and democracy talk, only are justifications 
violent for actions. In some occasions this lead to accuracy.  
On the other hand, both presidents refer frequently to the importance of defending the free 
world. They are mentioning these values so frequently that they in some degree must have 
had the Wilsonian aims and ideals as a genuine value. Their National Security Strategies seem 
to substantiate this claim.  
A National Security document explains how the president`s are working to protect the 
American people, advancing American interests and enhancing a global security. Reading 
these strategies, it seems like both wanted to enter a post-historical paradise of democratic 
peace. Nearby, an idealistic version of Immanuel Kant`s perpetual peace. As stated in 
Truman’s NSC-68: “A defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere” (Kissinger 
1994:462). In Bush`s second term National Security Strategy from March 16, 2006 he sounds 
similar to Truman`s expression: 
”The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all 
over the world” (http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nss-2006/index.htm). 
In this contextual discussion it can be wise to include Robert Kagan`s claim about a 
resurrection of old dualism. According to Kagan, the competition between democracy and 
autocracy has re-emerged. Kagan claims that we today are witnessing an old struggle between 
radical Islamists and the modern cultures (Kagan 2008). By including Truman and Bush`s 
rhetoric into the discussion, it is possible to support Kagan`s argument that dualism from the 
Cold War’s days has returned. In today’s situation it is impossible to deny that there are 
ideological contestants left to liberal democracy. A symbolic expression of the ideological 
conflict can be found in the attack on the World Trade Centre. Little suggests that the attack 
at World Trade Centre was a random choice. Seeing the World Trade Centre as a symbol on 
American glory made the buildings a tempting target for terrorists.  
It can be objected against Kagan that states like Russia, China and some states in the Middle-
East in the 90`s started to move toward political and economical liberalism, but on the other 
hand the positive expectations were in many ways misplaced. In the Middle-East the 
development are going in an opposite direction, toward a return of theocracy.  
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In regard to this development, John Ikenberry were probably too optimistic in describing the 
end of the Cold War as the beginning of a “liberal paradise” (Leffler and Legro 2008:56).  
At the world stage, there are several actors who believe in a strong state, leadership and who 
see democracy as a system of weakness. The dualistic battle the Wilsonian Bush met were in 
some degree identical with the one under Truman`s Cold War days. After the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the symbol on repression was gone, but the battle between freedom and autocracy 
seems to be continuing. As Bush stated so well in 2001: 
“What is at stake is not just America`s freedom. This is the world`s fight. This is 
civilization`s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, 
tolerance and freedom ” (presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.htlm).  
As Truman expressed, it half a decade before Bush in 1949:  
“In the pursuit of these aims (free people, peace on earth, equality), the United States 
and other like-minded nations find themselves directly opposed by a regime with 
contrary aims and a totally different concept of life” 
(www.trumanlibrary.org.calender/viewpapers.phd?=1030). 
Little suggests that the “End of History” was closer under Truman, Bush or Obama. By 
examining the rhetoric, it seems to be more a return to history. A new repressing enemy 
appears as a fundamentalist from the Middle-East who repeatedly are confronting Western 
values. It is possible that terrorism could become as important in holding the two sides of 
Atlantic together as the Soviet threat was during the Cold War. As some have argued, maybe 
we are in the early stages of a Second Cold War where the history of dualism between good 
and evil is repeating itself (Singh and Lynch 2008:6). 
The next chapter will examine Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush in relation to the 
Jacksonian tradition. It will check out the following claim made by the discontinuity research: 
“George W. Bush represented new elements with his extreme hard-line policy” (Melby 2004, 
Daalder/Lindsay 2005). 
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3.5 SUMMARY CHAPTER 3 
 
The discontinuity research argues that black and white thinking was a hallmark of the Bush 
administration after 9/11. Taken from a perspective of continuity, many American presidents 
have promoted strong dualism in their speeches and statements. This chapter has shown that 
Truman and Bush can be seen as traditional Wilsonians. In the same way as Bush, Truman 
distinguishes between good and evil societies in his rhetoric.  
But Walter Russell Mead`s theory sometimes simplifies American attitudes, when he regards 
Wilsonians as one direction in American foreign policy.  It is doubtful that all Wilsonians are 
peaceful doves. There exists a variety of types within the tradition.  
With introducing a historical perspective, different theorically aspects and my additional 
theory, Truman and Bush turned out to be highly comparable as Wilsonians. Both were 
exploiting the history of World War II.  George W. Bush was not alone in harbouring a great 
deal of skepticism towards totalitarian states. Also Harry Truman compared communism and 
Nazism. In their presidential doctrines one can hear echoes of Truman`s words in the Bush 
doctrine. The content is much about “us” against “them”.  
In terms of religious Wilsonians Bush seems to be more religious. He refers more frequently 
to religious terms. But we have to take into consideration that Muslims and Christians have 
the same God. Communistis on the other hand have no faith in religion. In this context 
Truman provoked “the others” more than what Bush did by referring to God.      
The presidents also gave a typical Orientalistc description of “the others”. ”We” are good, 
free, modern, successful, democratic and fair as people. They are not. The presidents used 
descriptive words such as: ”terrorists”, ”despotism”, ”liars”, ”murders”, ”false”, ”poverty” 
and ”aggression” to describe ”the others.”  
Looking at it this way it is not revolutionary to characterize somebody as evil monsters in the 
USA. Condescending rhetoric has been used consistently in the course of history. Much 
indicates that these presidents in a true Wilsonian spirit wanted to promote the good, known 
as Pax Americana.  
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In this context the presidents are talking to “the others” as they were small children.  If “the 
others” would not listen, who far are they then willing to go? I have argued for the existence 
of two different types of Wilsonians. One of them the “communicative Wilsonians” prefers 
soft method and cooperation with “the others”.  
The war-hungry Wilsonians add an extra element in their willingness to use military power to 
promote the Pax Americana. Bush and Truman can be connected to the war-hungry direction. 
They were willing to take dramatic measures in order to promote the moral right. Promoting 
the good by using raw power seems to be little new in American foreign policy. After the 
World War II, the isolationistic alternative in the foreign policy was perceived as a dangerous 
path to follow. During the American history there are many examples on incidents that 
recognize that the only accepted plan for peace is the loaded gun. Much indicates also that 
these president`s after a short time in office lost their faith in dialogue as method. They turned 
to a hard-line style.  
Many hard-liners love Truman`s efforts in promoting democracy, and his fight for defending 
the free world. Bush himself regarded Truman as one of the greatest presidents. Those who 
saw Bush’s foreign policy as radically moralistic, should not overlook the fact that both 
Truman and even today`s President, Barack Obama, embrace vital parts of Bush`s freedom 
agenda.  
However, one solid argument given by the discontinuity research is George W. Bush use of 
the crusade term. Seen in relation to people from the Middle-East this had an unfavourable 
effect.  
Although George W. Bush lead a more powerful nation than Truman, both were well aware of 
the USA`s great power after World War II.  In speeches they were arguing for a more active 
U.S. involvement in the world. It can be said that Bush, as Truman had to deal with an enemy 
that disliked the western system and way of life.   
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CHAPTER 4: JACKSONIAN TOUGHNESS - A TRADITION IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY? 
4.1 Two Presidential Jacksonians?  
Some would say that Harry S.Truman was the originator of the Cold War. Revisionist 
historians argue that Franklin D. Roosevelt`s respectful treatment of Soviet had been reversed 
by his successor Harry S. Truman (Patterson 1988, Alperovitz 1995). One thought by the 
revionists historian Gar Alperovitz is that the Americans under Truman dropped two atomic 
bombs on the Japanese in order to alert the Russians that they had great power. Alperovitz 
claimed that the U.S. dropped the bombs to intimidate the Russians (Alpervovitz 1995:11-14). 
Not all agree with a presentation like this. Some argue that Truman was a mild president 
(Miscamble 2007).  
Although people disagree about Truman`s presidency, several researchers label him as a hard-
liner in foreign affairs (Patterson 1988, Bacevich 2005, Moen 2008, Medhurst and Scott 
1997). John Lewis Gaddis presented in, “We Know Now”, Truman as a noisy shopkeeper with 
hard-line advisers (Gaddis 1997:23). In this research Truman appears to be quite noisy. 
Truman`s rough style is reflected in his rhetoric. Once, he characterized the Russians as 
a:”pigheaded people” (Patterson 1988:44).  
Often he was regarded as one of the people, an ordinary man, a typical representative of 
Heartland America. Among some, it was being said that if Truman could be president, so 
could the next door neighbor (McCullough 1992:59). A good quotation about Truman`s 
popular orientation is provided by admiral Ernest J. King. At the Potsdam Conference, King 
told Lord Moran to look after Truman by telling:”Watch the President. This is all new to him, 
but he can take it. He is more typical American than Roosevelt” (McCullough 1992:434).  
Several factors indicate that Truman enjoyed the image of himself as an ordinary man. He 
promoted this image throughout his career (Kirkendall 2004-Hamby:350), as in this 
statement:”I`m a meat and potatoes man” (Keyses 1995:38). If we take a brief look at some 
of his formulations, they are closely related to the Jacksonian tradition. The plain spoken 
Truman operated from the gut with his simple and populistic tone in talking too reporters 
(Weisman 2008:234). Once, he assured them that:”the country was not going to hell” 
(McCullough 1992:742).  
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Other expressions of the Presidents tough attitude can be located in sayings such as: ”If you 
can`t stand the heat, you better get out of the kitchen,” “the buck stops here” (McCullogh 
1992:584), or as when the President in dealing with Stalin advised using a:”baseball bat ” 
(McCullough 1992:384). All these statements express tough and simple Jacksonian rhetoric.  
The direct style in these statements shows the main-reason why Truman still is a controversial 
president. In a biography of Truman written by David McCullough, it emerge that the 
President had no problems with using negative description in relation to others. When he 
talked about Stalin, he used terms like: “Uncle Joe, or “Son of a bitch” (McCullough 
1992:452). African-Americans were ”niggers ”and the Zionist leader Chain Weizmann were a 
”boldheaded son-of-a-bitch” (Keyes 1995:101). 
When it comes to George W. Bush it seems like no serious researcher will debate whether he 
was aggressive or not. According to the United Nations, Afghanistan, Iraq and several other 
states, he appeared aggressive. After the terror attack, Bush proclaimed that he was: “pissed 
off” and he wished to:“kick their ass” (Draper 2007:141). On an early stage Bush told that he 
would kick: “Saddam`s sorry motherfucking ass all over the Middle-East” (Weisman 
2008:98).  
Academic debates at this field consist in a larger degree about discussing the necessity of the 
President`s methods. What kind of tools and behavior shall the U.S. make use of in order to 
safeguard its own citizens and the world community? Some supported the hard-line, and saw 
it as a necessity. Among these supporters we find Bill Kristol, Max Boot, Norman Podhoretz 
and Robert Kagan. While others like Noam Chomsky and John Galtung saw it as a policy of 
madness (Eide and Ottosen 2002). 
Whatever future historians may say about this President one thing is clear: their verdict will 
hinge upon evaluations of the President`s tough style and war on terror. The big question is 
whether his foreign policy will succeed in the end. The answer to that is not given, it remains 
to be seen. Just as Truman, Bush will be judged for his success, or not in the battle against 
”the others.” Independent of political views it should prevail little doubt that George W. Bush 
was an archetypical representative for the Jacksonian tradition. In resemblance with Truman, 
he was proud of his roots in ”Heartland America”. Some argued that he had anti-elitist 
grievance and hated Yale (Weisberg 2008:42).  
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In “Bush at War”, Bob Woodward provides a consistently characteristic of Bush as tough, 
simple and populistic. By referring to some of Bush statements, we can easily underline this 
image: 
”A president has got to be the calcium in the backbone. If I weakens, the whole team 
weakens. If I`m doubtful, I can assure you there will be a lot of doubt. It is a necessity 
to be confident and determined” (Woodward 2003:259). 
Bush preferred a strong presidency. He admired former leaders who had a tough attitude 
toward ”the others.” Truman and Reagan`s direct style in meeting with communism, and 
Churchill`s leadership during World War II were seen as ideals. In the best Jacksonian 
tradition, Bush wanted to: ”scare the hell out of the enemy.” As he said: ”I want to have them 
quaking in their boots” (Woodwaard 2003:98).  
It is easy to be critical toward George W. Bush, but on the other hand he has successfully 
been able to promote himself as a man of the people. Unlike many of the U.S. elite politicians, 
Bush has managed to emerge as a common man. For better or worse, he was a Heartland 
America president. After the attack, many believed in his leadership. He was a major part in 
the grief process. He visited the ruins at Ground Zero and cried at his office later on. In the 
response to the attack, he took a cruel revenge on “the others.” 
4.2 Jacksonian Variation: Introducing Additional Theory With - The ”Moderate And 
Extreme Jacksonians” 
The common view of Svein Melby and Walter Russell Mead is that they view these 
president`s as Jacksonians (Melby 2004. Mead 2002). Does this mean that there is a 
connection between Truman and Bush? According to Melby, there are clear differences 
between Truman and Bush (Melby 2004:18). Melby explains that the Jacksonian tradition 
rarely gets any influence in American public politics. When the tradition got so much power 
under Bush, it was because of 9/11 and the unipolar situation (Melby 2004:39).  
The strong Jacksonian influences in American politics under Bush represented a totally new 
and aggressive style according to Melby. Bush is presented as the most extreme version of 
Jacksonian, while Truman`s foreign policy is being described as defensive-oriented toward 
cooperations (Melby 2004:17-18,149). As in the writings about the Wilsonian tradition, Mead 
seems to be simplifying and overlooking the existence of different wings within these 
traditions. Mead describes the Jacksonian mentality as a hard-line toward ”the others.”  
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The enemy has to be met with hard military measures. A Jacksonian prefers to hit as hard and 
as fast as possible (Mead 2002:254). Mead gives examples on this mentality telling that this 
was Oliver Cromwell`s (1599-1658) strategy in Ireland, Andrew Jackson`s strategy in the 
Creek Wars against the Indians, Douglas MacArthur`s strategy in Korea, and it was what the 
tradition wanted to do in Vietnam. Also during the Vietnam and Korean Wars there were 
serious proposals to use nuclear weapons (Mead 2002:256).  
My objection or addition to the typology can be summarized in the following questions: Does 
Mead really believe that all Jacksonians acclaimed military use in these places, and that they 
wanted to use nuclear weapons in Asia? Is it possible to argue that some Jacksonians have a 
more violent attitude than others? I will claim that some Jacksonians want to crush their 
enemies harder than others in the tradition. Not all the Jacksonians agree with military leaders 
as William T. Sherman (1823-1890) that the civilian population had to suffer in warfare, 
George C Patton’s (1885-1945) eagerness in entering a military crusade against communism 
(Lawrence and Jewett 2003:81), or Curtis la Mey`s (1906-1990) desire to use nuclear bombs 
during the Cuban missile crisis (Fog of the War: 2003 documentary).   
If the Jacksonian tradition is based on realism like Mead claims, it becomes a bit misleading 
that all Jacksonians support warfare in Iraq, Vietnam and Korea, and are willing to use 
nuclear weapons in these places (Mead 2002:245). Although Jacksonians are anti-intellectual, 
it is doubtful that all of them would agree that it is appropriate to engage in warfare in the 
periphery. We have to consider that Jacksonians are nationalists, and some nationalists regard 
a costly war in the periphery as something that may weaken the military capabilities to 
respond to other threats.   
It is possible to divide the tradition into two types, one moderate and one extreme. What is the 
basis for these theoretical divisions? By using Mead`s contrasting elements it is possible to 
argue for a division. The division becomes visible when we check out the tradition`s different 
values, such as liberalism versus conservatism, and optimism versus pessimism (Mead 
2002:248). By referring to these values, I will label one group as ”moderate Jacksonians.” 
These moderate ones embrace conservatism and pessimism in foreign affairs. They seek a 
hard-line policy, but in the name of the conservative realism they see the world as a center-
center geopolitical battle, not as a center-center-periphery battle. These Jacksonians would 
resist interventions that don’t favour the U.S. interests.   
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These ”moderate Jacksonians” would probably have been skeptical about attacking places like 
Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, unless it benefitted their nation. They embrace pessimism because 
they have little faith in human beings and the international society. The utopia is not around 
the corner; therefore a nation needs to have a strong military unit in the center (Mead 
2002:248). Often the isolationistic tradition, the Jeffersonians, and ”moderate Jacksonians” 
stand together in opposition to humanitarian interventions, or intervention in support of 
Wilsonian world-order initatives. But opposite to Jeffersonian, all Jacksonians have a great 
faith in military power, and moderate forces.  What about the other direction?  
The ”extreme Jacksonians” favors values as liberalism and optimism. These are the real 
dangerous warmongers in American politics. They differ from the moderate ones because 
they act a bit stronger offensive toward ”the others.” They see the world as a dangerous place, 
but are not as negative as the moderates. They sees few limitations in American power.  
Liberalism and optimism goes hand in hand in promoting national interests by intervening all 
over the world. In their eyes it is possible to promote a better world in every corner of the 
world by using military power.  
In order to elaborate the differences between these Jacksonians it can be productive to apply 
to a short historical overview, starting with commenting two representatives for each 
direction: Ronald Reagan and John Foster Dulles. 
4.3 A Historical Overview on Extreme and Moderate Jacksonians 
Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) and John Foster Dulles (1888-1954) have strong belonging to the 
Jacksonian tradition, but they are not the same type of Jacksonians. John Foster Dulles can be 
labeled as one of the few ”extreme Jacksonians” in American politics. Dulles who served as 
the U.S. Secretary of State under Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1953 to 1959, was a significant 
figure in the early Cold War era, advocating an aggressive stance against communism. Dulles 
compared the communism with the content in Hitler`s Mein Kampf (Gaddis 2005:135). In 
1950, he published “War or Peace”, a critical analysis of the American policy of 
containment. Dulles criticized the foreign policy of Harry S. Truman.  
He argued that containment should be replaced by a policy of liberation (Gaddis 2001:59). 
Although in the end he relied much on the containment policy, as a single person he appeared 
to be one representative of the ”extreme Jacksonians.” Dulles wanted to roll the Communism 
back in all over the world.  
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He threatened the Russians with massive nuclear retaliations, and stated that the differences 
with the Russians could not be removed by compromise (Whitfield 1996:7-8). In the 
Eisenhower-administration the ”extreme Jacksonians” did not gain total or hegemonic power. 
Some historians argue that the moderate real politicians (Jeffersonians), Dwight D. 
Eisenhower won the ideological battle in the administration (Gaddis 2005:126). 
Despite that Ronald Reagan implemented Dulles rollback policy during the 1980`s, he seems 
to be a solid representative for the moderate ones with his real political approach. Reagan 
embraced a conservative policy that strengthens the American nation against the Soviet 
Union. He built a strong army and intervened several places in order to secure American 
interests, but his policy of roughness never got too tough (Schweizer 2002). He never got 
stuck in a quagmire as Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973) did in Vietnam, or as Bush in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In Eastern Europe, Reagan was tough towards communism, but he acted 
carefully. Reagan never took the chance on warfare against Russian communism (Godbolt 
1994:290). 
Ronald Reagan as a ”moderate Jacksonians” can be compared with the politics of Richard 
Nixon (1913-1994) and Henry Kissinger (1923-). Although these three belong to the moderate 
direction, they are not totally the same type of politicians. In one way they have in common 
that they are classical conservative international thinkers. They think in terms of realism 
geopolitics (Nye 2007:5,148). But they are also influenced by the other traditions in Mead`s 
typology. Next to being moderate Jacksonian real politicians, Ronald Reagan was strongly 
influenced by Wilsonian mentality. He appears more populistic as Jacksonian than Nixon and 
Kissinger. The last two were in a larger degree affected by the intellectual Jeffersonian 
tradition. But they also embraced a tough foreign policy line. The same flexibility can be 
found within the ”extreme Jacksonians.” Also they operate within many of Mead`s traditions.  
In American politics there are few ”extreme Jacksonians.” But John Foster Dulles is not the 
only one. In order to explain the difference between these directions and arguing further for 
my additional theory, I will argue historically, and introduce some leaders with an ”extreme 
Jacksonian position. An arche-typical ”extreme Jacksonians” have often a military 
background with representatives such as William T. Sherman, Douglas MacArthur and 
George C. Patton.  
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More politically, Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt belong to this tradition. Let`s turn 
our attention toward some of these leaders, starting with William T. Sherman (1820-1891). 
Sherman was a general in the Union Army during the American Civil War (1861–65), for 
which he received recognition for his outstanding command of military strategy as well as 
criticism for the harshness of the “scorched earth” policies that he implemented in conducting 
total war against the Confederate States. Total war means a conflict of unlimited scope were 
the aim is to destroy the rival`s capacity to continue resistance. In Sherman`s warfare there 
were no differences between combatants and non-combatants. Sherman's advance march 
through Georgia was characterized by destruction of civilian infrastructure. Sherman told 
under a march that he would: "Make Georgia howl," and "Make its inhabitants feel that war 
and ruin are synonymous terms" (http://www.civilwarhome.com/shermanbio.htm). 
Further, he was responsible for the conduct of the Indian Wars. Like General Philip Sheridan 
(1831-1888), he believed that military control of the reservations was essential, and that 
Indians should be punished for misdeeds. He regarded Sitting Bull and the Sioux as outlaws 
and hostile savages. They had to feel the superior power of the Government, he once said 
(http://www.legendsofamerica.com/WE-IndianFighters.html#General%20George%20Crook).  
A representative in more modern time was Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), a highly 
decorated U.S. solider of war. The problematic part with MacArthur`s leadership was the fact 
that he saw little weakness in the American military maschine (Manchester 1978:693). He 
wanted not only to attack Korea, but totally destroy the country, and expand the war by using 
atomic weapons towards China 
(http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html).  
Although Lyndon B. Johnson`s warfare in Vietnam, after the escalation in 1968 are 
comparable to some of Sherman`s tactic, it would be absurd to categorize any president as a 
total one hundred percent ”extreme Jacksonian.” After the First World War, there is not a 
great deal of ”extreme Jacksonians ” president`s in American politics, but there were some 
politicians such as John Foster Dulles, or perhaps controversial presidential advisers/ministers 
as, Dean Acheson (1893-1971) and Zigniew Brzezinski (1928). In searching the period before 
World War I, a few ”extreme Jacksonian ” president`s appear. One of them, Andrew Jackson 
(1767-1845) was the seventh president of the United States. As already stated in the 
introduction, he is one of the originators of the hard-line in American politics.  
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He was the commander of the American forces at the Battle of New Orleans (1815), before he 
became president. The most controversial aspect of Jackson's presidency was his policy 
regarding America`s Indians. He leaded the war against the Creek Indians and the Cherokees 
in the Black Hawk War. Jackson was responsible for the removal of Indian tribes from their 
ancestral lands. The Norwegian historian Hans Olav Lahlum is applying the term ”mass 
murder” in describing the presidential Indian policy (Lahlum 2008:90). Even in the balanced 
biography “The Lion”, written by Jon Meacham, the President is promoted as an unstable 
killer. In commenting Jackson`s Indian policy Meacham talks about a massacre (Meacham 
2009:12). 
It can be objected to the categorization of Jackson as an extreme hard-liner that he was not 
especially rough against the Indians. Jackson lived, after all, in a time where hatred against 
the Indians flourished. The mentality of the white male supremacy was firmly understood in 
the U.S. long before and after Jackson. Yet, the fact that the Bureau of Indian Affairs were 
placed under the department of War, tells much about his methods toward Indians. The 
American government was brutal under Jackson, and an estimated 4.000 of the 16.000 
Cherokees were killed under his presidency (Meacham 2009:23). It was not just the Indians 
who experienced the cruelty of this President. Jackson was also ruthless against the Britons 
and Spanish. He feared an anti-American alliance between these groups. Actually, he was 
often ruthless in the pursuit of anyone he believed to be a threat to the world as he saw it. 
(Lahlum 2008:91). 
The Indian question was seen as one of security. To him, the tribes represented the threat of 
violence. This statement by Andrew Jackson represented probably much of his attitude: 
”With such arms and supplies as I can obtain I shall penetrate the Creek towns until 
the captive with her captors are delivered up, and think myself in laying waste their 
village, burning their houses, killing their warriors and leading into captivity their 
wives and children until I obtain a surrender of the captive and captors” (Meacham 
2009:95). 
Much can be said about a legendary president as Jackson. In that case Thomas Jefferson 
(1743-1826) summarized it well in describing Jackson as a dangerous man with strong temper 
and unstable emotions (Moen 2008:145). The other ”extreme Jacksonian” is Theodore 
Roosevelt (1858-1919), a man with a striking resemblance with Andrew Jackson.  
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Roosevelt was a war hero and like Jackson he is regarded as one of the builders of the 
Imperial U.S. While Jackson industrialized the country, Roosevelt expanded the U.S. sphere 
of interests further. Roosevelt was fascinated by international affairs and realized that the war 
with Spain had transformed USA from a provincial nation on the fringes of the global affairs 
into a world power. A major part of Roosevelt`s policies were characterized by his famous 
comment,"Speak softly and carry a big stick” (Miller 1994:87).  
The ”big stick” was often used under his presidency with nationalistic tendencies. The U.S. 
had to be a place for Americans in Roosevelt`s eyes. He argued strongly that Americans 
should have a proud place in their own country and the world (Miller 1994:97). To 
demonstrate American power he sent out the ”Great White Fleet” to display American power. 
”The Great White Fleet” is a nickname on the worldwide American navy battle fleet under 
this president. With this ”big stick politics”, he made it clear that the U.S. could use military 
power against Great Britain and Canada in a border dispute (Moen 2008:336). 
In 1905 the President made an amendment to the Monroe Doctrine, making it possible for the  
U.S. to intervene in order to secure economic interests in other places than Europe. A result of 
this was that the U.S. saw it as a legitim right to intervene in Cuba`s internal governance. 
Despite that the President received the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating an end to the Russo-
Japanese War, he was no dove in international politics. Despite the fact that his biographer 
Arthur Miller nuances the image of this president by telling about his gentle sides, he ends up 
concluding that he behaved imperialistic. In “Theodore Roosevelt, A Life”, he repeatedly 
refers to terms like imperialism and nationalism in relation to the President (Miller 1994).  
Presentations like this seem to be appropriate. Already before being president, Roosevelt built 
up a reputation in Dakota as a hard-liner of a cowboy (Moen 2008: 331). This cowboy image 
became no weaker when he got shot under a speech and demanded to continue talking to the 
crowd.  
Roosevelt`s ”extreme Jacksonian” style exists also in his formulations such as he wished a 
war welcome because the country needed one (Moen 2008:332) and quotes like: ” No triumph 
of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war” (Miller 1994:255). Theodore 
Roosevelt can be seen as a chauvinist on behalf of the white people. He advised Americans to 
wield power for a reason: “In pursuit of right and honor” (Pierce 2007:225).  
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It should be stated that the he was responsible for genocide in the Philippines. Over 250, 000 
of the civil population lost their lives in the conflict (Moen 2008:338).  
What about Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush in relation to my additional theory? Before 
starting the comparison, it has to be said that the distinction between ”moderate” and 
”extreme Jacksonians” cannot explain all features in American foreign policy. I state clearly 
that using this division is all about explaining how far some are willing go in order to secure 
the nation against ”the others.” Most of the time these two Jacksonians agree on following a 
tough line, but occasionally they are debating questions like: What can be regarded as a threat 
to American national security? What kind of geographical areas shall we protect? How far are 
we willing to go in order to protect American lives?  
The next part will direct it`s attention toward an investigation of Bush and Truman`s extreme 
or moderate Jacksonian rhetoric in their doctrines. Are there any Jacksonian differences or 
similarities between the president`s in the way they met ”the others”? 
4.4 The Doctrines: Meeting ”The Others” in an ”Extreme Jacksonian Manner”  
The Bush Doctrine is a central part in this survey. The main core in Bush`s policy is to be 
found in his doctrine. When researchers talk about this doctrine, they generally refer to these 
three sets of principles:  
1) the idea of preemptive action.  
2) the promoting of democracy. 
3)  regime change.  
When it comes to two of these, promoting democracy and regime change, we have already 
seen that Bush is not the only president who regarded these as high values in his foreign 
policy. In chapter three we saw that the Truman Doctrine was based on universal principles as 
political freedom and freedom from oppression. When the discontinuity research claims that 
Bush was extremely ambitious in his foreign policy it should have included Harry S. Truman 
as well. Both doctrines were Wilsonian dualistic in many ways. The doctrines consisted of  
”the empire of liberty thought”, a willingness to use force to promote the good society or Pax 
Americana. In this case, the discontinuity research underestimated the continuity aspects.  
The major question now is the debate surrounding point number one, the preemptive strike. 
How brutal will these Jacksonian president`s behave against ”the others”?  
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4.4.1 Preemptive Strike a New Element? 
The discontinuity research means that George W. Bush became revolutionary in embracing 
preemptive warfare in the controversial speech at West Point 2002 (Melby 2004:149-153 
Daalder and Lindsay 2005:120-121). Does this speech represent new elements in American 
politics? Here`s one of Bush`s remarks:  
”New threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive 
retaliation against those nations—means nothing against their shadowy terrorist 
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when 
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on 
missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies” (…)  
If we wait for threats for fully materialize, we will have waited too long” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html). 
What is Bush actually saying here? First of all he sounds like one of his heroes, Sir Winston 
Churchill (1874-1965). Churchill has stated a similar formulation by arguing: 
”If you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without a bloodshed, if you 
will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly: you may come to the 
moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against yours” (Kaufman 
2007:91). 
A definition of a preemptive strike can be: An attempt to repel or defeat a perceived inevitable 
offensive or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war before 
that threat materializes. ”The others” must be confronted at an early stage, any time before 
they become too dangerous. This emphasis on a unilateral preemptive strike shaped the 
administration reactions to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  
Bush decided to destroy the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which had provided shelter 
to the al-Qaida movement, and to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq for 
supposedly developing weapons of mass destruction. The discontinuity research obviously 
sees new elements in the ”extreme Jacksonian” attitude, promoted by the Bush and Churchill 
formulation above, telling that sometimes using force sooner can save much blood, toil, tears 
and sweat later. Melby argues repeatedly that Bush was more aggressive than any former 
president. Bush`s policy was based on a cowboy ”do it alone” style.  
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He was a Jacksonian, but a radical one (Melby 2002:33-35). Again, we see that Melby uses 
the four traditions a bit differently than Mead. While Mead claims that the U.S. became more 
itself after the attack, Melby saw new elements in it.  
A key point for Melby is that Bush extreme form as a Jacksonian almost never comes to 
power in American politics (Melby 2004:113). When it came to expression under Bush, it was 
a revolution. Melby goes further and claim that the speech at West-Point was revolutionary 
because Bush took a Jacksonian farewell with Truman`s foreign policy (Melby 2004:149-50). 
This is illustrated in the following formulation by Melby:  
“United States started a new course in relation to the outside world. While the Truman 
Doctrine of 1947 had dominated by a defensive alignment, and a reduced level of 
ambition, Bush proclaimed now a more aggressive style” (Melby 2004:149).  
The Norwegian researcher gets support from Daalder and Lindsay at this point. They claim 
that the Bush Doctrine was an innovative strategy. According to them, Bush left decades of 
long consensus that put containment at the heart of the American foreign policy 
(Daalder/Lindsay 2005:124).  
If Bush was abandoning the U.S. security strategy since the days of the Cold War, then he 
represented a revolution. There may be some new elements here to support his discontinuity 
research. In addition to the fact that the terrorist act was new in itself. The United States has 
almost never been hit by war. It is nearly 150 years ago since the civilian population was 
affected by war. Pearl Harbor was after all an attack on a military installation on Hawaii, not 
at the mainland America. From a continuity perspective none would deny the dangerous 
rhetoric in the U.S. after 9/11, but what`s new in it some may ask?  
Melvyn P. Leffler has argued persuasively that Bush`s radicalism has been powerfully 
overstated. In a comparative and historical perspective it is possible that Bush represented 
something familiar (Singh 2006:29). It is likely that Leffler is on to something. The concept of 
preemptive action is not new in history. It has been used since the beginning of time. Just like 
in Thucydides ancient time, there was in 2001 a need to strike the enemy before they could 
attack.  
When Bush warned at West Point that: ”Americans must be ready for preemptive action when 
necessary to defend our liberty and lives” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html), he seems to echo an old tradition 
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among ”extreme Jacksonians.” The best example of a country going to war against another 
nation for supporting and harboring terrorism is still Austria-Hungary`s attack on Serbia in 
1914. Austria-Hungary`s case for going to war rested on Serbian involvement in the 
assassination of the Austro-Hungarian crown prince in Sarajevo. Under the Iraq War there 
were arguments that the country needed to be struck before it acquired nuclear weapons.  
As Bush said: ”Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass 
destructions” (www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html).  
Truman is closely related to Bush`s rhetoric of action when a year after his doctrine on March 
17th 1948 he stated in a Special Message to the Congress on the threat to the freedom of 
Europe that: 
” I believe that we have reached the point at which the position of the United States 
should be make unmistakably clear. There are times in world history when it is far 
wiser to act than to hesitate” (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/audio/winCast.rss). 
Although the continuity perspective is building on a solid historical empirical basis it should 
not be overstated. When Leffler claims that there was nothing new in the doctrine, he 
undermines some of the new elements with Bush. Compared with the Truman Doctrine, the 
Bush formulation, preemptive strikes seems to be seeking a new way of dealing with the 
enemy. The West-Point speech tells clearly that containment means nothing. Containment is 
in the speech promoted as an old-fashioned way in dealing with menacing elements.  
Even if there is a rhetorical link between these president`s it is not that plainly formulated as 
is the case with Bush. After looking at Truman`s speeches, none of them have ever made the 
case for preemption in principle, let alone in the public. Why declare it out loud to the public? 
One answer to that is that by doing so Bush appears to be an ”extreme Jacksonian” acting on 
emotions, not in rational real politics, or Jacksonian moderate manner. By making preemptive 
action public the U.S. appears arrogant, unilateral and violent. There was little to gain, making 
it public. Recognize attack on someone before they act is an attack on international law.  
But, as one of the discontinuity researchers, Melby also contradicts his own research. New 
element exists, but Melby draw his conclusions too far in creating a dualism between Truman 
and Bush. If he accepts that Truman also is a Jacksonian, then he has to admit that a 
Jacksonian never acts defensive (Melby 2002:33). It exist different degrees of aggression 
among Jacksonian, but a Jacksonian prefers violent actions.  
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Walter Russell Mead gives examples of this by telling that spending money on the military is 
one of the best things a government can do in the Jacksonian tradition (Mead 2002:240). 
Jacksonians are skeptical about international diplomacy which they regard as weakness. In 
this context, Bush is not the only Jacksonian who has ignored international law. Throughout 
America`s history, president`s have debated the position and role of the United States in the 
world politics. The UN has always provoked mixed feeling in the U.S. There are many cases 
where U.S. has overlooked UN. The Cuban Missile crisis, the Vietnam War, Grenada, and 
Panama are other places.  
The U.S. has attacked international law several times before. It is nothing new that the 
Americans don`t feel they can rely upon the goodwill of others to secure its safety. Therefore 
they have acted alone several times. On the other side, they have never stated it as clearly as 
Bush did. How come? It is likely that he felt “the others” were menacing in a larger scale than 
before. In response the U.S. had to turn to an ”extreme Jacksonian” position in order to 
confront the new enemy. As Bush said at West Point 2006: ”The terrorists have no borders to 
protect, or capital to defend. They cannot be deterred—but they will be defeated”  
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html). 
4.4.2 Meeting a New Enemy? 
The discontinuity research claims that the term preemptive strike refers to more dangerous 
enemies than before (Melby 2002: 23-26 Daalder and Lindsay 2005:126). In the speech Bush 
was calling for: ”New thinking to match new threats.” The commander in chief told the 
newest generation of soldiers that the old Cold War Doctrine of Containment was no longer a 
sufficient basis for defending America:  
”We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats 
before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of 
action. And this nation will act.” (…) 
”Be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend 
our lives” (www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html). 
The discontinuity research is on to something by referring to this speech. By proclaiming the 
term in public Bush seems to be a new representative for the ”extreme Jacksonians.” But the 
research has a tendency to draw bold conclusions.  
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Did George W. Bush really take a radical departure from the policies that had defined 
America approach towards world affairs throughout the Cold War and beyond? According to 
Melby, he did so. He argues that Bush was abonding containment and the reliance on 
collective action in order to meet the new threat (Melby 2002:23). Even though Bush said so 
himself it is doubtful that the doctrine totally rejected containment. There is a difference 
between whats being said and the real action. The term preemptive action seems to be more a 
supplement in addition to these familiar strategies. It is likely not about replacing 
containment, it`s more about giving the strategy more strength (Gaddis 2004:86).  
Containment has for decades been the heart of the U.S. international policy. This strategy has 
led to good results and success. Why change everything when the formula is successful? The 
U.S. faces wider challenges than just terrorism. Several states will challenge the country in the 
future. Viewed in this way it is possible that containment still will regulate the relationship 
between the United States, China, Russia and Islamic nations.  
In these discussions, we must take into consideration the fact that the U.S. remains as one of 
few nations that possesses power to destroy any country if they wish to do so. But the fact that 
the U.S. has greater power than everyone else does not mean it can impose it`s will on 
everyone else. From this perspective, containment still operates at all levels of politics. But 
the term preemptive action tells a great deal about ”the others”. Are ”the others” in a larger 
degree more dangerous than previously?  
Preemption is a radical term. It has to be there for a reason. It has never been stated so clearly 
publicly during the Cold War or in the 90`s. No ”normal” president, in a nuclear age, would 
have risked another Pearl Harbor. In this Cold War context the ”extreme Jacksonians” never 
got total control.  
In examining the West Point speech, the most radical aspect is the concept of the new security 
environment. It implies a dark future telling that ”the others” are more dangerous than ever. 
The combination of a stateless enemy with dangerous weapons can create a stronger enemy 
than previously. It creates fear for Armageddon if they get their hand on an atomic bomb. 
Viewed like this, there are many good arguments that ”the others” represent a greater threat. 
In Truman's time in office, states were the main participants in the international system.  
The states represented the security challenges during the Cold War (Melby 2002:23). The 
enemies Bush met are often referred to as the new borderless enemies.  
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When a challenge finally came, on 9/11, it was not from a state, but from a group. The 
terrorists acted on behalf of no state, although al Qaida was operating from a base in 
Afghanistan, it is not likely that containment could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. Terrorists 
attack as states never do, from the sanctuary provided by anonymity: how does one negotiate 
with a shadow? How does one deal with someone who`s prepared to commit suicide? They 
have no country to lose, no economy to worry about, and no love of life. Easily expressed: 
States will survive, terrorists don`t care. While states want to follow international game ship 
and seek good reputation in the international society, terrorists don`t take these things into 
consideration (Gaddis 2005).  
Several factors indicate that Bush had to deal with a more dangerous enemy than what 
Truman confronted. Terrorists cannot be controlled in the same way as communists. In this 
environment it is understandable that some ”extreme Jacksonians” are questioning the 
strategy of containment. Can it function in an environment in which states are no longer the 
principal threats to be contained? Regarded as this the discontinuity research has a point 
arguing for differences between meeting ”the others” for Bush and Truman. But is it possible 
to claim that president`s also had a common threat they had to deal with? 
4.4.3 Meeting ”The Others” as an Ideological Enemy 
When Melby describes Bush as an aggressive Jacksonian transformer in American policy, he 
is also doing so by referring to three main directions in American foreign policy.  
These are: 
1) The Instutionalists.  
2) The Realists. 
3) Expansionists 
According to Melby, the Institutionalists is keen in supporting the international community, 
and would legitimize the U.S. foreign policy in international norms and rules.  
Real politicians have a vision that the U.S. should relate to the world as it is, not as the U.S. 
wish it to be. Morality is seen as a dangerous path to follow in real politics. The U.S. must 
avoid going out in the world in trying to promote Western values. The U.S. should think 
about geopolitical and strategical interests.  
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The last direction is the one Melby connects with Bush, expansionism. In expansionism there 
is a strong belief in the U.S. power. The U.S. should act alone. Institutions as UN weakens the 
nation`s great power. Melby claims that the U.S. under Bush became expansionistic and 
imperialistic (Melby 2004:230).  
A division like this one can provide a solid explanation in understanding the battle between 
the international direction`s ways to deal with ” the others.” With these three typologies he is 
explaining Bush policy by referring to the same directions as Daalder and Lindsay. In “The 
Bush revolution” Daalder and Lindsay understand Bush as an anti-realist. Bush did not return 
to his father`s hard-nosed real politics. He wanted to meet ”the others” on a global scale with 
preemptive action (Renshon 2004). So far, Bush appears to be a typical representative of the 
”extreme Jacksonians” or as Melby claims, an ”aggressive expansionists” (Melby 2004:231).  
Taken into consideration that history to a large degree is a battle of interpretations, these 
labels can turn out to be a matter of debate. When politicians during the Cold War went on a 
global warfare against the communist threat, they have often been marked as internationalists 
or interventionists, not as expansionists. A historical understanding like this needs some 
refinements. Why apply the label expansionist in referring to Bush? Is Truman and other Cold 
War president`s innocent Jacksonian interventionists? Was Bush the only aggressive anti-
realist in the U.S. history?  
In this discussion, we must not forget that communism was seen as a great threat toward the 
U.S. on a global scale. Why should the U.S. spend money, sacrifice young lives and fight in 
the four corners of the world, some may ask. The doctrinal sentence:”Out and help suppressed 
people in the world.” was in some American`s eyes a dangerous path to follow 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandoctrine.html). 
In this connection, it is time to clear our one mistake in the presentation of history. There are 
not enormous, almost dualistic differences between meeting ”the others” now and then. 
Meeting ”the others” during the Cold War was by no means only based on state versus state 
containment.  
This view represents a simplification of the reality. Just like under the Bush period, former 
U.S. presidents tried to stop not only states, but also ideological movements. It is unfortunate 
that the discontinuity research ignores the fact that former president`s regarded ”the others” as 
an ideological enemy.  
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By including a historical perspective in this paper, it seems like the Bush and Truman 
Doctrine`s take it`s place in an extended family of grand statements of aggressively global 
purpose, or democratic imperialism.  
While many of the founding fathers were skeptical about going abroad on an ideological 
battle for ”searching monsters to destroy”, one of them, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) laid 
the foundation for American global expansionism in his speech at Gettysburg in 1863. In his 
Gettysburg address he proclaimed: ”God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth” 
(http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/lincoln/gettysburg.html).  
According to Lincoln a global tradition exists in the U.S. The doctrines then become 
controversial. The historian Robert H. Ferrell puts it pertinent when he uses the word ”global 
crusade” in describing the Truman Doctrine (Ferrell 1994:252).  In comparison to the 
discontinuity  research it is interesting that they are using the same label, ”crusade” on the 
Bush Doctrine (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:78).  
This is further evidence of these president`s focus on a worldwide perspective. In their 
doctrine, they seem to create a partnership between Jacksonians and Wilsonians. While the 
Jackonians see a clear danger in the terrorist`s spread of nuclear weapons or communist 
takeover, the Wilsonian recognized opportunities to remove a repulsive regime and spread 
democracy throughout the Middle-East or Asia.  
The president`s global policy is to be found in their warfare in Iraq and Korea. Can we then 
compare the president`s when it comes to meeting ”the others” in a tough Jacksonian manner 
in the Korean and Iraq War? 
4.5 After 1948 and 2001: Meeting a Global Enemy: The ”Extreme Jacksonians” 
Strengthen Their Position  
Meeting the enemy at a global scale is in international politics a dangerous and controversial, 
but not a new pattern. As Thomas Aquinas once stated: ”We do not seek peace to be at war, 
but go to war in hope that we may have peace” (Kaufman 2007:92). On one side the U.S. 
often enters limited warfare in order to secure wealth, resources, and security. On the other 
side, the state is also applying global warfare in order to promote peace and security beyond 
its own borders. After 1948 and 9/11, this combination is present.  
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After 1948 with Truman and after 9/11 with Bush, a context of pressure lay a solid foundation 
for growth in the ”extreme Jacksonian” attitudes. 
In 1948-49, several closely related events made people shake like a leaf. During this time, the 
Soviet Union had tightened its grip on Eastern Europe, blasted its first atomic bomb, while 
China were lost to the Communists, and the ”red danger” won ground in Korea. All these 
events, including the Alger Hiss case and the growing communist activity in Europe, probably 
increased the fear and hatred towards communism.  
The level of fear is comparable to 9/11 where many Americans were skeptical toward people 
with a background from the Middle-East. After 9/11 several people were afraid of driving in 
tunnels in American cities, or taking domestic flight (Moen 2005:12). During the Cold War, 
we find much of the same hysterical fear. Communists were hunted down by intelligence 
agencies in alliance with leading politicians. The Newspapers had daily  headlines about the 
”red danger”, students had training in hiding under school desks to protect themselves from 
nuclear fallout from Russian warheads, and since 1939 the employees of the Government had 
to swear under oath that they were not communists.  
The fear was already in 1949 so high that 63 percent of the Americans believed in war against 
Soviet Union within the next 25 years (Godbolt 1994:73). A Gallup in 1949 showed that 70 
percent of Americans supported the use of nuclear weapons against the Communists 
(Whitfield 1996:5). The fear became no less when the Soviet launched a “Hate America 
Campaigns” (Giles 2002:49). For those who saw communists as radical people seeking world 
domination, inspired by the Marxian ultimate aim: the destruction of the capitalist state, it 
must have been a scary time living under the Cold War.  
When North Korea finally attacked South-Korea after Stalin had given Kim IL Sung the go 
ahead to reunify the country by military means, the climax of fear was reached. In the U.S, 
there was an attitude saying that something had to be done to prevent communism from going 
further (Godbolt 1994:91-3). 
4.5.1 The Korean War 1950-1953 
 ”Seeing Red” and ”Containment with a Global Twist”  
Harry S. Truman went to a military battle against the “red danger” in Asia. Acting under two 
resolutions passed by the UN Security Council, he ordered armed forces against North Korea 
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in June 1950 led under General Douglas MacArthur. This resulted in a bloodshed that lasted 
for three years until a truce was signed in 1953. The way Truman replied to those challenges 
is often referred to as: "the great transformation in American foreign policy" (Lundestad 2000 
Gaddis 2005). As I will argue, the strengthing of the ”extreme Jacksonians” in American 
policy. This context affected Truman`s rhetoric in a large degree.  
When the English historian Thomas Carlyle once wrote that all of history is the biography of 
the great men, he was mistaken (http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/historyov.html). 
All leaders, even great powerful ones as Truman and Bush, govern in a set of circumstances 
that precedes them. What`s more, they must deal with circumstances as they develop, rather 
than as they wish them to be. The attack by North Korea came actually as a total surprise 
(McCullough 1992:777). The last American troops had been withdrawn from South Korea. 
Truman had not expected an attack on South Korea at all. In a Bush manner, Truman knew he 
had to act quickly before it was too late. 
Three of Truman`s speeches in my selections, one of them the Inaugural Address from 20th  
January 1949 and two Annual Messages to the Congress, 4th January 1950 and January 8th  
1951, reflected this context of fear. These speeches are based on an anti-communistic rhetoric. 
In the Annual Message to the Congress in 1950, Truman told that communism was 
threatening the following values: freedom, better life, honesty, democracy, cooperation, 
peace, prosperity and free choice (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm).  
The rhetoric was followed up by military actions. There is historical evidence on this 
transformation in scientific work done by Geir Lundestad and John Lewis Gaddis. These 
historians pointed out that Truman in this context, tripled the defense budget when he 
approved the National Security Council, also known as NSC-68 (Lundestad 2000:133). After 
some discussions Truman accepted the logic and policy recommendations of NSC 68, 
outlined by the National Security Council in April 1950. This document dictated the main 
lines of American defense policy for much of the Cold War. The document wanted a 
fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, and stopped Soviet dominance in the 
Eurasian landmass (Kissinger 1994:462).  
It can be stated that this document laid the foundation for an expansion of military and 
economic aid to Asia. The man behind this document was Paul Nitze. Nitze, the director of 
policy planning, can be described as an “extreme Jacksonian”.  
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The best way to win against the Russians according to Nitze was to prepare a nuclear clash. 
Or as he once said: “If you want peace prepare for war” (Thompson 2009:3). 
This point about a new aggressive line is further elaborated upon by John Lewis Gaddis in, 
“The United States and the Orgins of the Cold War.” Gaddis argues that, while previous 
containment policies sought to block Soviet expansion by a variety of political, economic, 
psychological and military measures, NSC 68 concentrated on militarily measures, stressing 
the need for the United States to be able to respond military whenever and wherever 
aggression took place (Gaddis 2005:104-105).  
In Truman`s 1951 Annual Message to the Congress he is supporting this military buildup by 
proclaiming: ”We are going to produce all the weapons and equipment that such an armed 
forced will need” (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm).  
The Americans felt they had to take a tougher stand against communism. And so they did. In 
a Radio speech to the American people on the 11th April 1951, Truman declared with an 
”extreme Jacksonian” rhetoric the following message: 
”The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out 
our freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be 
numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United 
States cannot- and will not sit idly by and await foreign conquest. (…) 
“If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression elsewhere in the world is a 
threat to the peace everywhere in the world.  
When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation 
who are bent on conquest, it becomes a dear and present danger to the security and 
independence of every nation.” (…) 
“The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the communist 
have yet made. The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of 
Asia” (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=290). 
 
As the speech expressed, what made the communists a gigantic threat was not only the danger 
of territorial aggression but the fact that the ”reds” could challenge, take over, or replace the 
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western political system. In the November 6th 1950 Address, the President gave the same kind 
of warning: 
”We are confronted by Communist imperialism- a reactionary movement that despises 
liberty, and is the mortal foe of personal freedom. The threat of Communist aggression 
is a continuing menace to world peace. So long as they persist in that course, the free 
nations have but one choice if they are to remain free. They must oppose strength with 
strength” (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13658). 
Given this belief that the Soviet state and ideology would advance anywhere there was an 
opening, Truman decided that it was time to frustrate Soviet ambitions. It was time to show 
the Soviet that the cost of imperialism was greater than the reward. So when Lundestand and 
Gaddis argued that the expansionistic direction in the Truman administration was 
strengthened because of the communist fear, they are on to something. The Korean War was 
believed to be a result of a communist struggle for world domination, as illustrated by these 
quotes above by Truman. The idea of the enemy being a part of some vast conspiracy was not 
unique to Truman or the Korean War.  
The most famous example would occur some years later during the Vietnam War with the 
domino theory. As we see in these speeches, Soviet was first of all not seen as a nation with 
limited aims and objectives, but as an evil, repressive, expansionistic empire driven by an evil 
ideology as perverse as Nazism. John Lewis Gaddis put major stress on this escalation of the 
war against communism in “Strategies of Containment.” Here, he claims that Truman put 
George F. Kennan, one of the fathers of the geographically limited containment policy on trial 
(Gaddis 2005:81).  
The diplomat George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was skeptical to the Soviet Union. Kennan had 
worked in Russia during Stalin's regime of terror and had seen the cruelty in the system. He 
disliked Roosevelt`s diplomatic trading with the Russians (Pierce 2007:169). In his famous 
long telegram of 1946 he expressed little confidence in the U.S.-Soviet friendship. The 
telegram described communism as a: ”Malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased 
tissue” (Lawrence/Jewett 2003:85).  
Kennan wanted a tough policy toward the communists by claiming that until the Iron Curtain 
is lifted there could be no safe security (Giles 2002:80). According to Kennan there could be 
no permant peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union (Pierce 2007:168).  
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He described the view from Kremlin as neurotic backwardness (Jespersen 2002:4). Despite a 
strong anti-Soviet position, Kennan seems to be a mix of a ”moderate Jacksonian” and 
defensive Jeffersonian realist. In a Jacksonian tradition he regarded power as the only 
language the Russians understood.  
On the other hand, he was skeptical toward Truman`s worldwide battle against communism. 
He disliked the Truman-Doctrine for being too ambitious (Pierce 2007:169). What was 
required in Kennan’s thinking was not to remake the world in the image of the U.S, but rather 
to preserve its diversity against attempts to remake it in the image of others (Gaddis 2005:55). 
Kennan had a prescription on a particularistic rather than universal concept of American 
security interests. 
Truman expressed in his speeches, willingness to battle against communism on a global scale. 
It was seen as a necessity, because as Truman said: ”The aggression in Korea is part of the 
attempt of the Russian Communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step.” Or as he 
declared later on in the same speech: 
”The threat of world conquest by Soviet Russia endangers our liberty and endangers 
the kind of world in which the free spirit of man can survive” 
(www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm).  
In communicating with George Elsey about the Korean War, he gave the same argument as 
Truman by telling: ”He (Truman) was strongly in opposition to all efforts by USSR to expand 
its influence of behalf on the United States and the rest of the non-communist world 
(Interview George Elsey 6th January 2010). Again we find the global perspective present. As a 
result of this, the tone got tougher in the Korean War.  
Truman was ”seeing red”, he overlooked Kennan`s advise by arguing in a ”extreme 
Jacksonian” manner: “If we are tough enough now, there won`t be any next time” 
(McCullough 1992:785).  
With this development, Kennan had to resign. In the aftermath it became obvious that the 
Americans had been rough enough. In the Korean War, over four million people got killed. 
The President created no less tense atmosphere when he told the press that the U.S. had 
considered using nuclear weapons against Korea (Gaddis 2005:48). In that way Shawn Parry 
Giles has probably a point when he argues in “the Rhetorical Presidency”, that the U.S. after 
1949 had a militaristic rhetoric (Giles 2002).  
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So far, Truman appears to be a ”extreme Jacksonian.” On the other hand, the President seems 
not to be an arche-typical representative for this direction. He saw the danger in nuclear 
weapons. In his Farwell Address he stated: ”Starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for 
rational men” (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059). In another 
statement, before the war, Truman proclaimed a anti-ideal for a Jacksonian: ”I don`t want to 
go to war” (McCullough 1992:780).  
Warfare in Korea was a costly affair for an old New Dealer like Harry S. Truman. The high 
price tag on the warfare made the domestic social reforms impossible. The image of Truman 
as an ”extreme Jacksonian” becomes even weaker when he, in the Korean War, was able to 
mobilize the UN Security Council to endorse collective security.  
In contrast to George W. Bush Iraq War, the UN gave its support for this action by sending 
troops to Korea, but on the other hand it weakened the operations legitimacy that this was 
only possible because the Soviet was then boycotting the Security Council. Neither was China 
a part of the Security Council at this time. It should also be noted that most contributing 
nations acted primarily under American pressure. This pressure was at one hand formal, 
because Europeans were fearful of Soviet offenses in Europe. They needed the Americans 
support. More informal, it is unlikely that it was possible to deny supporting the nation that 
was rebuilding them, provide Marshall-Aid and protect the free world.  
Truman was never leaving the ”moderate Jacksonian” real politics totally. He was careful 
about using too much Jacksonian rhetoric. He did not apply the term ”war” in speeches about 
Korea. Truman legitimized the intervention as a ”police action.” A description that failed to 
give Americans enough feeling that the country was in danger (Ferrell 1984:210).  
Despite that Kennan had to leave office in 1949 because it was clear that his 
recommendations no longer carried the weight they once had, this did not mean that Kennan`s 
influence was over. As Gaddis notes, many of Kennan`s recommendations were implemented 
during the Cold War (Gaddis 2005:87).  
In addition to not giving up on the real politics, Truman stopped General MacArthur`s desire 
to expand the Korean War. When the general disobeyed orders and declared wishes to attack 
China with nukes, the President fired “Mr.Prima Donna” (Ferrell 1984:211). The picture of 
Truman as a non-extreme Jacksonian is also strengthened with his response to McCarthyism.  
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The President spoke against the hysteric sort of anticommunism that was hurting the U.S. 
more than it gained the nation. Truman expressed that he disliked McCarthyism when he 
declared that Joseph McCarthy was a ”Pathological liar” (Keyes 1995:12).  
However, it would be too simplifying to regard Truman only as a ”moderate Jacksonian.” He 
never took a stand against anti-communistic hawks. In one way he rejected McCarthyism, but 
he was replacing the earlier stereotypes of Russia as well-intentioned and cooperative as 
propagated by the Roosevelt administration. He pointed out repeatedly that Russia`s foreign 
policy advanced through military conquests (Godbolt 1994:64). In practice, he seems to have 
balanced between a moderate and extreme form of Jacksonian.  
In the following two speeches Truman expresses a belonging to both camps. In the first, 
Annual Message to the Congress 1951, the President proclaimed: 
” If Western Europe were to fall to Soviet Russia it would double the Soviet supply of 
coal and triple the Soviet supply of steel. If the free nations of Asia and Africa should 
fall to Soviet Russia, we would lose the sources of many of our vital raw material, 
including uranium, which is the basis for our atomic 
power”(www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm). 
Truman argues in a moderate Jacksonian real political manner in telling that he goes to war 
because of geopolitics and resources. Behind this formulation is probably a conservative real 
political fear of losing Japan (Elsey 2005). Americans were afraid of losing control in Asia, 
and especially Japan (Leffler 1992:391). Truman says nothing about going to war in order to 
”save” the world. It is all about strengthing the U.S. position. In the following speech, given 
the same year in front of a national radio and television audience, the President appears to be 
an ”extreme Jacksonian”: 
”If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new 
acts of aggression elsewhere. (…) 
“We cannot hope to maintain our freedom if freedom elsewhere is wipped out” 
(http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=861&st=&st1=). 
These sentences have some ”moderat Jacksonian” features. Maybe there was a need to protect 
a weak nation? If the aggression had succeeded, it would have destroyed the American 
strategic position in East-Asia.  
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On the other hand, this content is about going to global war to ”save” the world. Free nations 
are in danger if the U.S. does not act. This is similar to what Bush told in his Second 
Inaugural Addresses: ”The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success 
of liberty in other lands” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush_georgew/second_inaugural.html).  
These statements made by Truman and Bush are typical expressions of the ”extreme 
Jacksonians marriage with the ”war-hungry Wilsonians” in conflicts. Applying the American 
hegemonic power for military purposes are not an intervention made by Bush. The 
formulations above created the foundation for American dominance in the world.  
By regarding the battle as a global one, Truman lays the foundation for several ”extreme 
Jacksonian” interventions based on ”containment with a global twist.” The worse of them was 
the Vietnam War. Later on in the 50`s, Truman`s words were characterized as the domino 
theory (Mead 2002:61). 
What about Bush and the Iraq War? Let us turn then to a closer comparison between these 
president`s. The 9/11 attacks on America resulted in president Bush altering the course of his 
administration`s foreign policy from the traditional approach of republican realists, like his 
father, toward a global battle just as Truman partly did in his days as president.  
4.5.2 Comparing The Iraq and Korean War: Learning From “The Correct History” 
Prior to the Iraq-war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed 
that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to their security. 
According to George W. Bush, liberty for the Iraqi people was a great moral cause and a great 
strategic goal, and the people of Iraq deserved freedom. Saddam was promoted as a brutal 
dictator, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. He had to be 
overthrown! He had connections to al-Qaida (Singer 2004:154).  
Bush played on emotions in telling that Saddam`s regime once ordered the killing of every 
person between the age of fifteen and seventy in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq 
(Singer 2004:168). Claims that the Bush-Administration exaggerated the threat and evidence 
of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities would eventually become a major point of 
criticism for the President.  
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Like Truman warned against a worldwide communism conspiracy, Bush was speaking about 
a global network of terrorists: 
”We know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that 
use terrorism to undermine Middle-East peace. We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda 
terrorist network share a common enemy – the United States of America” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html). 
George W. Bush and Harry S. Truman had one thing in common, and that was dealing with a 
homely pressure. In this situation, they seem to have learned from the ”correct history” when 
it comes to meeting threats from ”the others.” The 9/11 incident and the outbreak of the 
Korean War, gave rise to the demand for a new kind of leadership. Campaigning against ”the 
others” required a strong presidential leadership.  
The main question for both became, How far shall a dictator and tyrant be allowed to go 
before a Jacksonian president will employ military force against them? For George W. Bush, 
it was remembering history in the 1930`s, the Truman years 1945-1953 and the 90`s. Before 
the 9/11 attack, Bin Laden was already responsible for many earlier attacks against the U.S. 
targets, including the bombing of USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and U.S. embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998. Bin Laden had often proclaimed his deep hatred for the United States. 
During the 90`s, he had established a large infrastructure in Afghanistan with the support of 
the Taliban. With the 9/11 attack the “cup had overflowed.” When 3000 American people 
died in this act of terror, Bush pulled together a War Council. It was the ”extreme 
Jacksonians” time to tell Bin Laden that his acts of terror and hatred toward the U.S. had to 
stop.  
Also, Saddam Hussein had a bad record with the Americans. He attacked Iran in 1980 and 
Kuwait in 1990, and he fired missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Israel. It is likely that the 
Bush administration thought they heard some echoes of the World War II inability to act 
against Hitler. The Americans argued they had to act before it was too late.  
Bush stated this view by telling: ”Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final 
proof-the smoking gun-that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html). 
The mistake from World War II of being too soft on dictators could not repeat itself. In the 
respond, it was clear that history had taught him that Americans could not let dictators and 
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tyrants play their game without meeting consequences. The oratorical framework in Bush`s 
case for war included the following elements, arousing the fears created by the horrific 9/11 
terrorist attacks, warning about the growing danger of terrorism, highlighting Saddam 
Hussein’s cruelty and aggression against neighbourstates, and warning about Iraq desire for 
weapons of mass destruction. Bush and Truman relied then on much of the same kind of 
rhetoric, a propaganda based on fear.  
As Truman said: ”If this (communist aggression) was allowed to go unchallenged, it would 
mean a third world war” (McCullough 1992:777). Truman operated probably under a similar 
context as Bush did. In 1945 after World War II, it was clear that the policy of appeasement 
had failed. The result of the 1930`s failure was a horrific savagery, culminating in the 
Holocaust. Some fear that the cataclysm that befell Europe in the 1930`s could easily happen 
again. In this situation, the U.S. had to behave strong, not weak and demoralized to Soviet 
aggression from abroad. In addition to this, a series of frustrating reverses overcame 
American illusions that the war had eliminated threats to freedom. Disagreements over the 
occupation of Germany, Austria and Japan arose very quickly, Russian pressure on Iran, 
Greece and Turkey mounted. All these incidents urged for a response.  
Communism could not take over places in the world without meeting consequences. As in the 
40`s, and 50`s, after 9/11 it is likely that many Americans feared that history could repeat 
itself. America had been under attack. The great nation was vulnerable after all. There was 
probably a strong mentality among people saying, this tragedy must never happen again.  
Although Bush was talking about the differences between the enemies now and earlier, he did 
accept some similarities. As he said at West Point in 2006:  
”Like the Cold War, we are fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that despises 
freedom, crushes all dissent, has territorial ambitions, and pursues totalitarian aims” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html).  
In this context, Bush went on a harsh global warfare against an invisible ideological enemy. 
Bush came to Congress for statutory authority to act military first against the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and later against Iraq. Truman did not follow the same course of action. 
Unlike Bush, Truman never came to Congress after the facto of war to seek legislative 
approval for his actions. He was ”seeing red” and went to war without the Congress approval.  
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It is impossible to disagree with the discontinuity research seeing Bush as an expansionist, or 
as labeled in this task, an ”extreme Jacksonian.” But as we have seen, little suggests that Bush 
was alone. When he was arguing for interventions in Iraq, he sounded like Truman in the 
Korean War. The following three Bush statements can illustrate a connection between these 
president`s: 
1:”As in the defense of Greece in 1947, and later in the Berlin Airlift, the strength and will of 
free people are now being tested before a watching world. And we will meet this test” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html). 
2:”Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will no end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” 
(http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html). 
3:. ”As long as the Middle-East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will 
remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread 
of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and friends” 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html). 
The two first remarks tell us that this is a battle for democracy. The battle is promoted as a 
global one. If we in the third statement had switched out the words ”Middle-East”, ”al Qaida” 
and replaced these with, ”Russia” or ”Communism” it could easily have sounded like a 
Truman speech. In these three statements, like Truman, Bush states that he must stop the 
enemy before they not only hurt the U.S. but the whole world as well, and it has to be done 
before it`s too late. In comparing the Iraq and the Korean War, we must take into 
consideration the fact that both wars were controversial.  
Many years have passed since the end of the Korean War. Now (2010) it is more than 60 
years since it began. Most Americans today are born after this war. There was little media 
coverage during this warfare compared to Iraq in 2003. It is unfavorable that the memory of 
the Korean War has nearly vanished.  We must not forget the opposition the U.S. had against 
this war, just as with Bush and his decision to attack Iraq.  
By examining Truman`s rhetoric during this conflict, it seems a bit uniform to characterizes 
his foreign policy as defensive (Melby 2004:149). Even Truman himself once told that the 
American purpose was much broader than the containment policy (Pierce 2007:226).  
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Some of the letters the President received from ordinary Americans show opposition against 
going to war in Korea. An example is: “In heaven`s name what are you doing? The blood 
hasn`t dried from World War II… We have nothing to do with Korea.” Another example is: 
“We demand that you stop murdering American boys and Korean people” (McCullough 
1992:791). 
But there are also clearly differences between the president`s under these wars, both in 
content and formulation. Bush sometimes sound harsher than Truman. While Truman avoided 
referring to the term ”war,” Bush refers to this term 25 times in my source selection regarding 
the Iraq War. Bush has a stronger belonging to the “extreme Jacksonians. On the other hand, 
it can be stated that the differences are not so great after all. Bush appeared to be a ”moderate 
Jacksonians” with embracing conservative real politics as well. His bold rhetoric did not 
always lead to equally blunt actions.  
He did not rush towards confrontation against Kim Jung IL. More of the opposite happened. 
Bush took part in a slow dance with North Korea in an attempt to get them to reduce their 
nuclear weapons (Renshon 2004:151). After 9/11, Bush had to resist some ”extreme 
Jacksonians” in the American society. Some of them wanted to utilize nuclear weapons 
against the “terrorist-states” after the attack. Some even wanted to drop nuclear bombs over 
Mecca (Davies/Ziauddin 2002). Others wanted to go further than Iraq by using the arche-
Jacksonian formulation: ”Everyone want to go to Baghdad. Real men wants to go to Tehran” 
(David Hastings Dunn 2003). Another point is that the President did not rush to war as critics 
has claimed, but made a genuine effort to forge a consensus at the UN.  
The next chapter will investigate whether George W. Bush was a revolutionary cowboy. 
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4.6 SUMMARY CHAPTER 4 
Is it really true that George W. Bush was a revolutionary Jacksonian president? There is little 
doubt about George W. Bush being a typical Jacksonian. When it comes to Truman, people 
disagree about his presidency. But several researchers label him as a hard-liner. In this 
research Truman appears to be quite noisy. Truman`s rough style is reflected in his rhetoric. 
He appears to be a typical representative of Heartland America. With this perspective he is a 
Jacksonian as well.   
As with the Wilsonian tradition, there are variations within the Jacksonian tradition. I have 
characterized these as the “moderate” and “extreme” Jacksonians. Both traditions prefer 
violence and toughness, but the extreme acts a bit more offensive toward  ”the others.” In the 
“extreme Jacksonians” worldview it is possible to promote a better world in every corner of 
the world by using military power. In U.S politics there is a tradition for “extreme 
Jacksonians.” 
The best argument given by the discontinuity research is that Bush embraced preemptive 
warfare in his speech at West Point in 2002. Was Bush an “extreme Jacksonian”, a political 
revolutionary who were willing to do whatever it took to secure the goal he saw as necessary 
and desirable? There may be some new elements here to support the discontinuity research. 
The terrorist act was new in itself. U.S has never been under attack like this before.  
After looking at Truman`s speeches, none of them have ever made the case for preemption in 
principle, let alone in the public. By doing so Bush appears to be an ”extreme Jacksonian” 
acting on emotions, not in rational real politics. 
However, the concept of preemptive action is not new in history. It has been used since the 
beginning of time. Jacksonians have always been skeptical to international diplomacy. In this 
context, Bush is not the only Jacksonian who has ignored international law. Throughout 
America`s history, president`s have debated the position and role of the United States in the 
world politics. It is nothing new that the Americans don`t feel they can rely upon the goodwill 
of others to secure its safety. Therefore they have acted alone several times.  
Several factors indicate that Bush had to deal with a more dangerous enemy than what 
Truman confronted. Terrorists cannot be controlled in the same way as communists.  
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In this environment it is understandable that some ”extreme Jacksonians” are questioning the 
strategy of containment. However, in this discussion we must not forget that also communism 
was seen as a great threat toward the U.S. on a global scale. Just like under the Bush period, 
former U.S. president`s tried to stop not only states, but also ideological movements.   
After 1948 with Truman and after 9/11 with Bush, a context of pressure lay a solid foundation 
for growth in the ”extreme Jacksonian” attitudes. In 1948-49, several closely related events 
made people insecure. For those who saw communists as radical people seeking world 
domination, it must have been a scary time living under the Cold War.  
Under the Korean War, Truman talked about a domino effect. He warned against a 
communist takeover. In this context he used a Bush like rhetoric. By regarding the battle as a 
global one, Truman layed the foundation for several ”extreme Jacksonian” interventions 
based on ”containment with a global twist”. But Truman was never leaving the ”moderate 
Jacksonian” real politics totally. He did not apply the term ”war” in speeches about Korea, he 
took a stand against MacArthur and he legitimized the intervention as a ”police action.”   
But he never took a final stand against anti-communistic hawks. Truman expresses a 
belonging to both camps. In some speeches he argues real political, others are more about 
saving the world. 
Under Truman and Bush, the “extreme Jacksonians” used historical experience to tell the 
enemy that the mistake from World War II of being too soft on dictators could not repeat 
itself. When George W. Bush argued for interventions in Iraq, he sounded like Truman in the 
Korean War. The aggression of “the others” had to be stopped in order to save the global 
democracy.  
Placing Bush alone as a one hundred percent ”extreme Jacksonian” would be a mistake. In 
doing so we are judging him by overlooking his successors, like Truman. It is an 
oversimplification to regard the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment in Korea just 
as reflecting ”moderate Jacksonian” geopolitical calculations alone. Truman`s rhetoric 
reflected some vital values and beliefs from ”extreme Jacksonians”, such as belief in America 
military power and defeating enemies in every corner of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: HARRY TRUMAN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AS JACKSONIAN 
MACHO COWBOYS 
The presentation of George W. Bush as a cowboy is another aspect in the discontinuity 
research. Melby promote Bush as a macho president, one who embraced the pure western 
style. The Norwegian researcher compares the president with Gary Cooper`s sheriff-role in 
the movie “High Noon.” As Melby writes: “Bush is the tough sheriff who faces the bad guys 
alone” (Melby 2004:44). By using the metaphor ”cowboy” Melby provides several 
connotations to the readers. Many of these are typical Jacksonian values such as, simple, 
honest, natural, violent, guns, individualism, toughness and revenge.  
During the presidency Bush sounded like a cowboy from a traditional western movie with 
some of his formulations. Statements like,”I`m a gut player” and “This is an enemy that runs 
and hides, but won`t be able to hide forever” (Woodward 2003:41), are all representative for 
the populistic Jacksonian tradition. “The others” are regarded as cowards who can be hunted 
down by instincts. Daalder and Lindsay are mentioning the same features as Melby. They put 
it like this: “Bush was “a doer”, not “a thinker”, his natural element was action, not analysis” 
(Daalder and Lindsay 2004:35). They refer to the slogan “Take `em out” as an example on the 
cowboy rhetoric (Daalder and Lindsay 2004:40).  
These researchers are building up the same image of the President as the media did, by 
arguing that Bush was simple and had a more violent behavior than any president before him. 
Is it possible to object to whether these are fair descriptions? Can we place the responsibility 
for the American tough and simple attitude at the feet of a particular President? Charging 
Bush with responsibility for militaristic and populistic tendencies of present day U.S. foreign 
policy makes perhaps as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) responsible for 
the great depression. Is it possible to relate the same macho type, simple, and plain-speaking 
attitude to Harry S. Truman?  
According to the anthropologist Thomas Hylland Erikssen, this is an opportunity that must 
not be ruled out. Hylland Eriksen claims that tough attitude has deep roots in the American 
history. This is because president`s wants to show the people that they are presidential macho 
men, men who protect people against aggression (Eide and Ottosen 2002:220-23).  
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There may of course be discussions on how tough Truman was in his style, but to characterize 
his policies as soft is as we have seen a claim taken far from reality.  
Let us take a look at the historical context, some speeches and statements and see whether 
Truman is comparable to Bush when it comes to being a plain-speaking Jacksonian cowboy. 
This part will focus on the following thematically subject:  
5.1 The Transition: Roosevelt to Truman. 
5.2 The Potsdam Conference and Meeting Molotov 
5.3 Wild West Macho-Men: Protecting The People. 
5.4 Confronting Idealism Without Strength 
 
5.1 The Transition: Roosevelt to Truman 
As Roosevelt`s successor, Truman has been critized for being one of the originator of the 
conflict between the United States and Russia (Williams Applemann Williams 1988). This 
subject is a matter of debate. On one hand, Truman warned that once the war was over the 
United States could be facing a situation more dangerous than ever before. Truman was 
worried that Stalin would become another Hitler (Nye 2007:125). It is possible to object 
against a presentation like this. Some saw Truman as the man who saved the world from the 
oppressive communism. According to Robert Ferrell, Truman was a hero with principled 
leadership (Ferrell 1984:8). Some would even argue that he laid the foundations for a policy 
that saved the world from a Third World War (Kirkendall 2004:6).  
I cannot go into this extensive historical debate that is largely a struggle between traditionalist 
and revisionist historians. But through looking at speeches, statements and the historical 
context, it is possible to see whether Truman is somewhat different from Bush in promoting 
Jacksonian masculinity. Truman wanted on one hand friendship with the Russians. He told 
early on in his presidency that his intention was to: “continue both the foreign and the 
domestic policy of the Roosevelt Administration” (Miscamble 2007:1). How effectively 
Truman held this promise has been a subject of intense discussion ever since. However, there 
are indications that the President wanted to get along with Stalin.  
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He stated early on in his presidency: “I like Stalin. He`s straightforward. He knows what he 
wants and will compromise when he can” (Leffler 2007:43). As the results of the negotiations 
stalled, Truman became frustrated (Godbolt 1994:64-5). He then expressed about the Soviets: 
“I hope I never have to hold another conference with them” (Keyes 1995:48).  
It didn’t take a long time before a series of frustrating reverses overcame American illusions 
that the war had eliminated threats to freedom. Disagreements over Germany, Austria, and 
Japan arose quickly, and Russian pressure on Iran, Greece and Turkey mounted strongly. 
Several of Truman`s advisers, such as the secretary of the Navy, James F. Forrestal, Admiral 
William Leahy, the chief of staff Dean Acheson, and foreign minister James F. Byrnes wanted 
the President to take a tougher stand against the Russians (Leffler 2007:41).  
Harry Truman had no experience in dealing with Russia. He had no background in foreign 
policy. He then became known for what he called his tough methods (Patterson 1988:38). 
This lack of diplomatic experiences is a common feature Truman has with Bush. It is likely 
that uncertainty in itself can explain their eagerness in demonstrating toughness. Roughness 
can cover up intellectual weaknesses, or lack of experience. It can be discussed to what extent 
Truman disliked communists, but it would be a failure to ignore his skepticism. Just like 
Andrew Jackson disliked Indians, Bush hated terrorists, Truman was very skeptical to 
communists.  
Even though George Elsey in my interview underlined that Truman did not hate communism 
(Interview George Elsey 6th January 2010), it is unlikely that the President had any sense for 
communists. During World War II he stated this cynical view: “If we see that Germany is 
winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany 
and in that way let them kill as many as possible” (Gaddis 2005:4). To Truman`s defence, he 
was not president only a senator at this time.  
However, the statement provides a great deal of information about his attitude. The statement 
expressed an “extreme violent Jacksonian” mentality against all totalitarian systems. While 
Roosevelt had underestimated Stalin`s experience as a geopolitical strategist, Truman did not 
make the same mistake (Gaddis: 2007). As John Lewis Gaddis writes, the new President had a 
healthy skepticism toward all totalitarian states (Gaddis 2005:16). Before Potsdam, Truman 
said: 
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 “We must stand up to the Russians at this point and we must not be too easy with them” 
(Miscamble 2007:97). At the Potsdam Conference Truman held his word. He also did the 
same when he met Molotov. 
5.2 The Potsdam Conference and Meeting Molotov 
After the war, the winning nations came to discuss Europe’s future in Potsdam. Truman`s far 
harder stance against the Soviet Union can be found already at this conference. He confronted 
Stalin with a theme Roosevelt had avoided, the Polish mass-graves known as the Katyn 
Massacre (Miscamble 2007:53). The President told also Stalin that the USA had developed a 
powerful new weapon. After a meeting, he took Stalin aside and informed him about the 
existence of the atomic bomb by saying: “We have a weapon of unusual destructive force” 
(McCullough 1992:442). Stalin considered this information as an attempt to intimidate 
(Kissinger 1994:435). After the conference Truman boasted in pure western style that he: 
“Gave the boys an earful and took `em for a ride” (Patterson 1988:38).  
Also, George W. Bush boasted of his foreign policy. When the Americans captured Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, Bush declared that the USA had: “Locked a tyrant in prison” (King/Edwards 
2007:154). After the Potsdam Conference, the Secretary of War Henry Stimson (1867-1950) 
told that Truman bossed during the meeting with the Russians (Patterson 1988:38). Later on, 
Truman ordered that the atomic bomb should be dropped over Hiroshima, and then Nagasaki. 
These actions demonstrated great American power. It confirmed that enemies to America 
would pay a high price for their aggression.  
If it can be argued that Truman was a macho-cowboy, the best evidence is likely to be found 
in his meeting with the Soviet foreign minister Vjatsjeslav Molotov (1890-1986). When the 
Soviet foreign minister passed through Washington in April 1945, on his way to the San 
Francisco Conference of the United Nations, Truman expressed that: ”Molotov should stop by 
and pay his respect for the president of the United States” (McCullough 1992:362). In the 
meeting with Molotov, the President used a direct style. Such as when Molotov said that the 
Poles had been working against the red army, Truman cut him short and told the Russian 
foreign secretary that he was not interested in propaganda (McCullough 1992:375).  
Truman stated that the Kremlin had to comply with its wartime agreements, get rid of 
communist government and repression in Poland, and establish a government that was 
representative to the Polish people. Molotov declared:  
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”I have never been talked to like that in my life.” Truman replied:”Carry out your agreements 
and you won`t get talked to like that” (Alperovitz 1995:108-09).  
After the meeting Truman boasted about giving the Russian foreign minister, a “straight one-
to-three to the jaw” (Patterson 1988:38). In retrospect, Truman`s behaviour at this meeting 
was a failure. Even the hard-liner, Avirell Harriman would regret that Truman went at it quite 
hard (McCullough 1992:376).  
The result of the meeting was that Molotov told Stalin that the U.S. had altered their foreign 
policy. That the Americans are becoming more aggressive. Although it is likely that an 
insulted Molotov exaggerated the change in American policy, he was not completely wrong 
when he delivered the message to Stalin. Not long after the meeting Truman gave the 
Russians the following macho ultimatum in proclaiming: ”If the Russian did not want to 
cooperate, they could go to hell” (McCullough 1992:374).  
This is a typical Jacksonian rhetoric. The message is clear, aggressive and simple in its form. 
Under Truman many were worried about the negative effects of his macho rhetoric. The 
President received a diverse set of critics. Among those,  the diplomat George F. Kennan, the 
journalist Walter Lippman, the political scientist Hans Morgenthau, politicians of the left and 
right, like Henry A. Wallace and Robert A. Taft (Patterson 1988:35). Commonly, these critics 
were that they all questioned the Presidents simple and careless rhetoric. Ambassador 
Harriman disliked the president`s slam-bang manner. His rhetoric was inappropriate and ill-fit 
in a diplomatic setting. It was little to gain politically in comparing Molotov with a “mutton 
head” (Keyser 1995:12).  
Also George W. Bush received criticism from both international liberalists such as Senator 
Tom A Daschle as well as conservative realists such as Brent Scowcroft. Many disliked the 
President`s aggressive behaviour toward Putin and Chirac (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:90 on 
Daschle. on Scowcroft 124).  
Another perspective in the cowboy rhetoric is being ”a doer.” Melby, Daalder and Lindsay 
mentioned several times that Bush was ”a doer” in international politics. He simplified the 
threat from ”the others” and acted like a ”man of action” (Melby 2004:18,87. Daalder and 
Lindsay 2005:35,185). Was Bush the only ”doer” in American policy? First of all, it can be 
said that both president`s exaggerated the image of  ”the others” as a threat, and in doing so, 
they can be compared as ”doers”, not ”thinkers” in foreign policy (Patterson 1988:36).   
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If we focus on their election campaigns, it appears that Truman also wanted to build an image 
of himself as a “macho man.” 
 5.3 Wild West Macho-Men: Protecting the People 
The philosopher Thomas Hobbes pointed out the following in the seventeenth century: There 
is no community, no authority, and no law. Hobbes claimed further that people always live in 
a state of continual fear of danger (Nye 2007:12). In a hobistic spirit it is often said that a head 
of state who is not able to protect his people has failed as a leader. Keeping people safe in 
their homes is one of the basic principles for a political leader. In some of the first 
communities humanity was bounded together by a desire to achieve protection against 
threatening elements. A lot of people have given up their sovereignty and independence 
during history, all in order to achieve security. In ancient and medieval times people gave 
great men and kings political support, food and money in exchange for protection. Feudalism 
can serve as an example of this system.  
Even in modern history people have transferred legislative power to military leaders in order 
to achieve security. With this perspective it is possible to argue that this kind of thinking is 
not extricated yet. Despite the fact that we today have some agencies that can regulate states 
behavior, states are still the most important part in the international scene. In order to create 
and establish peace, states still need to behave in a power seeking way. As with states, 
president`s also want to create images of themselves as macho. Being strong men who can 
protect the people in difficult times will give the leaders power and trust. As Bush said it: 
”I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I 
will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the 
American people” (http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html). 
Bush will do his job in protecting the American people just like a sheriff protected his 
hometown in the Wild West. In doing the sheriff`s job, he described himself as” a doer”, not 
”a thinker.” This image Bush strengthens by proclaiming: ”Some worried that the United 
States has lost its edge. My job is to make sure that that blade is sharp.” And: ”I`m the 
commander – see, I don’t need to explain- I do not need to explain why I say things. That`s 
the interesting thing about being the President” (Woodward 2003:146-47). 
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What about Harry S. Truman? In one of his most famous sayings: ”Buck stops here”, he is 
expressing much of the same mentality as Bush. The expression has its origins from a game of 
poker. If the player did not wish to deal he could pass the responsibility by passing the 
"buck", as the counter is called to the next player.  
In foreign policy, Truman saw this transferring of responsibility as a cowardly move.  The 
President took his responsibility seriously: ”I am here to make decisions and whether they 
prove to be right or wrong I am going to make them” (McCullough 1992:384).  
This image building has a purpose. A strong leader is someone that can arouse confidence in 
turbulent times. Under Bush, this image of an action macho-man is heavily expressed in the 
election campaign speeches. In presidential campaign speech in Ohio October 27th 2004 Bush 
declared that: ”Remind them, If they want a safer America, and a stronger America and a 
better America, put me and Dick Cheney back in office.” In the same speech Bush gave the 
audience the following promise: 
”The most solemn duty of the American president is to protect the American people. If 
America shows uncertainty or weakness in this decade, the world will drift toward 
tragedy. This will not happen on my watch” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_oct27.html).  
In several speeches during the election campaign, Bush was promoting an image of himself as 
a strong man, while his opponent was characterized as a weak leader, one that will not do 
whatever it takes to secure the American people. Bush gave rhetorical jabs to his opponent 
John Kerry, he argued: ”My opponent`s views would make America less secure and the world 
more dangerous” (http://presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_oct18.html). 
In Truman`s famous Whistle-stop Campaign in 1948 where he defeated the republican 
Thomas Dewey, there are several rhetorical links to Bush. The Norwegian historian Hans 
Olav Lahlum has described Truman`s 1948 campaign as strongly anti-communistic (Lahlum 
2008:376). In one way this seems to be a strong ”charge.” But, it is not a completely 
inappropriate term either.  
Mainly there are two reasons for arguing for links between Bush and Truman`s anti-”the 
others” attitudes in the election campaigns. First, Truman used a tough Bush like rhetoric 
against his opponent in Oklahoma City 28th September, 1948:  
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”Their (Republicans) reactionary policies will lead to the confusion and strife on which 
communism trives” (www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965).  
Or as he said shortly afterward in Michigan 6th September 1948:  ”You can choose the 
Republican party and live in fear” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1797).  
In these speeches, he told the American people that they are safe because of his solid policy 
against communism. Second, Truman has in common with Bush an eagerness in promoting 
himself as the man with the solutions on how to stop ”the others.” In a speech in Iowa 18th  
September 1948, he told the audience the following:  
”The abundant harvest of this country is helping to save the world from communism. 
Communism thrives on human misery. And the crops you are producing are driving 
back the tide of misery in many lands.”  
In Indiana October 15th 1948, Truman promoted an image of himself as a good leader, 
fighting against a new depression. Among the anti-communistic voices in American politics it 
was important to avoid a depression because the communist ideology could not succeed. The 
communists were predicting that the capitalistic system would break down. In this context 
Truman explained that: 
”The thing that would help the communists is having a depression. That is what I have 
trying to prevent.” (…) 
”The Communists don`t think I`m helping them. They don`t want me to be the 
President of the United States. They are doing all they can in this election to bring a 
Republican victory” 
(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1990). 
There are common features, but the president`s are not identical in their styles. In Truman`s 
election speeches he is not very concerned with foreign policy issues. As opposed to Bush, 
Truman has a much greater focus on the domestic policy in his speeches. Although the 
existence of some anti-communistic rhetoric, condemning communism, was not the main 
focus in Truman many rural campaign speeches. As George Elsey told in the interview, 
Truman focused on domestic matters because those were the issues in the campaign that 
would be won or lost (Interview George Elsey, February 14th January 2010).  
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In this campaign, Elsey wrote some of the speeches, and as he said the content is about 
avoiding a new depression, getting health insurance, jobs, the right farmers, housing prices 
and dealing with the Unions, not attacking communism.  
George W. Bush on the other hand, had a stronger focus on ”the others.” In the comparison 
between the campaign speech, Bush communicated a more aggressive message. He applied 
terms like: terrorists, enemies, tyrants and dictators in describing “the others”.  
However, mentioning ”the others” more frequently than before is not synonymous with the 
USA becoming more violent or aggressive under Bush. In a globalized world, it is not a 
surprise that Bush in a larger degree was oriented toward the global enemy. Under the Cold 
War and in the 90`s, the U.S. voters were never very interested in foreign policy issues (Holsti 
2004:281). Why then talk about international relations to the voters? In today`s globalized 
world, after the terror attack on the U.S. soil, this low interest in foreign policy is likely under 
change.  
Despite differences in their level on focusing on ”the others”, there are clearly similarities 
outside these election campaigns. Promoting an image as ”a doer” and not “a thinker” is a 
popular image among some leaders. Being ”a doer” is a typical Jacksonian feature. A man of 
action often embraces being ”a doer.” This is probably the reason why Truman stated so 
clearly that his speeches had to be clear and: ”free of hesitation and double talk” (McCullough 
1992: 546). A clear style and action are signs of strength for both of them. The plain talk 
avoids pretense, which these president`s disliked. It also helps equalize the distance between 
them and their audience. The purpose is to convey information in a direct understandable way 
to the American people. 
As Truman stated: ”the simplest words make for the best communication” (Keyes 1995:26). 
The president`s straight-ahead way to speech is a part of the anti-intellectual mentality in the 
Jacksonian tradition. With an informal style, without taking considerations to the diplomatic 
setting, these president`s provoked the international community.  
But, as seen above, Truman and Bush are not identical as macho cowboys. Truman acted in a 
way less macho. He received criticism for being too soft on communism. After the 
communism expanded geographically, some wanted a stronger stand against ”the red danger”.  
 
 
 
114 
 
These hard-liners, or “extreme Jacksonians”, meant that Truman`s foreign policy towards 
Russia, China and North Korea was a policy of weakness. Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908-
1957) attacked the administration and accused it for being communistic. 
The discontinuity research has a solid reason to promote George W. Bush as a unique Wild 
West Cowboy. It can be argued that Bush expressed a clearer Wild West Macho concept than 
Truman. The President directly expressed Wild West formulations by telling that: 
 ”There`s an old poster out West, as I recall, that said, Wanted Dead or Alive” (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2005:93). Another example is an interview with CNN in 2001. In this interview Bush 
said: 
“If you cough him up and his people today we`ll reconsider what we`re doing to your 
country. You still have a second chance. Just bring him in, and bring his leaders and 
lieutenants and other thugs and criminal with him” (Woodwaard 2003:235).  
By these examples, Bush builds up a dominant notion of the United States taken from popular 
culture as a country of cowboys. The enemies get an ultimatum before they are being 
attacked. This tough style is not surprising. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen explains: the macho 
symbolic words by Bush is a response toward toughness of  ”the others”. Eriksen also claimed 
that two macho cultures were clashing after 9/11 (Eide and Ottosen 2002:227-28).  
On the other hand, we should not overestimate the revolutionary aspects of Bush in macho-
rhetoric. It is not the first time macho cultures have clashed. Truman was under pressure from 
“extreme Jacksonians” he probably knew that he had to be tougher than his predecessors in 
negotiating with the “iron man” Stalin. Perhaps this is why he is often characterized as a 
cowboy? His biographer David McCullough is concerned about promoting Truman as an 
”iron man”, a typical Jacksonian oriented president with a simple plain style (McCullough 
1992:724). Many Americans in the 50`s saw Truman as the man on the horseback, a strong 
cowboy whom folks turned to in times of national danger (McCullough1992:608).  
Merlyn Leffler writes that Truman was a simple, straightforward man. A man with great faith 
in America`s moral superiority (Leffler 1992:26). These descriptions sound familiar in 
relation to Bush. Despite that Bush seems to be more aggressive toward ”the others” in his 
election campaign, it can be discussed whether it represented a revolution. By comparing 
these president`s macho-style, Bush does not represent a total upheaval.  
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Actually, both embraced the tough hard-line. Their anti-ideal appears to be ”weak idealism”. 
By this, I mean idealism without the supporting of hard power.  
5.4 Confronting Idealism Without Strength 
In a historical perspective, it is common for Truman and Bush that they took over after 
president`s who were accused of naive politics toward “the others”. Roosevelt has been 
accused of a naive approach to post-war planning.  
It`s been said that he placed too much faith in, or underestimated Stalin, while Bill Clinton 
were said to be too soft on China, Russia and al Qaida (Nye 2007:120). In this context, the 
president`s made use of a Jacksonian Wild West macho rhetoric against their common anti-
deal, “idealism without strength”. Truman confronted idealism in dealing with Henry 
Wallace; Bush did nearly the same in critizing Clinton’s presidency. Let us start with 
Truman`s disagreement with the old New Dealer, Henry Wallace (1888-1965).  
Henry Wallace was an intellectual, spoke Russian and in 1940 Roosevelt choose this liberal as 
his vice president. He ran for president in 1948 claiming no containment of the Soviet Union 
was necessary (Kaufman 2007:16). Under Truman he served as minister of agriculture. Many 
admired Wallace, but some also feared him for his mild attitude in foreign affairs. Wallace 
urged a return to what he viewed as Roosevelt`s policy (Kissinger 1994:464). He directly 
criticized Truman`s politics for being without moral, a foreign policy based on Machiavellian 
principles of force and distrust (Kissinger 1994:468). Truman saw this man as an idealistic 
pacifist (McCullough 1992:517). 
When Henry Wallace started to talk about the tougher Americans get to the Russians, the 
tougher they get to the Americans, he should soon experience that his president had a totally 
different view. Truman said:  
“Since the language of military power was the only language the Russians understood, 
it was necessary that the United States maintain sufficient military strength to confine 
Soviet influence” (McCullough 1992:544). 
The disagreement between Wallace and Truman became so problematic that Wallace, the 
minister of agriculture, had to resign from the Truman-administration in 1946. Over 50 years 
later Bush attacked the Clinton administration for the same reason, accusing it for idealistic 
cowardice (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:37).  
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Bill Clinton (1946-) who had invested a great deal of political capital on the success of his 
Middle-East peace efforts ended up being disappointed (Clinton 2004:747-48). Bush drew a 
lesson from this. He critized Clinton for appeasing terrorist leaders. According to Bush, the 
U.S. had to deal with these guys in a tough manner without illusions (Daalder and Lindsay 
2005:38). If we include Truman`s behavior at Potsdam, the meeting with Molotov and the 
firing of Wallace, and the Bush behavior in ”hunting down the terrorist”, it is reasonable to 
claim that these two in best western style regarded idealism as weakness.  
Both president`s proclaimed this clearly, Truman by arguing: ”The will to peace must be 
backed by strength for peace. We must be prepared to pay the price for peace” (McCullough 
1992:608).  
Bush also declared: ”We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We 
cannot put our faith in the words of tyrants” 
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html).  
It appears that the Jacksonian macho rhetoric was not intervented by Bush. Just like in the 
Wild West, the presidents thought they had to operate in a hostile environment. They 
probably did believe that the world was a dangerous place, a nearly hobbisian world where 
there is anarchy and violence around every corner. In this world you have to be strong in 
order to survive. The mentality is likely comparable with the one Winston Churchill had 
under World War II. Churchill told the parliament that there had to be no negotiation with the 
Nazis. Only a hard confrontation line was appropriate in dealing with Hitler.  
The Western myth is brutal in itself. It is based on a mentality saying, the only way to fight 
evil is to meet it with direct confrontations. If the U.S. interests had been attacked without 
any direct response, Truman and Bush would likely have been seen as weak idealists 
comparable to Neville Chamberlain (Weisman 2008:237). Therefore Henry Kissinger argues 
that in 1946 Truman launched a get- tough policy by successfully demanding Soviet`s 
evacuation of Azerbaijan (Kissinger 1994:446). The president`s went so far in their rhetoric 
that it is fair to characterize them as cowboys. In a pure western style they wanted the enemy 
destroyed. When Kissinger once asked Truman which foreign policy decision he wanted to be 
remembered for, he did not hesitate to tell in a Wild West manner: “We completely defeated 
our enemies and made them surrender” (Kissinger 1994:425). 
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5.5 SUMMARY CHAPTER 5 
The presentation of George W. Bush as a cowboy is another aspect in the discontinuity 
research. During the presidency Bush sounded like a cowboy from a traditional western 
movie with some of his formulations. This chapter has debated whether George W. Bush can 
be seen as the only cowboy in American history. Little suggests that we can label Bush as a 
revolutionary macho cowboy.  
It is possible to relate the same macho type, simple, and plain-speaking attitude to Harry S. 
Truman. As we have seen, Truman went further with his tough macho style. Before the 
Korean War, he said that the communists had to learn that they would pay a price for 
aggression. Bush gave the same message to terrorists or states he thought had connection with 
terrorists. In meeting with challengences they made use of a hard-line macho rhetoric. Bush 
escalated the hard-line macho rhetoric after 9/11. Truman did so in 1948, in response to an 
aggressive communism.  
Truman`s behavior as leader after FDR`s death, the Potsdam Conference, in the meeting with 
Molotov, the firing of Henry Wallace and as a leader trying to protect the people, can be 
described as aggressive. Much of the rhetoric is typical Jacksonian. The message is clear, 
aggressive and simple in its form. As with Bush, many under Truman were worried about the 
negative effects of his macho rhetoric. 
Both president`s exaggerated the image of  ”the others” as a threat, and in doing so, they can 
be compared as ”doers”, not ”thinkers” in foreign policy. In their election campaigns, it 
appears that they tried to build images as “macho men”. In this context they made use of 
Jacksonian Wild West macho rhetoric against their common anti-deal, “idealism without 
strength”.  
Looking at it through historical glasses, we have to admit that America has a tendency to 
romanticize using military power to defeate enemies, this most likely regardless of who`s 
president.   
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Among internationally oriented researchers, there are ongoing debates about the concept of 
continuity and discontinuity in American foreign policy. This research has focused on 
whether Bush`s rhetoric can be seen as radical new or as a traditional element in American 
foreign policy. As one representative for the discontinuity research Sven Melby is pretty clear 
in arguing that Bush represented a revolution. He places himself among researchers such as 
Daalder/ Lindsay, Peter Singer, Edwards and King. In Melby`s reader-friendly, “The Bush 
Revolution In American Foreign Policy” and in the more scientific research report 
“Hegemonens Hamskifte”, he provides the following three arguments for seeing Bush as a 
new element: 
1) The President`s dualism: Bush perceived the world as a struggle between good and evil 
spheres. He was more moral and religious oriented than previous presidents. His rhetoric was 
simple and religious. The image of “the others” was simplified. “We are good, “the others” 
are evil. Stereotypes were being created. “The others” were compared with Nazis and devils. 
The speech to the Congress 20th September 2001, in which Bush describes the world in terms 
of black and white, was highly dualistic. 
2) The President`s approach in meeting with “the others”: Melby refers frequently to the West 
Point 20th January 2002 speech. In this speech Bush proclaimed a global warfare against “the 
others.” With this speech, as the leader of the world`s most powerful empire, Bush is 
characterized as an aggressive head of state. An anti-realist who left Truman`s defensive 
policy of containment. Particular formulations referring to preemptive warfare were seen as a 
radical element.      
3) The President`s macho cowboy rhetoric: Melby recurrently refers to Bush as a simple 
straight talking president. Bush is portrayed as an anti-intellectual, “a doer”, not “a thinker” in 
American politics. He acted more out of emotion than rationality. With Wild Western 
statements such as: “I`m a gut player, Hunt `em down, and “take `em out”, he provoked the 
international community in a larger scale than any President before him.  
Not all agrees to a presentation like this one. Researchers such as Melvyn P. Leffler, John 
Lewis Gaddis, Robert Kagan and Walter Russel Mead argue more for continuity.  
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Walter Russell Mead operates with four traditions in American policy. According to Mead, 
these traditions were present under Bush. These traditions are: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, 
Wilsonian, and Jacksonian. The traditions are according to Mead always present in American 
politics. Two of these have been highlighted in my research: the Wilsonian and Jacksonian. 
The Wilsonian tradition demands an active American involvement in the world. Democracy 
and freedom should be spread to all people over the world. The U.S. has a moral obligation. 
The Jacksonian prefer American values such as toughness, conservativism, liberalism and 
simplicity.  
Bush`s rhetoric was aggressive. With his polarization of the world into good and evil spheres, 
he must carry much of the responsibility for his hawkish image. Statements like: “Axis of 
evil”, “Hunt them down”, “Crusade for freedom”, speak for themselves. But looking at it 
historically, it can be discussed whether Bush`s sharp tone was a new phenomenon in 
American politics.  
In searching for answers, this research has investigated presidential speeches and statements 
from two American president`s by focusing on time of crisis. The controversial Harry S. 
Truman has been compared with George W. Bush, and the discontinuity research has been 
controlled against the Wilsonian and Jacksonian typologies. With this as a basis, I had the 
following thesis to relate to:  
1) Is it so that George W. Bush represented radically new elements in his speeches in relation 
to “the others”, compared with Harry S. Truman? Or is it possible to talk about historical 
continuity in the U.S policy in this area?  
2) Are Bush and Truman members of the Wilsonian and Jacksonian tradition? And are they 
the same kind of Wilsonians and Jacksonians? 
Among some researchers Truman and Bush wouldn't normally be a subject of comparison. 
Some reacted negative when I chose to compare these two. Among some Truman is seen as 
the man that saved the world from a third world war, while others see him as an anti-
communistic hawk. In addition to a little unusual comparison, I added different aspects to 
Meads theory. Among other things I created my own additional theory into Mead`s theory. 
The Wilsonian and Jacksonian typologies turned out to be a bit narrow-minded “tyranny of 
the models” in explaining politics in practice. It needed some flexible aspects.  
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A Wilsonian is more than a peaceful dove. The tradition embraces peace, sometimes so much 
that some of them recognize promoting the “good society” by applying rough power.  
I have argued for a division between two types of Wilsonians, the “communicative” and the 
“war-hungry” one. Nor neither is the Jacksonian one coherent tradition. A Jacksonian admires 
toughness, but has different ways to demonstrate it. Not all Jacksonians want to go to war all 
over the world. I created a division between “the extreme Jacksonians” and “the moderate 
ones.” If Truman and Bush turned out to be representative for the same aspects and directions 
within this tradition, it could further strengthen the continuity claim.  
Perhaps it is too early for a historical verdict on George W. Bush. As the President himself 
said: “You can`t possibly figure out the history of the Bush presidency until I`m dead” 
(Draper 2007:1).  
However, it is not too soon for some nuances. Chapter three shows that the discontinuity 
research is promoting a nearly unhistorical reflection on Bush as a revolutionary dualistic 
president. It became clear early that dualism was not a unique feature with Bush. By 
introducing a short historical overview, many American presidents have promoted strong 
dualism in their speeches and statements. Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush turned out to 
be typical representatives for the Wilsonian tradition by dividing the world into good and evil 
societies. In speeches and statements, Bush painted the international scene in moral terms. 
Truman had the same kind of Wilsonian rhetoric, despite of the real political context of Cold 
War. Both shared a context of pressure. Bush with 9/11, Truman with expansive communism. 
In response to this they applied a dualistic rhetoric with the presence of dichotomy`s. Here are 
some of the utterances: 
“We”   “The others”: 
Democracy Autocracy. 
Freedom Slavery 
Peace  War 
Truth  Lies 
Wealth Poverty 
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By examining a wider aspects and variations among Wilsonians, Bush became more a 
traditional than a revolutionary politician. When Bush characterized “the others” as Nazis in 
his speech on 20th September 2001, there was nothing new in it.   
In a historical perspective, the term totalitarian was and still is the antithesis of American self-
image. It is an efficient metaphor against an enemy. If the enemies are perceived as evil as 
Nazis, they deserves no mercy.  
In rhetoric, it is a well-known trick to dehumanize your opponent in calling him/her a 
Fascist/Nazi. Truman did the same as Bush in several occasions. Stalin was promoted as a 
new type of Hitler. George Elsey underlined the same comparison in the interview. Under the 
Korean War, Truman said that communism acted just like Hitler had done. Both made use of 
words with negative historical connotations such as: dictatorship, evil, Nazi, Fascism, and 
they were warning the audience against a third world war. It can be argued that they abused 
the history in order to gain or defend certain political aims.  
As dualistic Wilsonians they agreed on the final result in history. The president`s said that 
their enemies will collapse because of their own greatness and “the others” weakness.   
In their main policy the doctrines, they are referring to the same terms. “The others” are 
“terrorists”, “totalitarians” and “aggressors.” In American politics, terrorists are often 
regarded as an unworthy opponent. The content in the doctrine is much about creating a battle 
between those who want freedom and those who “despise” freedom. In terms of dualism, the 
Truman doctrine is the Bush doctrine legacy.  
When it comes to Wilsonian dualism and religion, Bush was in a larger scale religious. But a 
religious and moralistic president in the U.S. is not a revolution. In meeting “the others” the 
historical context is different in this case. Bush spoke toward Muslims who believe in the 
same God as he did. Communism on the other hand has a tense relationship to all kind of 
religions. In his speeches, Bush took religion seriously. He tried to avoid using specific 
Christian terms. Bush did not want to provoke the Muslim world. He surprisingly gave 
several nuances in his presentation of “the others”.  
It is doubtful that the President was a keen admirer of Islamic faith, but he stated cynically 
that the problem was not Islam, let alone in religious faith itself, the case was that some 
extremists had misinterpreted their own religion. In Bush`s rhetoric not all Muslims are 
promoted as Americas enemies.  
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This is opposite to Harry Truman`s use of religion. The former Missouri Senator was 
employing religion to create a diversion between the U.S. and the communists. Truman stated 
that communists were infidels and could not be trusted. In the Korean War he stated that the 
devil was loose. Early on in his presidency he also made it clear that he did not want any 
compromises with the evil.  
In the next aspect, the Wilsonians and creators of stereotypes, the dividing of the world into 
good and evil spheres is not a new phenomenon with George W. Bush. Both followed a 
cultural tradition closely linked to Edward Said`s theory of “us” and “them”.  
There is nothing revolutionary about characterizing somebody as evil monsters in the U.S. It 
is part of a historical technique in dehumanizing an enemy. History shows that it is unifying to 
construct a clear image of an enemy. Truman and Bush were aware of this by telling that “the 
others” were barbarians, children and underdeveloped as people. By doing this, the 
president`s overlooked the complexity in cultures. Gaining a certain purpose was likely more 
important than the accurate description of the reality.  
In examining the Wilsonian rhetoric, I argued that American president`s often tried to 
promote a Pax Americana. Democracy protected by hard power is often seen as the road to 
peace in American politics. Isolationism is seen as the road to war. Bush and Truman act both 
as strict fathers who wanted to raise “the others”, and teach them how to behave. This “we 
know best mentality” is a dangerous path to follow. It irritates people and leads to a 
camouflaged imperialism. In the rhetoric the president`s appears with nationalistic 
formulations. They stated that “the others” hates the U.S. because the nation was successful.  
In asking whether these are the same Wilsonians or not, Bush turned out to be a “war-hungry 
Wilsonian”. But Bush was not alone in promoting morality with guns. The American empire 
has for a long time; sought to impose peace upon the world by using hard force. In the U.S. 
history it is much easier to find war-hungry Wilsonians than the communicative ones. After 
9/11 Bush said it was hopeless to deal with fanatic terrorists. How does one negotiate with a 
shadow willing to sacrifice his own life?  
After World War II, Truman had a hard time trying to deal with Stalin. Much indicates that he 
lost a lot of confidence in communicating with the Russians. He responded to the Russian 
stubbornness by tightening the grip. As he once expressed: 
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 “If the Russians did not want to cooperate, they could go to hell” (McCullough 1992:374). In 
my sources, Truman told in a “war-hungry Wilsonian” way that he was willing to fight for 
peace.  
Truman`s image as “the defender of the free world” is one of the reasons why Bush admired 
him. By including a historical context, the picture becomes more complicated. Even though 
they talked like “war-hungry Wilsonians” they had to balance between these two types of 
Wilsonians. In a Cold War context with nuclear weapons, Truman was on one side careful. 
On several occasions he spoke as a “communicative Wilsonian” by declaring that he wanted 
no war. Communicating with “the others” was fronted as an ideal.  
On the other side, Truman became a highly unpopular wartime leader. As the Russian 
communism became more expansive, Truman continued to promote “war-hungry Wilsonian” 
rhetoric by arguing that: “The will to peace must be backed by strength for peace. We must be 
prepared to pay the price for peace” (McCullough 1992:608).  
But George W. Bush cannot be categorized as a one hundred percent “war-hungry 
Wilsonian”. He relied on communicative and defensive political rhetoric toward states such as 
China, North-Korea and Saudi Arabia. The most radical element in Bush as a dualistic 
president came when he referred to the term crusade in a public speech. This is a word loaded 
with negative historical connotations toward people in the Middle-East. In this case, Bush 
differs from Truman as a more dualistic war-hungry Wilsonian president. However, those 
who saw Bush`s moralistic rhetoric as a new element, should not overlook the fact that both 
Truman and even today’s President Barack Obama embraces vital parts of Bush freedom 
rhetoric. 
Under the Bush presidency, there was a resurrection of classical Cold War rhetoric. The 
competition between liberalism and autocracy was making a comeback under Bush. 
Communism has passed from the scene, but powerful challenges to democracy have not. 
Little suggests that “end of history” was closer under Bush. By examining the rhetoric, it is 
more a “return to history”. 
Both Bush and Truman lead an incredible powerful nation in their time as president`s. This 
gave the “war-hungry Wilsonians” solid opportunities to manoeuvre at the international stage.   
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But there is a huge difference; the Europeans needed the American presence more in Truman 
period, than under Bush. This means that it is was easier to take a stand against the U.S. under 
Bush`s period.   
Chapter four shows that both can be promoted as Jacksonian president`s. Although the level 
of Jacksonian style under Truman`s presidency can be debated, he had a tough rhetoric.  
The Russians were promoted as corrupt, liars, criminals, reds, devils, and as a pigheaded, 
imperialistic and repressed people. George W. Bush followed the same track by telling that he 
was “pissed off” and that he wanted to “kick some ass”. The terrorists were evil parasites.  
Truman and Bush are plain spoken. They appeared as typical representatives for Jacksonian 
simplistic form, two ordinary men with connection to the “Heartland America”. Whether they 
are the same Jacksonians can be debated. This thesis has given a short historical overview on 
the two types of Jacksonians in American politics.  
Explaining American politics based on the extreme and moderate Jacksonian typology, cannot 
explain all features in the U.S foreign policy. But the division can explain that some 
Jacksonians are more violent and aggressive than others. Both are representing violent 
attitudes, but the extreme ones have smaller limitations.  
In focusing on the doctrinal methods in dealing with “the others”, Bush turned out to be a new 
element with his preemptive strike talk in the West Point speech. Promoting the containment 
policy as an old fashioned way to deal with menacing elements is aggressive in an “extreme 
Jacksonian” tradition. At this point, Truman was not as clear as Bush. But it is not a 
revolution in terms of a total upheaval. Empirical history shows that there is little new about 
using a preemptive warfare rhetoric. Bush is not the only Jacksonian president who has 
ignored international laws. There are many cases where the U.S. has overlooked the UN.  
The new elements in Bush`s rhetoric was that he made the term public. By making 
preemptive action public the U.S. appeared unilateral and arrogant. In this case, the 
discontinuity research was on to something, but it turns out wrong with the tendency to draw 
bold conclusions. Arguing that Bush took a Jacksonian farewell with Truman’s policy is an 
oversimplification. Promoting Truman`s foreign policy as defensive, and Bush as aggressive 
is incorrect based on my investigation and from my sources. Using the word expansionist in 
relation to Bush and interventionist on Truman is perhaps more a rhetorical trick than genuine 
research.  
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Although Bush had to deal with a stateless enemy there was not that nearly, dualistic 
difference between meeting “the others” now and then. As Bush, Truman had to deal with not 
only states, but also an anti-democratic ideological movement. The Truman-Doctrine had a 
global perspective in it: “Out and help suppressed people in the world”.  
Even Bush compared his enemies with the one from the days of the Cold War. The 
president`s global warfare politics can be found in Korea and Iraq.  
After the Soviet`s expansion in the late 40`s, a context of fear influenced Truman`s rhetoric. 
The same happened to Bush after 9/11. Paranoia and insecurity were the basis of normal life 
in these periods. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and 9/11, the climax of fear 
was reached. With the U.S. involvement in these situations these, “extreme Jacksonians” 
gained more power.  
Under the Korean War, Truman talked about applying nuclear weapons. He characterized the 
communists as red devils and communism as a Hitler-like ideology. Truman was “seeing 
red”. He was partly abandoning George F. Kennan`s moderate Jacksonian line, tripled the 
defence budget by improving the NSC-68 and started up a global warfare against 
communism. In an “extreme Jacksonian” manner Truman warned against a worldwide 
communist takeover. This rhetoric should later on lead to the domino theory telling that if 
aggression was allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of 
aggression elsewhere. This was a policy that lay the foundation for American dominance in 
the world at a global scale and the “extreme Jacksonians” warfare in places like Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos.  
Truman`s rhetoric under the Korean War shows that the policy of containment had a more 
complex nature than just being a moderate defensive real political strategy. Truman himself 
admitted that the American purpose was much broader than the containment policy. It also 
had an expansive element in its willingness to battle against communism on a global scale. 
While Truman warned against a worldwide communism conspiracy, Bush was speaking about 
a global network of terrorists. The President were telling in an “extreme Jacksonian” manner 
that the American`s freedom and freedom in the world, are dependent on each other.  
My sources illustrates that the president`s had to balance between a moderate and an extreme 
Jacksonian rhetoric. Under the Korean War, Truman became more “extreme Jacksonian” with 
his global perspective in confronting “the red danger”, but he never abandoned his “moderate 
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Jacksonian” position totally. The warfare in Korea was in addition to stopping the communist 
movement also promoted as a war for defending vital geopolitical areas. Truman did not want 
to expand the war by including China. He avoided using the term “war” on the situation. He 
also critized “extreme” Jacksonians such as Joseph McCarthy by calling him a “liar”.  
It would also be a mistake to regard George W. Bush as a one hundred percent “extreme 
Jacksonian.” He was not willing to do whatever it takes to secure the nation. He did not rush 
towards confrontation everywhere. He had to take a stand against some “extreme 
Jacksonians” arguing for the use of atomic bombs against Mecca. The fact that the U.S. has 
greater power does not mean it can impose its will on everyone.  
Truman belongs to the “extreme Jacksonians” in replacing earlier stereotypes of Russians as 
cooperative with pointing out that the U.S. needed a stronger stand against communistic 
conquests. Truman stated that if communist aggression was allowed to go unchallenged, it 
would mean a third world war. Rhetorically, Bush appears to be a more “extreme Jacksonian” 
than Truman. He is talking about preemptive warfare against “the others”. But it is not a 
revolution.  
In face of ideological conflicts, various similarities in foreign policy begin to appear. Both 
had to operate in a context of fear. They had to relate to what they saw as the “correct 
history”. Earlier history had taught them not to be too soft with dictators. The history of 
World War II and the soft dealing with Saddam and Bin Laden could not repeat itself. Actions 
of dictators had to meet consequences. The president`s had to respond in some way. The 
campaigning against “the others” required a strong Jacksonian leadership. This influenced 
their speeches and statements.  
A similar feature appears in chapter five. In this chapter I examined whether Bush was a 
revolutionary cowboy in American politics, or not. This in terms of being a radical simplistic 
and aggressive plain-speaking head of state. One who was not “a thinker” but “a doer” in 
dealing with “the others”.  
Bush had several statements that fit well into the Wild Western tradition. Statements such as: 
“take em out”, “I`m a gut player”, “wanted dead or alive” are expressions for this kind of 
tough western rhetoric. But we cannot lay the responsibility for American tough and simple 
attitude at the feet of a particular president. It makes as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover 
responsible for the great depression.  
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Harry S. Truman’s tone at Potsdam, in the meeting with Molotov, in the election campaign 
and in the dealing with Henry Wallace, is all evidence that the rough rhetoric has deep roots 
in American history. It is not without a reason both president`s have been critized for using a 
careless simplistic rhetoric. The president`s demanded speeches free of hesitations and double 
talk.  
To a homely audience, this was likely a smart move. In a diplomatic setting it was 
provocative.  They promoted an image of themselves as presidential macho-men and leaders 
who were able to protect the people against danger. They critized their predecessors weakness 
in dealing with “the others”. These features are not breathtaking if you take under 
consideration that the U.S. operates in a hobsitic world where danger is around every corner.  
If the U.S. interests had been attacked or threatened without any direct response, these 
presidents would have been regarded as weak leaders, comparable to Neville Chamberlain. 
An image little desirable in the Jacksonian Wild West tradition. “Men of action ” or ”doers” 
can arouse confidence in turbulent times. Being “a doer” or a cowboy is not an exclusive 
feature with Bush.  
Truman was in the 50`s seen as a man on the horseback. A leader people turned to in times of 
danger. Truman was expressing himself as a cowboy by telling that he gave: “the boys an 
earful” and a “straight one-two on the jaw”. With its imperial history, it is likely that America 
has a tendency to glorify using military power to defeat enemies nearly regardless of 
president.  
Final Comment 
By employing a historical perspective, Mead`s theory with new aspects and additional new 
theory in this paper, the discontinuity research is given little credit. However it should be 
stated that by applying different sources it is perhaps possible to gain a different result than 
what this research did. This research, based on speeches, shows that the discontinuity 
arguments overstated the radicalism in Bush`s presidency, especially in terms of being a 
revolutionary dualistic president.   
George W. Bush was not a revolutionary dualistic president. Actually, Truman is in a larger 
scale dualistic. He was promoting communism as totally opposite to everything the West 
stands for. Regardless of motivations, Bush is different in some cases.  
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But, Bush is a bit more aggressive as Jacksonians. He has a stronger belonging to the 
“extreme Jacksonians” than Truman, but he does not represent a total upheaval. Truman has 
also a foot inside the “extreme Jacksonians” direction.  
Much of Bush`s rhetoric resonates with traditional themes in American policy. Whatever 
future historians may say about Bush, one thing is clear: their verdict will hinge upon 
evolutions of the president`s tough style and war against terror.  
The major question is whether his foreign policy will succeed at the end. The answer to that is 
not given. We have to remember that history can take surprising turns. Truman was, when he 
resigned, rated as one of the weakest president`s in the U.S. history. After communism 
collapsed he was suddenly rated as one of the best president. What will be the final image on 
George W. Bush, still remains to see.  
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